Napoleon's doomed invasion of Russia in 1812 is an iconic moment in world history. Most people know the general premise, that Napoleon's army was forced to flee the Russian winter. But why did this campaign doom Napoleon? (1)
There's no doubt that Russia's strategy, orchestrated by War Minister Barclay de Tolly, was ideal. The Russian army retreated deep into the interior, forcing Napoleon to chase them hundreds of miles before they finally offered him battle at Borodino, near Moscow. (2)
Borodino was a colossal battle - the single bloodiest day of battle in Europe's history, until the First World War. However, it ended with a stalemate and the Russian army was able to retire bloodied but intact. Napoleon was now unable to achieve any major strategic aims. (3)
The Russians abandoned Moscow, and it was soon torched. With the Russian army intact and Tsar Alexander I refusing to negotiate, Napoleon faced the prospect of wintering deep in the hostile Russian heartland, far away from his own capital. So, he bailed. (4)
Napoleon's army frantically retreated from Russia along a barren, freezing path, crumbling from hunger, sickness, wounds, desertion, and Russian cavalry hounding the flanks. In the end, Napoleon lost in excess of 400,000 men in Russia.
But this isn't the important part! (5)
Napoleon's invasion force was surprisingly light on French soldiers. He mustered over 600,000 men, but less than half were actually French. The rest were drawn from various satellite and client states around Europe, including a huge number of Poles. (6)
Furthermore, Napoleon's Imperial Guards - the best infantry units in Europe at the time - were withheld from battle at Borodino. Napoleon commented that he did not want to have them "blown up" thousands of miles from Paris. This proved very important. (7)
Due to the multinational composition of his invasion force, and the decision to keep the Imperial Guards in reserve, Napoleon was far from a dead man walking in 1813. By the spring, he already had a fresh force of over 200,000 men active in Germany. (8)
So, why was the Russian invasion so catastrophic for Napoleon? After all, the total number of French casualties in the campaign was lower than the losses they inflicted on the Russians - they too were badly chewed up. So what was the difference maker?
Horses. (9)
Napoleon's army lost an enormous number of horses in Russia, some in battle, but largely to hunger, as they were unable to provide feed for them. Cavalry were notoriously difficult and expensive to replace, and after 1812 Napoleon was never able to replenish his cavalry arm. (10)
So by the middle of 1813, Napoleon had actually replaced French manpower losses and was fielding perfectly adequate infantry forces, but his cavalry remained permanently weak. Twice, this would prove absolutely decisive. (11)
Cavalry was critical in Napoleonic warfare as the weapon of exploitation - used as the hammer to inflict huge casualties after the enemy's formations were wrecked, and to block retreats. Napoleon now lacked the ability to consolidate and exploit victories. (12)
In May 1813, Napoleon fought two battles against combined Prussian-Russian armies - one at Bautzen and one at Lutzen - and won them both. However, his lack of cavalry prevented him from pursuing and trapping the allied armies, and twice they escaped with modest casualties. (13)
Insufficient cavalry prevented Napoleon from destroying these allied forces in May, and allowed them to remain intact and regroup with the Austrians for the Battle of Leipzig - which finally ended Napoleon's control of Central Europe and set the stage for his final fall. (14)
The lesson we draw from this is about the synergistic use of arms, and the deceptive nature of numbers in war. Napoleon's ability to regenerate his infantry ultimate meant nothing in the absence of adequate cavalry forces. (15)
We saw something similar happen to Germany in World War Two. By 1944, the German forces on the Eastern Front were numerically quite close to those that they brought 1941, but they were materially far weaker due to insufficient air, armor, and artillery. (16)
Of course, Napoleon made a brief resurgence in 1815 before being defeated for good at Waterloo. This has led "Waterloo" to become a figure of speech for someone's downfall. The irony in this is that Waterloo was not Napoleon's Waterloo.
His Waterloo was Borodino. (17)
Bonus: A portrait of Tsar-Saint Alexander I
He was an excellent wartime leader for Russia, kept his head during Napoleon's invasion, and singlehandedly created the coalition that defeated him. He was also a sensitive and soft hearted man.
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This is a slop post, but there's a broader problem with the way people try to score cheap points by pointing out things like the life expectancy issue, the HIV rate, alcoholism, etc. These issues are very telling as to why Russians feel the way they do about Putin and the USSR.
Westerners broadly misunderstand how the collapse of the USSR was experienced in places like Russia and Ukraine. The implosion of the Soviet economy was not a pleasant experience in any way, and the country did not make a clean transition, either politically or economically.
All the generally understood problems with the Soviet planned economy were true. Soviet central planning was more wasteful, less dynamic, less innovative, and created less wealth than western market economies. All that being said, the system largely "worked."
Very blackpilling when you learn that Viking Berserkers didn’t really exist in the sense that people generally think. I wish they did, but they didn’t.
"Berserk" as a word comes from "Serk", which meant shirt, with either "bear" or "bare" attached to it, giving the image of either a warrior with ursine regalia or else unarmored, possibly even naked.
Carl von Clausewitz is among the most widely known and cited (if not widely read) theorists of war. His signature work, "On War" (published in 1832) is the source of many commonplace expressions and terms that permiate the modern lexicon. (1)
Clausewitz was the originator of concepts like "friction", "culmination", "the fog of war", and more. His comment that "war is the continuation of policy with other means" has been endlessly quoted. Like a Shakespeare, he undergirds much of our modern vocabulary of war. (2)
Clausewitz is widely known, but perhaps not so widely read. Despite its influence, "On War" is an opaque and disorderly text. This is largely because Clausewitz died while his writing was still in an unorganized draft. The published volume was edited by his wife, Marie. (3)
This December 18th marks the 108th anniversary of the end of the Battle of Verdun - an infamously bloody episode of the First World War which killed over 700,000 French and German troops over nearly ten months of fighting. (1)
Verdun in many ways was the seminal First World War battle, in that it churned up dozens of divisions fighting for apparently meager gains of just a few kilometers. It appears at first brush to be entirely senseless, but the strategic conception deserves close scrutiny. (2)
By the end of 1915, German hopes for a quick resolution to the war had been firmly dashed. The initial command cadre had been replaced, and General Erich von Falkenhayn had taken command of the German general staff with an unenviable strategic position. (3)
Robert Drews book on the Bronze Age Collapse is one of my absolute favorites, and it's one that I find myself thinking about a lot with the advent of cheap FPV drones as a military expedient, as seen in Ukraine. (1)
Drews basic argument is that the collapse of rich and stable late bronze age societies was due to the advent of new technical and tactical methodologies which made the aristocratic chariot armies of the day obsolete. (2)
Warfare in the bronze age centered on armies comprised principally of chariots deployed as mobile archery platforms, with infantry playing a subordinate role as auxiliaries and security troops. (3)
Maybe instead of arguing online about Columbus/Indigenous Peoples Day, you read this excellent book? This dismisses the myth of the helpless native and presents a coherent story of the European encounter with North America.
The key theme here is that Europeans didn’t encounter a virginal land occupied by naïve peoples. North America already had a scheme of geopolitics, with diplomatic protocols, alliance systems, and warfare.
Native Americans by and large did not see Europeans as alien intruders, but as a new chess piece in this power system. Europeans were integrated into the diplomatic web, and native tribes tried to leverage them against each other.