Russia is losing 2/3 of a battalion combat group of equipment a day and we are into day 79.
That's over 52.6 full battalion equipment sets out of the 120 initially sent into Ukraine & ~180 over all in the Russian Ground Forces
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IOW, 43% of the total committed Russian mechanized combat vehicle fleet and likely the best 29% of the total Russian combat vehicle fleet have been destroyed or captured.
Percentage casualty rate wise, this is the institutional equivalent of the III Armored Corps in Ft Hood 2/
... Texas catching a high yield tac-nuke for the US Army.
Per the Oryx visual compilations, Ukraine is losing one vehicle destroyed or captured for every 3.5 Russian vehicles.
If the current Ukrainian casualty rates match the 2014-2015 fighting.
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Ukraine is taking about one casualty for between 5 & 7 Russian casualties right now.
The Ukrainian diaspora email list I participated in carefully collated Ukraine versus Russian casualties in the 2014-2015 period of Donbas fighting.
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The aggregate Ukraine vs Russia losses in 2014-2015 were:
...that the single largest cause of AFU non-combat losses was lethal medical conditions, resulting from inadequate medical screening of personnel who were being called up during the conscription campaign, that covered men of up to 45 years of age.
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As the list-admin observed at the time:
"1. Russians are accustomed to taking heavy combat losses and the political blowback is much smaller than would be seen in any Western nation;
2.The high combat loss rates deplete the aggregated experience pool in the Russian military
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... dumbing it down, and making it more likely to take foolish risks, and offer bad assessments to the nation's political leaders;
The realities of (1) & (2) have been observed repeatedly in the Ukrainian war, and given the losses sustained in middle ranking and junior
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...officers in the campaign, the propensity to blind optimism and the tendency to starting fights that sane people would not start will obviously continue for decades.
The punchline is that the culture of yes men surrounding the leader, the general insensitivity to combat...
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...losses, and the depletion of talent and expertise will make the Russians prone to starting fights they cannot win for the foreseeable future.
Put differently, the Ukrainian war has made the Russians much more dangerous than they were before this war."
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The previous passage was why I was stating Twitter in January & early February 2022 that the Russians really were going to go for a full regime change invasion.
The reason I didn't surface any of this then was Russian disinformation had so overrun Western government policy
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...makers, the ranks of senior intelligence officials, and corporate media that anyone mentioning it without months of videos showing incompetent Russian military performance versus superb Ukrainian combat tactics would be labeled a flipped out kook.
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The applicable proverbs which applied while I waited to surface this:
"There are none so blind as those who do not wish to see."
"There none so deaf as those who do not wish to hear."
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Simply _No One_ wanted to see or hear that the Russian Military is really a uniformed version of the movie "Idiocracy."
25,000 dead Russian soldiers still isn't enough for many of them right now.
"Directed Cognition" does that.
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For the rest of you, we have this BBC screaming headline:
Ukraine is going for a one million citizen military mobilization.
The six years of Dombas fighting conscript classes plus prewar Ukrainian military is ~650,000 right there.
Add in the mobilizing territorials, & yeah, one million Ukrainians under arms are here by 30 June.
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These Ukrainian reinforcements include the six conscript classes who fought in Donbas in 2016-2021.
That is, the Ukrainians are calling combat veterans back to the colors fighting in the same areas that they served six to nine months of combat in, working with NCO's
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...who are already fighting there.
Russian conscripts present in Ukraine & being called up are barely trained greenhorns with no NCO's to speak of.
Effectively, 100 Ukrainians are generating the same combat power as 300 Russian troops.
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And this combat effectiveness value ratio is increasingly in Ukraine's favor over time.
As the Russians lose more and more of their best soldiers & vehicles.
Their greenhorn replacements die faster & kill fewer Ukrainians.
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The Russian offensives at Izyum and Severodonietsk failing beyond recovery is confirmation that my prediction of the Russian tactical truck fleet collapsing right now is close to the mark.
Russia has lost the ability to do more than a single push out of the Donbas, and then
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... only with civilian trucks.
We are in the beginnings of a Russian Lanchester square law curve collapse. 24/
This is one of the most logistically incompetent hot takes by any German journalist in the Russo-Ukrainian War.
95% getting through is a 5% loss rate per trip
95%(x) for 10 to 20 kills means x = 200 to 400 trucks on this route
10 trips means 40% total fleet loss - 80 to 160 trucks
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You can follow the 5% loss curve in this 500 unit fleet at 10 exposures in the graphic below.
A 40% fleet loss in 10 days from a 5% drone loss rate is logistical collapse for the Russian Army in occupied Ukraine.
Only some trying to get AfD eyeballs would say different.
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This leaves out the fact that the Russian Army doesn't use *ANY* mechanized logistical enabler like pallets, Truck D-rings, forklifts, or telehandlers.
Russian trucks are in the drone kill zones 3 times as long as a Western truck due to loading times.
"The DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile, with a range of approximately 4,000 to 5,000 kilometers, was specifically designed and publicly nicknamed by Chinese military analysts as the "Guam Killer.""
As laid out by warquants -dot- com, China is buying one million OWA drones to destroy all US/Taiwan/Taiwan allied military logistics from Guam to the China coast.
A quantity of one million "Shaheed plus" class OWA drones has quality all its own.
Homicide statistics since the early 1960s are not comparable to earlier periods because medical advances have turned many fatal injuries into survivable ones.
I'm tempted to say the difference between military flag ranks who are competent at 2026 peer to peer warfare, and those who are not, is the understanding and application of attritional loss curves to combat loss rates, electronic warfare and logistics.
The set of curves I had an AI produce for me above have been used for air warfare many times starting at the end of WW2, in the USSBS after WW2 and by many classic RAND airpower studies from the 1950's to 1980's.
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All post 9/11/2001 Western flag ranks are counter-insurgency (COIN) trained & experienced.
They have no gut feel at all to statistical attrition models at all.
These "COIN-head" flags may prove to be highly resistant to changing this. Which is required to deal with drones.
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The effectiveness of drones is directly affected by the electronic warfare competence of the drone users.
The fact that the US Army defenestrated every EW practitioner in the 2000's and has compete "EW virgins" as flag rank leadership means it will fail with mass casualties in its first major drone war combat.
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