Thread by @MarkHertling

On 2/24 -at the start of the conflict- I posted the attached thread with reasons why I thought Ukraine would win.

We’re now seeing RU transition to a “hasty defense” in many sectors, while regrouping for new offensive operations.

That portends some problems for RU. 1/12

https://twitter.com/markhertling/status/1497035826139738125

In his classic “On War,” Clausewitz provides an entire chapter on “culmination.”

He implies there are various factors that cause an army to culminate -stop- their offense & revert to the defense.

Fatigue, will, force depletion, supplies, not reaching strategic goals, etc. 2/

An army may also transition to the offense from the defense if they have the strength & believe doing so will help achieve operational or strategic goals.

But to do that, the army must have a growing resource capability, will, momentum, & achievable strategic objectives. 3/

I said a few weeks ago that we would soon see both the RU and UKR force “culminate” and transition to different operations.

We are on the cusp of that transition. 4/

RU:
-has seen a continuous deterioration of their force, as indicated by their equipment loss & personnel casualties
-there have been increasing indicators (and intel reports) of extremely low morale, desertions, and unwillingness to reenter the fight. 5/

-while RU has attempted to “fix” their leadeship and logistics shortcomings, they have not.
-the failure to achieve (& then even reduce) strategic objectives through operational design & tactical battles are apparent 6/

RU has thus far failed to seize/secure 3 major cities -Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa- that are key to achieving their strategic objectives.

They are now in the process of stating “new” strategic objectives & once again adjusting their operational campaign plan. 7/

UKR:
-strategic goals remain unchanged while the operational campaign & sequencing of tactical battles have contributed to success.
-RU terror & criminal actions have only contributed to the will of UKR army & government. 8/

-with arriving military aid, the needed UKR resources for offensive operations are available.
-there is a growing momentum generated by success achieved during limited counteroffensives. 9/

In early April, I said “watch the fight in Kharkiv, the NE Donbas, & the southern coast.”

It’s now time to focus on the E (center) and SE Donbas fight & the Rostov-Mariupol-Kherson-Odesa line of communication.
10/

I’ll be closely watching movement of forces (& logistic support) in both these areas…and the capability of RU blue water navy operating in a literal conflict. 11/

One last thought…

Clausewitz is also quoted regarding “chance” in war.

My thought -less refined than his definition-is chance favors the side that creates their own luck.

I give UKR the advantage in this category, too. 12/12

Sorry, that should be “littoral” not literal. Me not catching spell check.