Russia is losing 2/3 of a battalion combat group of equipment a day and we are into day 79.
That's over 52.6 full battalion equipment sets out of the 120 initially sent into Ukraine & ~180 over all in the Russian Ground Forces
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IOW, 43% of the total committed Russian mechanized combat vehicle fleet and likely the best 29% of the total Russian combat vehicle fleet have been destroyed or captured.
Percentage casualty rate wise, this is the institutional equivalent of the III Armored Corps in Ft Hood 2/
... Texas catching a high yield tac-nuke for the US Army.
Per the Oryx visual compilations, Ukraine is losing one vehicle destroyed or captured for every 3.5 Russian vehicles.
If the current Ukrainian casualty rates match the 2014-2015 fighting.
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Ukraine is taking about one casualty for between 5 & 7 Russian casualties right now.
The Ukrainian diaspora email list I participated in carefully collated Ukraine versus Russian casualties in the 2014-2015 period of Donbas fighting.
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The aggregate Ukraine vs Russia losses in 2014-2015 were:
...that the single largest cause of AFU non-combat losses was lethal medical conditions, resulting from inadequate medical screening of personnel who were being called up during the conscription campaign, that covered men of up to 45 years of age.
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As the list-admin observed at the time:
"1. Russians are accustomed to taking heavy combat losses and the political blowback is much smaller than would be seen in any Western nation;
2.The high combat loss rates deplete the aggregated experience pool in the Russian military
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... dumbing it down, and making it more likely to take foolish risks, and offer bad assessments to the nation's political leaders;
The realities of (1) & (2) have been observed repeatedly in the Ukrainian war, and given the losses sustained in middle ranking and junior
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...officers in the campaign, the propensity to blind optimism and the tendency to starting fights that sane people would not start will obviously continue for decades.
The punchline is that the culture of yes men surrounding the leader, the general insensitivity to combat...
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...losses, and the depletion of talent and expertise will make the Russians prone to starting fights they cannot win for the foreseeable future.
Put differently, the Ukrainian war has made the Russians much more dangerous than they were before this war."
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The previous passage was why I was stating Twitter in January & early February 2022 that the Russians really were going to go for a full regime change invasion.
The reason I didn't surface any of this then was Russian disinformation had so overrun Western government policy
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...makers, the ranks of senior intelligence officials, and corporate media that anyone mentioning it without months of videos showing incompetent Russian military performance versus superb Ukrainian combat tactics would be labeled a flipped out kook.
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The applicable proverbs which applied while I waited to surface this:
"There are none so blind as those who do not wish to see."
"There none so deaf as those who do not wish to hear."
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Simply _No One_ wanted to see or hear that the Russian Military is really a uniformed version of the movie "Idiocracy."
25,000 dead Russian soldiers still isn't enough for many of them right now.
"Directed Cognition" does that.
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For the rest of you, we have this BBC screaming headline:
Ukraine is going for a one million citizen military mobilization.
The six years of Dombas fighting conscript classes plus prewar Ukrainian military is ~650,000 right there.
Add in the mobilizing territorials, & yeah, one million Ukrainians under arms are here by 30 June.
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These Ukrainian reinforcements include the six conscript classes who fought in Donbas in 2016-2021.
That is, the Ukrainians are calling combat veterans back to the colors fighting in the same areas that they served six to nine months of combat in, working with NCO's
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...who are already fighting there.
Russian conscripts present in Ukraine & being called up are barely trained greenhorns with no NCO's to speak of.
Effectively, 100 Ukrainians are generating the same combat power as 300 Russian troops.
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And this combat effectiveness value ratio is increasingly in Ukraine's favor over time.
As the Russians lose more and more of their best soldiers & vehicles.
Their greenhorn replacements die faster & kill fewer Ukrainians.
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The Russian offensives at Izyum and Severodonietsk failing beyond recovery is confirmation that my prediction of the Russian tactical truck fleet collapsing right now is close to the mark.
Russia has lost the ability to do more than a single push out of the Donbas, and then
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... only with civilian trucks.
We are in the beginnings of a Russian Lanchester square law curve collapse. 24/
The statistical comparison in the FBI data from pre-1961 is invalid as the underlying medical systems have so changed as to utterly pollute the "murders per 100,000" data.
Violent crime data pre-1961 and post 1961 are apples to oranges comparisons.
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-Trauma care centers (1961),
-Standardized trauma procedures (1978),
-Adoption of military Korea/Vietnam medical emergency treatment & air transport procedures,
-Improved triage (1986)
-And (since 2011) widespread adoption and use of blood clotting bandages...
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Chairman Xi suffers from the traditional dictator's trap of believing his own sh*t because he has made it too dangerous for his cronies and underlings to tell him the truth.
Thanks to that, Chairman Xi's Regime has pretty much no resilience in adversity because it's so kleptocratic and it's all about what the guy in charge can do for his next set of corrupt cronies today.
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This 1970's comment about the Shah of Iran is so historically on point in 2026 because it shows how Xi's regime is failing "The dictator on the wall test."
This map of 124 Russian railway electric traction stations and the 40K OWA drone fired in 2025 demonstrates the political-military leadership failure of the Zelinskyy government.
Like Stalin's failed winter 1941-1942 counter offensives against Nazi Army Group Center,
...Ukraine is penny packing OWA drones everywhere to no great effect based on which military "Union" faction was last in the room with President Zelenskyy before a decision
Even Ukraine's vaunted oil offensive is a bare plurality of total drone strikes 2/
The latest @RyanO_ChosenCoy thread detailing the bureaucratic issues of Ukraine's military in targeting Russian logistics makes clear Ukraine's military has inter-service and intra-service union/factional disputes that are positively American in scale.
If the target of a US "rapid strike" was either the Kharg Island oil export facility or Iran's banking/financial system with a combination of explosives and non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse munitions, the Mullahs will fall.
There are two real courses of action (COA) for an American air campaign if Regime Change is the goal.
The Schwerpunkt - political center of gravity - of the Mullah regime is its ability to pay for the use Regime Security Forces & foreign hired mercenaries.
This is one of the 3 major strategic mistakes of the Zelenskyy Government.⬇️
Putin has shown better, more consistent, and more effective leadership in the strategic bombing of Ukrainian electrical infrastructure than Zelinskyy has in striking Russia's railways.
Russia remains uniquely vulnerable to a focused drone strike campaign on it's electrical railway traction step down transformers.
Zelenskyy's leadership not only ignored hitting that unique Russian vulnerability since Feb. 2022.
See the figure below⬇️
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To give you an idea of the abject political-military failure of the Zelenskyy government in this regard one has to look at the industrial supply chain for those traction substations.
The Soviet Union had two major transformer factories: Tolyatti and Zaporozhye.
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