May 11, 2022. Russian forces continued efforts to encircle Ukrainian positions in the Severodonetsk-Rubizhne-Lysychansk area but did not make any confirmed advances.
1. We still have not observed open-source evidence to support reports that Ukrainian forces recaptured Borshchova (Борщова), Slobozhanske (Слобожанське), Lyptsi (Липці), or Ternova (Тернова) in Kharkiv Oblast. To this end, Russian source Readkova claimed that Ukrainian forces...
are preparing a full-scale offensive for Kozacha Lopan and Tsupivka and that Russian forces are holding the line in Liptsy on May 11. (Source: t.me/readovkanews/3…)
2. We expanded assessed Russian advances to Velyka Komyshuvakha given Russian forces captured it on May 9. This approach likely came from the northeast from Izyum. (Sources:
3. We recessed Russian assessed advances across the Seversky Donetsk River from Pryvillia to Bilohorivka after Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian pontoon bridge to Bilohorivka on May 9. Sources:
4. We expanded Russian control to cover Polohy, Zaporizhzhia Oblast, based off reports of Russian occupation activities in the city. (Source: gur.gov.ua/content/vykrad…)
5. We mapped Hannivka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, as Ukrainian counteroffensives given Dnipropetrovsk Oblast officials stated on May 11 that Russian forces fired on Hannivka, indicating that RU forces no longer are in it. (Sources: t.me/dnipropetrovsk…; t.me/mykola_lukashu…)
We previously had not observed direct evidence that the known and immediately adjacent Ukrainian counteroffensives in northern Kherson liberated Hannivka and didn't want to make assumptions about the status of the village without evidence.
6. We are unable to verify Ramzan Kadyrov’s claims that Russian forces captured Voievodivka, the Zarya Chemical Plant, and other villages in Luhansk Oblast on May 11 at this time. (Unconfirmed claims: t.me/RKadyrov_95/20…; t.me/istorijaoruzij…; t.me/istorijaoruzij…)
7. The Ukrainian General Staff Report of 1800 May 11 confirmed that Ukrainian forces recaptured Pitomnik, as ISW mapped on May 10. (Source: facebook.com/GeneralStaff.u…)
8. Finally, the Kherson Oblast State Administration stated that Russian forces still occupy Petropavlivka, Chervone, Bilyaivka, and Ukrainika as of May 11, verifying ISW’s maps in this area. (Source: facebook.com/khoda.gov.ua/p…)
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There's a tremendous amount of disinformation about religious liberty in Ukraine. One of the key false axioms is that the the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC) is an independent religious organization that is being repressed by the Ukrainian government. The assertion that the UOC is an independent religious organization is false. It is an extension of the Russian state and an instrument of Russian hybrid warfare.
The UOC is the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church’s subordinate element in Ukraine.
The UOC MP provided material support for Russia’s initial invasion of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine in 2014. slovoproslovo.info/rosiyski-okupa…
Russian soldiers used UOC MP churches as military storage depots, garrisons, field hospitals, and even fighting positions during Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Ukraine's counterattack in Kupyansk is interesting for many reasons, including surfacing apparent problems and analytical challenges with assessing control of terrain in open-source war maps.
It inspired me to make the following meme and a short thread.🧵
Mapmakers now face a challenge when making maps based off geolocations. The methodology that many cartographers have is that a geolocated ground presence means control.
The problem is that the Russians caught on and began metagaming this methodology.
It’s well established that Russian forces use 2- or 3-man infiltration teams to push far beyond the Russian frontline into Ukrainian held territory. Their mission is to wait for more forces to consolidate a strong point that can be used to continue pushing forward. Infiltrators also sometimes wave a flag ostentatiously at a designated landmark in order to claim that Russian forces control a particular area. Russian forces did exactly this in Kupyansk, resulted with many maps showing that Russian forces exercised the same level of control in Kupyansk as they do in Mariupol.
The Russian geolocated presence in both locations is qualitatively different, of course. But many maps don't make that distinction and show both locations under the same shade of red.
Ukrainian forces have resumed offensive operations in Kursk and are confirmed to have made tactical advances within at least 300 meters of Berdin.
Quick thread on tracking tactical Ukrainian advances:
Fresh snowfall makes identifying tracks easier. Russian sources posted video on January 5 showing how Ukrainian mechanized vehicles are making distinctive dark marks on snowy white backdrops as they push forward across fields: t.me/RVvoenkor/83914
These vehicle tracks are visible from space. Satellite imagery collected on January 5 shows distinctive vehicle tracks in the snow on the way from Ukrainian forces’ previous positions near Cherkasskoe Porechnoe heading in the direction of Berdin.
Maxar collected a trove of new high-resolution satellite imagery showing the damage to Russian ammunition depots in western southern Russia. 📷@Maxar
Thread with much imagery.
Starting off with the before / after shots of the ammo storage buildings at the Oktyabrski depot.
Imagery of the destruction of probable missile cannisters at the Oktyabrski ammo depot.
At one location in the Toropets depot, a large crater nearly 82-meters wide is visible where there used to be a storage building and bunker. Additionally, train rail cars that were likely used to transport ammunition to the depots were damaged or destroyed at each location.
We created a tool to illustrate the extent to which US restrictions on Ukraine’s use of ATACMS constrain Ukraine’s ability to strike important military infrastructure in Russia.
We made this tool to help visualize the extent to which US policy is protecting a vast number of objects in Russia's rear and how many legacy installations and known military landuse protected by US policy is supporting Russia's war effort.
225 unique military and paramilitary objects are available here for exploration.
Clicking on pins on the map allows the user to lean more details about that object.
Current US policy prohibiting Ukraine from using US-provided weapons in the territory of the Russian Federation is severely compromising Ukraine's ability to defend itself.
Whatever the merits of this US policy before the Russian assault on Kharkiv Oblast began, it should be modified immediately to reflect the urgent realities of the current situation.
Defeating Russia’s operation in Kharkiv Oblast requires defeating Russia’s glide bomb threat. Russian forces are using glide bombs launched from Russian airspace to enable Russian ground maneuver in Kharkiv Oblast.