Napoleon's doomed invasion of Russia in 1812 is an iconic moment in world history. Most people know the general premise, that Napoleon's army was forced to flee the Russian winter. But why did this campaign doom Napoleon? (1)
There's no doubt that Russia's strategy, orchestrated by War Minister Barclay de Tolly, was ideal. The Russian army retreated deep into the interior, forcing Napoleon to chase them hundreds of miles before they finally offered him battle at Borodino, near Moscow. (2)
Borodino was a colossal battle - the single bloodiest day of battle in Europe's history, until the First World War. However, it ended with a stalemate and the Russian army was able to retire bloodied but intact. Napoleon was now unable to achieve any major strategic aims. (3)
The Russians abandoned Moscow, and it was soon torched. With the Russian army intact and Tsar Alexander I refusing to negotiate, Napoleon faced the prospect of wintering deep in the hostile Russian heartland, far away from his own capital. So, he bailed. (4)
Napoleon's army frantically retreated from Russia along a barren, freezing path, crumbling from hunger, sickness, wounds, desertion, and Russian cavalry hounding the flanks. In the end, Napoleon lost in excess of 400,000 men in Russia.
But this isn't the important part! (5)
Napoleon's invasion force was surprisingly light on French soldiers. He mustered over 600,000 men, but less than half were actually French. The rest were drawn from various satellite and client states around Europe, including a huge number of Poles. (6)
Furthermore, Napoleon's Imperial Guards - the best infantry units in Europe at the time - were withheld from battle at Borodino. Napoleon commented that he did not want to have them "blown up" thousands of miles from Paris. This proved very important. (7)
Due to the multinational composition of his invasion force, and the decision to keep the Imperial Guards in reserve, Napoleon was far from a dead man walking in 1813. By the spring, he already had a fresh force of over 200,000 men active in Germany. (8)
So, why was the Russian invasion so catastrophic for Napoleon? After all, the total number of French casualties in the campaign was lower than the losses they inflicted on the Russians - they too were badly chewed up. So what was the difference maker?
Horses. (9)
Napoleon's army lost an enormous number of horses in Russia, some in battle, but largely to hunger, as they were unable to provide feed for them. Cavalry were notoriously difficult and expensive to replace, and after 1812 Napoleon was never able to replenish his cavalry arm. (10)
So by the middle of 1813, Napoleon had actually replaced French manpower losses and was fielding perfectly adequate infantry forces, but his cavalry remained permanently weak. Twice, this would prove absolutely decisive. (11)
Cavalry was critical in Napoleonic warfare as the weapon of exploitation - used as the hammer to inflict huge casualties after the enemy's formations were wrecked, and to block retreats. Napoleon now lacked the ability to consolidate and exploit victories. (12)
In May 1813, Napoleon fought two battles against combined Prussian-Russian armies - one at Bautzen and one at Lutzen - and won them both. However, his lack of cavalry prevented him from pursuing and trapping the allied armies, and twice they escaped with modest casualties. (13)
Insufficient cavalry prevented Napoleon from destroying these allied forces in May, and allowed them to remain intact and regroup with the Austrians for the Battle of Leipzig - which finally ended Napoleon's control of Central Europe and set the stage for his final fall. (14)
The lesson we draw from this is about the synergistic use of arms, and the deceptive nature of numbers in war. Napoleon's ability to regenerate his infantry ultimate meant nothing in the absence of adequate cavalry forces. (15)
We saw something similar happen to Germany in World War Two. By 1944, the German forces on the Eastern Front were numerically quite close to those that they brought 1941, but they were materially far weaker due to insufficient air, armor, and artillery. (16)
Of course, Napoleon made a brief resurgence in 1815 before being defeated for good at Waterloo. This has led "Waterloo" to become a figure of speech for someone's downfall. The irony in this is that Waterloo was not Napoleon's Waterloo.
His Waterloo was Borodino. (17)
Bonus: A portrait of Tsar-Saint Alexander I
He was an excellent wartime leader for Russia, kept his head during Napoleon's invasion, and singlehandedly created the coalition that defeated him. He was also a sensitive and soft hearted man.
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🧵 Starting a thread of random books that I like and recommend that people might find interesting.
This is comprehensive look at how the Soviet Union’s unparalleled systems and rules of state secrecy shaped the powers of the state. Harrison frames secrecy as the pivot of a tradeoff which gave the USSR a high degree of security at the expense of state capacity.
A really unique book that looks at “Shinto” - originally a variegated and decentralized collection of Buddhist and native Japanese beliefs, which the imperial government deliberately molded into a “religion” that was useful for creating good imperial citizens.
Nothing about this threat even makes sense. If you think that Ukraine is worth fighting a war with Russia, you wouldn't set some weird redline where you pledge to intervene *after* Ukraine has been defeated.
The French Army has eight combat capable brigades (2 armored, 2 mech, 2 light armored, 1 mountain, 1 airborne). French force quality is fine, but this is an expeditionary force that's not built to slug it out in Eastern Europe.
A quick note on combat engineering: Over the last few months, we started to hear Ukraine talk about ramping up the construction of fortifications as they faced a pivot to a strategic defense, in some cases specifically calling for a corollary to Russia's "Surovikin Line."
This will likely be very difficult for Ukraine, for a few reasons. At the core is the dearth of dedicated combat engineering in the AFU, in contrast to the Russian Armed Forces.
The Russian Army has a host of dedicated engineering units, including several prewar engineering brigades, as well as several new engineering regiments that have been formed since 2022.
Americans bragging about lend-lease always strikes me as rather funny, because you're basically taking pride in the fact that FDR was a naïve idiot with a communist-compromised administration who gave away hundreds of billions worth of equipment for free.
In real time, American officialdom and army leadership was actually extraordinarily upset about FDR's profligate generosity, when he started shipping off American readiness stocks while they were trying to prepare for war.
"America rules, look at how easily the Soviets tricked FDR into giving them a hundred billion dollars worth of gear."
At the moment, Russia is grinding forward almost everywhere on the front, creating a bit of ambiguity as to their intentions. The overall operational trajectory in Donetsk Oblast, however, is fairly clear. With Marinka captured, they will advance up the N15 line to Kurakhove. (1)
Kurakhove as an important center of support for Ugledar - artillery based in this area was critical in helping Ukraine hold Ugledar last year. Advancing up this line puts Ulgedar into a severe salient. (2)
Meanwhile, clearing Avdiivka creates space for Russia to advance up the H20 line - important for two reasons. First, it allows a two pronged attack on Kostyantinivka (supporting the advance from Bakhmut), and it bypasses the heavily fortified AFU positions around Torestk. (3)
The ongoing wars in Ukraine and Gaza have resurrected debates around old concepts like mobilization and force structure. A few years ago, these were just esoteric topics for military historians to chew on, but now they are back. (1)
Force generation and structure seem like a simple question of demographics - a question only of squeezing fighting aged males out of the population pyramid and getting them into uniform. It *feels* like all that should matter is the overall size and age of the population. (2)
But then we look at Israel and Russia. Both conducted a "mobilization", with Russia (population 140 million) calling up 300,000 reservists in October '22, and Israel (9 million) calling up 360,000 last month. Israel called up a larger force, with a fraction of the population. (3)