Ukrainian president Zelensky says Macron tried to push him to make "concessions on our sovereignty in order to help Putin save his face". uawire.org/zelensky-macro…
In his speech on May 9 he said: ""It is up to Ukraine alone to define the conditions for negotiations with Russia. But our duty is to stand with Ukraine to achieve the ceasefire, then build peace."
On the same day Macron warned twice against "humiliating" Russia.
The biggest question: is Macron freelancing, or is this agreed with:
- Germany?
- Brussels?
- Washington?
Macron was visiting Scholz on 9 May. On 11 May Scholz spoke with Selensky on the phone. Today Scholz talked to Putin and called for a ceasefire and "progress" in the search for a diplomatic solution.
We can assume that Macron and Scholz are on the same page -- more or less.
Zelensky probably went public with this information because he felt cornered.
All this pretty much echoes the Normandy format; Macron and Scholz seem to think that the end of this war will be some kind of Minsk III, just on a larger scale -- negotiated by France, Germany, Ukraine and Russia.
The foreign policy advisor of Scholz, Jens Plötner, was Frank-Walter Steinmeier's chief of staff and in that role deeply involved in the Minsk I and II negotiations.
US secretary defense also called for an "immediate ceasefire" -- like Scholz.
Does that mean that Macron's initiative was agreed with both, Berlin and Washington? If so, what kind of negotiation mandate was agreed? Did Macron perhaps overstep this by trying to push Zelensky into concessions?
Whatever happened, it failed. Zelensky felt pressured by Macron and went public -- probably to make sure that Macron understands that this won't fly.
But this episode tells us a lot about the emerging conflict between those who want the war to end quickly and those who think it must end with Ukraine not loosing much territory, or winning back some it has lost in 2014/15.
The longer this conflict drags on, the more the tensions between those camps are likely to rise.
My view is that when Russia is winning some or much territory, the ceasefire or peace won't be sustainable, because Russia will feel encouraged, with regards to its methods (war of aggression and conquest) and its goals (re-establishment of empire).
Russia's methods and goals must be frustrated, otherwise Russia will just use the break to prepare itself for the next, third round against Ukraine. We would be back at war rather earlier than later.
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Merkel hat 2015 gesagt, Putin lebt in einer anderen Welt. Dennoch blieb die deutsche Russlandpolitik von der Idee geprägt, Putin durch freundliche Worte und Taten in unsere (postmoderne) Welt hineinzuziehen. Insbesondere Steinmeier war davon tief überzeugt.
Scholz knüpft jetzt nahtlos daran an. In seinem t-online Interview wiederholt er immer wieder, dass Putin / Russland "verstehen muss", dass er / es sich auf dem Holzweg befindet.
Die "postheroische", postmoderne deutsche Logik, der zufolge ökonomisches Wohlbefinden und moralischer Seelenfriede die höchsten Ziel sind, werden umstandslos auf Russland übertragen.
Ukraine und Russland -- wo stehen Deutschland und der Westen? Eine kleine Zwischenbilanz.
Die Schlacht um die deutsche Ukraine- und Russlandpolitik ist geschlagen, durchgesetzt hat sich der Kanzler mit seiner Linie, nur das Mindeste zu tun — gerade genug, um im westlichen Bündnis nicht unangenehm aufzufallen und um interne Kritiker bei Grünen und FDP zu besänftigen.
Scholz hat geschickt schwerste rhetorische Waffen aufgefahren: es drohe eine schwerste Wirtschaftskrise und ein atomarer dritter Weltkrieg, wenn man sich mehr einsetzt, bei Energiesanktionen und Waffenlieferungen. Das hat gewirkt, es hat den Diskurs gedreht in Richtung Angst.
Whether Russia wins or loses in Ukraine -- it will be a danger to Ukraine and Europe. There is no way out of the confrontation with a Russia that has cancelled the status quo and pursues imperial ambitions in Eastern and probably Central Europe.
If this is the premise, then the question is not how to stop the fighting immediately; it is how to end this war in a way that rather diminishes instead of increases Russia's future threat to Ukraine and Europe.
There are two schools of thought: one assumes that by giving Putin something he will calm down (appeasement); the other thinks that the imperial ambitions must be clearly frustrated in order to show that imperialism is a wrong path for Russia, a dead end.
Macron said on 9 May: "It is up to Ukraine alone to define the conditions for negotiations with Russia. But our duty is to stand with Ukraine to achieve the ceasefire, then build peace." …sidence-francaise.consilium.europa.eu/en/news/speech…
"Because in the end, when peace returns to European soil, we will need to build new security balances and we will need, together, to never give in to the temptation of humiliation, nor the spirit of revenge..."
Es bleibt ein Riesenproblem des deutschen Ukraine-Diskurses, dass die Unterstützung der Ukraine nur als "Solidarität" und Hilfe für das Opfer dargestellt wird -- und nicht als zentrales deutsches Interesse.
Dies die Unterstützung der Ukraine sehr angreifbar, indem deutsche Interessen (ökonomische, sicherheitspolitische, russlandpolitische) gegen die Unterstützung für die Ukraine ins Feld gebracht werden können -- und werden, implizit auch von Scholz.
Dabei geht es in der Ukraine in Wahrheit darum, Russlands Aggression früh zu frustrieren, damit Russland sich nicht in ein auf Eroberung ausgerichtetes Imperium verwandelt -- das hat Europa schon erlebt, und es war ein Desaster, für alle in Europa.
@DimitarBechev: "Macron’s speech rehashed early 1990s ideas about multi-tier Europe, with the likes of Serbia, North Macedonia, and Bosnia sharing company with Ukraine and Moldova—as well as the UK—in the outer circle. ...
@DimitarBechev That means, effectively, that the EU will lose whatever little traction it has retained over the domestic politics of aspiring members."
@StefanLehne: "Macron’s idea of a “European political community” reflects the French tendency of thinking of enlargement primarily in terms of finding alternatives to it."