METL is a commander's prediction of what missions his/her unit will likely face in combat related to an anticipated mission.
After analyzing any mission, Commanders identify a "Mission Essential Task Lists" of MANY essential tasks they believe they must accomplish in combat. 2/
Now those tasks are dependent on
-the size/type of unit (Division, Brigade, armor, infantry, engineer, etc)
-the area where they think they may go
-what the terrain may be like
-how the enemy will fight
-most importantly, anticipated mission from a higher commander 3/
Example, the METL for a Brigade Commander with a mission to attack an enemy in a country with rivers, obstacles & a hardened enemy may consist of:
-Deliberate attack
-Hasty defense
-River crossings
-Integrate air & artillery into maneuver scheme
-Conduct exploitation...etc 4/
All of those potential METL tasks are in an unclassified doctrinal publication (globalsecurity.org/military/libra…), with a bunch of associated subtasks.
Commanders determine which one applies most to them...& that starts a process.
Here's a page out of the manual: 5/
As a Division Commander, I would determine what tasks I might be asked to perform in a specific contingency plan.
I'd get that approved by my boss (a Corps Commander), he'd approve, then I'd relay to my subordinates.6/
Then, every unit in the division would analyze that METL & determined how they - as units from Brigades to Companies - would contribute to helping me accomplish the division mission.
For example, here's a generic example of a METL tasks for an infantry battalion: 7/
And...here's a list of tasks that a Military Intelligence Company might need to do. 8/
Commanders at different levels hold something called a quarterly training brief with his/her subordinate units to determine: 1) what tasks they identified as important 2) how they plan on training for each of those tasks. 3) what they need for support
Wait, there's more! 9/
In theory, after each "headquarters" (commanders at Division down to company) identify their unit's tasks, status (trained or untrained), 7 support, the small unit LEADERS (platoon leaders, squad leaders, etc) start training on THEIR tasks. 10/
While a Division Commander may say "river crossing" is one key tasks...
& unit commanders find supporting tasks contribute to a successful river crossing (as @WarintheFuture pointed out),
...it's the YOUNG LEADERS (lieutenants & sergeants) who train on the intricacies! 11/
Young leaders train & pull things together to integrate different tasks.
In @WarintheFuture example of various steps of a successful RCO, there are different teams doing "recon, supress, obscure, secure, reduce, assault"...
And all must be well-trained, well-led, integrated.12/
That leadership, training, integration of various subtasks for JUST ONE SIMPLE METL TASK OF MANY is exceedingly difficult.
But executing that one "simple" task was critical to accomplishing the mission.
And the Russians failed. 13/
As I've said many times, the leadership & training I saw in limited exposure to Russian training/exercises told me the events were actually highly choreographed unopposed "demonstrations."
They were lying to themselves. This is all - all - BS. 14/
As a tanker, I was always particularly enamored with the Russian tanks with snorkeling devices (see the video in #14 at about the 7:00 mark and the pic below)...
...especially when I was at a demonstration & saw they paved a route underwater for the tanks to drive across. 15/
Performance in combat requires trust in people, doctrine, equipment...that requires leadership.
Performance in combat requires hard training to specific tasks to standard...and that takes time, hard work & a professional army. 16/
Again, @WarintheFuture described the steps & how hard it is to conduct an RCO.
Other missions (attack, defend, breech, air integration, resupply on the move, etc, etc), take similar effort.
The RU army has neither the leadership or the training base to accomplish those. 17/
It appears the RU Army thought they could just go in and destroy & kill.
They've been criminally good at that.
But they are also destroying themselves - and their nation - in the process, as evidenced by the action at Severskyi Donets. 18/18
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
In his classic “On War,” Clausewitz provides an entire chapter on “culmination.”
He implies there are various factors that cause an army to culminate -stop- their offense & revert to the defense.
Fatigue, will, force depletion, supplies, not reaching strategic goals, etc. 2/
An army may also transition to the offense from the defense if they have the strength & believe doing so will help achieve operational or strategic goals.
But to do that, the army must have a growing resource capability, will, momentum, & achievable strategic objectives. 3/
What did Putin's "Victory Day" speech contain and what does it tell us?
There were some interesting take-aways, some good, some bad.
Here's what I saw in the film and the reports. A🧵 1/6
Many (me included) were wrong on predicting: 1. A declaration of victory (strategic, operation, or tactical). 2. A formal announcement of mobilization.
What wasn't said is important (especially #1) because intel said he had told his generals to produce a victory by 9 May. 2/
As a reminder, here what I thought were the early RU Strategic objectives:
-Execute regime change in Ukraine (replace Zelensky in Kyiv).
-Control Black/Azov Sea access
-Destroy Ukraine's army in the east
-Subjugate Ukraine's population
-Further Divide NATO & US 3/
Having done a fair share of targeting of enemy forces during my career, I'm a bit baffled about the amount of coverage of the intelligence sharing that is going on between the US and Ukraine.
Here's why. Another 🧵 1/12
When conducting "targeting," there are three important elements to consider:
1). The collection of important intelligence
2). The "boarding" of the target (how to hit, where to hit, when to hit, defenses, etc.)
3). The enemy's ability to avoid being hit. 2/
Collection of intelligence comes in many ways:
-Overhead satellite imagery
-Collection of electronic signals
-Collection of human intelligence information
-"Patterns of life/movement"
-Enemy ability to defend itself
Many countries do intel collection & the US is great at it. 3/
“How to Sabotage your Russian Tank 101.” Dear Russian Soldiers, We understand some of you are sabotaging your tanks which means others may want to and do not know the best way. Here are some basic tips for how to render the T72 inoperable: 2/
1. Pour a lot of dirt, sand, or sugar into the fuel tanks to clog the lines. 2. Drain the oil in either the engine or transmission, and it will eventually burnout either system. 3. Since the T72 runs on a “Christie” track/suspension, it’s easier to sabotage the road wheels... 3/
I hesitated to comment on this @washingtonpost article, because I thought their use of "jack-in-the-box" description was inappropriate. But dozens of people have DM'd me asking "what do you think of this?"