Trent Telenko Profile picture
May 16, 2022 9 tweets 3 min read Read on X
This is a pretty important question I'll try and answer.👇

Thread🧵

1/
The lethal effects of artillery were not put on a really scientific basis until WW2.

There were lots of reasons for this involving money & politics I won't go into.

When the operational analysts to their first bite. They made charts like this mapping fragment impacts.
2/
The previous chart wasn't accurate because because it mapped a static detonation.

Analysts knew these maps were wrong because of damage inflicted in WW2.

It took early vacuum tube digital computers in the 1950's to accurately model how velocity altered that frag-pattern.
3/
What analysts were trying to achieve was a consistent modeling of airburst frag-patterns to kill infantry in trenches.

Then this information was fed into engineering shell designs to get the metallurgy & design of shells
4/
...such that they consistently made fragments of the right size/velocity to kill infantry over larger areas.

Starting in the 1970's through early 2000's this technological avenue was abandoned for the deployment of cluster munitions.
5/
The movement to ban cluster weapons lead to a push to replace lots of little bombs with more efficient fragmentation with 40 years better computer technology, explosives & metallurgy.

This Rheinmetall infographic shows what that means in terms of shell lethality.
6/
PBX4 IM is a insensitive plastic explosive that fragments steel more efficiently than TNT.

# Pre-Frag means the number of engineered fragments the shell produces. Now read the infographic bottom line from left to right.
7/
Russian 152mm shells have not ridden the increased lethality technological development train because Russia kept artillery cluster munitions.

The M795 155mm shell has. And it much more lethal on a shell for shell basis than a Russian 152mm shell because it did.

8/
There is a price to be paid for US M795 shell being both more lethal in its fragmentation and safer to use because of the explosives.

It costs more than a Russian 152mm shell.

There are reasons why the defense budget costs more for fewer weapons.

This is one of them.
9/End

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More from @TrentTelenko

May 29
Oh My!

The electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) of these jammer mountings has got to suck.

How many "nulls" this jammer throws (AKA where no jamming energy transmits) will be substantial.

1/
I did a thread on this in 2024 when the first turtle tank jammers appeared.

2/
The basics of electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) studies of antenna mounting have been around since 1944.

3/
Read 5 tweets
May 29
This is a development I have been expecting, once the AI truck hunting drones started hitting the main roads in occupied Ukraine.

Mining roads by air & rocket was late Cold War NATO doctrine after all.

1/
Deploying lots of anti-tank and anti-personnel land mines with Gator cluster munitions dispensers was one of the major themes of the 1980's Follow On Forces Attack (FOFA) doctrine.

The doctrine was highly effective, hence Ukraine using it in 2026.

2/
Image
The major issue with Gator is it ran a fowl the never sufficiently cursed out Ottawa Treaty banning AP land mines.

Despite the USA never having signing the treaty.

It generates international NGO lawfare accusations of "War Crimes" every time the USA uses the munition.

3/ Image
Image
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Read 5 tweets
May 29
Regarding this:

>>The intensification of strikes against Russian 🇷🇺 logistics (150 vehicles, 30 trains, 400 warehouses) is a real game-changer in the war.

The 30 trains represent far more logistical tonnage than the trucks.

1/
Carrying capability 🧵
A Russian train with 30 box cars/wagons carries 1,800 to 2040 metric tons of cargo.

Per @grok Truck Equivalents for ~2,040 tons of cargo:

3-axle Kamaz tactical truck only (at ~13 t each): ~157 trucks (2,040 ÷ 13 ≈ 157). Range: 136–204 trucks depending on 10–15 t

2/ Image
4-axle Kamaz tactical truck only (at ~20 t each): ~102 trucks (2,040 ÷ 20 = 102). Range: ~82–127 trucks for 16–25 t

Mixed fleet (e.g., half 3-axle at 13 t, half 4-axle at 20 t): Roughly 120–140 trucks total

3/ Image
Read 7 tweets
May 28
I called out the Chinese invasion requirements for Taiwan in May 2023 complete with a prediction they would have to be building satellite detectable 1944 invasion of Normandy Mulberry style infrastructure.

Chinese JLOTS req'ts link⬇️
x.com/TrentTelenko/s…

1/ x.com/johnkonrad/sta…
And this is the link to my prediction of what later became their "Corvis Mulberry" shore connectors.

The prototypes for which were under construction when I made my May 2023 prediction.

2/
In that thread I connected classic "irrational regime" Chinese 'Wolf Warrior diplomacy' as a behavior indicator of how they would view the world wide maritime trade and financial collapse invading Taiwan would cause as advantageous to China.

3/ Image
Read 10 tweets
May 26
Ummm...no. @grok said 10K Truck Movements, not trucks.

A truck making two movements a day within 150 km of the Russian border for 30 days is 60 truck movements out of the 10K, or 0.6%.

@grok's estimate was based on mirror imaging Western Mechanized logistics.
Truck Intel🧵
1/
I did two further @grok analytical passes which reduced the truck movements, first to 3K to 8K truck movements:

"Revised estimate: Likely 3,000–8,000+ effective military/logistics truck movements per month on key southern routes (e.g., M-14 segments, Mariupol–Taganrog/T-0509, Berdiansk/Melitopol spurs), potentially higher in gross passages but far lower in productive throughput than Western equivalents due to systemic non-mechanized constraints."

2/Image
And then down to 2.5K to 7K truck movements, See:

"Likely 2,500–7,000 effective military/logistics truck movements per month on key southern routes (M-14 segments, Mariupol–Taganrog/T-0509, Berdiansk/Melitopol spurs), with gross passages potentially higher to offset massive inefficiencies—but productive throughput remains severely constrained by non-mechanized realities, supplements like rail/barge, and systemic intelligence blind spots."

3/Image
Read 10 tweets
May 25
This⬇️

>>In total, I have more than 100 mapped hits on russian logistical means.

...means a lot in terms of truck attrition.

100 killed out of a truck fleet of projected 2,500 on this route is 4% of the total.
1/
Ukrainian military intelligence estimated Kamaz made 15,000 trucks from Feb 2022 to early 2026.

Call that period 49 months, and that's a Truck production rate of 300 a month.

100 trucks killed in a couple of months is "normal wastage."


2/
A hundred Russian trucks, with a high proportions of fuel tankers and wreckers concentrated on one or two supply roads or a single road junction in a couple of weeks is a horse of a different color.

That is anti-access area denial (A2AD) on a stick.

3/
Read 5 tweets

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