The lethal effects of artillery were not put on a really scientific basis until WW2.
There were lots of reasons for this involving money & politics I won't go into.
When the operational analysts to their first bite. They made charts like this mapping fragment impacts. 2/
The previous chart wasn't accurate because because it mapped a static detonation.
Analysts knew these maps were wrong because of damage inflicted in WW2.
It took early vacuum tube digital computers in the 1950's to accurately model how velocity altered that frag-pattern. 3/
What analysts were trying to achieve was a consistent modeling of airburst frag-patterns to kill infantry in trenches.
Then this information was fed into engineering shell designs to get the metallurgy & design of shells 4/
...such that they consistently made fragments of the right size/velocity to kill infantry over larger areas.
Starting in the 1970's through early 2000's this technological avenue was abandoned for the deployment of cluster munitions. 5/
The movement to ban cluster weapons lead to a push to replace lots of little bombs with more efficient fragmentation with 40 years better computer technology, explosives & metallurgy.
This Rheinmetall infographic shows what that means in terms of shell lethality. 6/
PBX4 IM is a insensitive plastic explosive that fragments steel more efficiently than TNT.
# Pre-Frag means the number of engineered fragments the shell produces. Now read the infographic bottom line from left to right.
7/
Russian 152mm shells have not ridden the increased lethality technological development train because Russia kept artillery cluster munitions.
The M795 155mm shell has. And it much more lethal on a shell for shell basis than a Russian 152mm shell because it did.
8/
There is a price to be paid for US M795 shell being both more lethal in its fragmentation and safer to use because of the explosives.
It costs more than a Russian 152mm shell.
There are reasons why the defense budget costs more for fewer weapons.
This is one of them.
9/End
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Deploying lots of anti-tank and anti-personnel land mines with Gator cluster munitions dispensers was one of the major themes of the 1980's Follow On Forces Attack (FOFA) doctrine.
The doctrine was highly effective, hence Ukraine using it in 2026.
I called out the Chinese invasion requirements for Taiwan in May 2023 complete with a prediction they would have to be building satellite detectable 1944 invasion of Normandy Mulberry style infrastructure.
In that thread I connected classic "irrational regime" Chinese 'Wolf Warrior diplomacy' as a behavior indicator of how they would view the world wide maritime trade and financial collapse invading Taiwan would cause as advantageous to China.
I did two further @grok analytical passes which reduced the truck movements, first to 3K to 8K truck movements:
"Revised estimate: Likely 3,000–8,000+ effective military/logistics truck movements per month on key southern routes (e.g., M-14 segments, Mariupol–Taganrog/T-0509, Berdiansk/Melitopol spurs), potentially higher in gross passages but far lower in productive throughput than Western equivalents due to systemic non-mechanized constraints."
2/
And then down to 2.5K to 7K truck movements, See:
"Likely 2,500–7,000 effective military/logistics truck movements per month on key southern routes (M-14 segments, Mariupol–Taganrog/T-0509, Berdiansk/Melitopol spurs), with gross passages potentially higher to offset massive inefficiencies—but productive throughput remains severely constrained by non-mechanized realities, supplements like rail/barge, and systemic intelligence blind spots."
A hundred Russian trucks, with a high proportions of fuel tankers and wreckers concentrated on one or two supply roads or a single road junction in a couple of weeks is a horse of a different color.
That is anti-access area denial (A2AD) on a stick.