The lethal effects of artillery were not put on a really scientific basis until WW2.
There were lots of reasons for this involving money & politics I won't go into.
When the operational analysts to their first bite. They made charts like this mapping fragment impacts. 2/
The previous chart wasn't accurate because because it mapped a static detonation.
Analysts knew these maps were wrong because of damage inflicted in WW2.
It took early vacuum tube digital computers in the 1950's to accurately model how velocity altered that frag-pattern. 3/
What analysts were trying to achieve was a consistent modeling of airburst frag-patterns to kill infantry in trenches.
Then this information was fed into engineering shell designs to get the metallurgy & design of shells 4/
...such that they consistently made fragments of the right size/velocity to kill infantry over larger areas.
Starting in the 1970's through early 2000's this technological avenue was abandoned for the deployment of cluster munitions. 5/
The movement to ban cluster weapons lead to a push to replace lots of little bombs with more efficient fragmentation with 40 years better computer technology, explosives & metallurgy.
This Rheinmetall infographic shows what that means in terms of shell lethality. 6/
PBX4 IM is a insensitive plastic explosive that fragments steel more efficiently than TNT.
# Pre-Frag means the number of engineered fragments the shell produces. Now read the infographic bottom line from left to right.
7/
Russian 152mm shells have not ridden the increased lethality technological development train because Russia kept artillery cluster munitions.
The M795 155mm shell has. And it much more lethal on a shell for shell basis than a Russian 152mm shell because it did.
8/
There is a price to be paid for US M795 shell being both more lethal in its fragmentation and safer to use because of the explosives.
It costs more than a Russian 152mm shell.
There are reasons why the defense budget costs more for fewer weapons.
This is one of them.
9/End
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1. Putin is not doing his job as President. 2. Putin is not paying attention to his own personal security. 3. Putin is preventing competent Russian military commanders from doing anything right.
2/
People mostly attribute #3 to Hitler, but the more recent example was U.S. Pres. Lyndon Baines Johnson during Vietnam playing company commander from the White House.
3/
@TheStudyofWar The Russian lack of infantry dismounts in their heavily mechanized & "Ghost Soldier" ridden Motor-Rifle Regiments means they cannot hold back wide front Ukrainian infantry infiltration that has superior Western night vision gear.
In the day the Ukrainians use drones to spot
1/
@TheStudyofWar ...Russian AFV check points. Then at night the Ukrainians infiltrate where Russians are not.
Then the next day Ukrainian infantry use drone directed artillery to kill the check points. Thus forcing Russian vehicle movement into the infiltrated missile teams.
Rinse & repeat.
2/
@TheStudyofWar When the Russians try a village strong point, you follow on with Ukrainian AFV's.
Then infiltrating more Ukrainian infantry around the strong point while the AFV's hold Russian attention.
The Frontage is simply too wide & Ukrainian night vision too good for the Russians
3/
The sort of load & unload rates US Army trucks achieve is through the heavy use of boxes, pallets, flatracks, containers, and mechanized material handling equipment built into trucks
@HN_Schlottman@KofmanMichael@KC_Guy@teuraskarju The utter lack of cranes, all terrain forklifts, and container handling material handling equipment in Russian TO&E plus the modern Russian Army's shortage of bodies for the manual handling of cargo means there is no way Russia can move the tonnage 3/
@RandomAcademic@sjellmann If you have not read Lester W. Grau & Charles K. Bartle's "The Russian Reconnaissance Fire Complex Comes of Age." Now is the time to go look it up with an internet search.
UAV artillery spotting tactics are universal, and the Ukrainians are better at it than the Russians. 1/
@RandomAcademic@sjellmann This is mainly because the existential threat of Russian invasion focused the Ukrainian military on "good enough today" is better than "perfect next year."
That means Ukrainian artillery spotting drones cost between 1/10th and 1/100th what a similar drone costs
2/
Russia is losing 2/3 of a battalion combat group of equipment a day and we are into day 79.
That's over 52.6 full battalion equipment sets out of the 120 initially sent into Ukraine & ~180 over all in the Russian Ground Forces
1/
IOW, 43% of the total committed Russian mechanized combat vehicle fleet and likely the best 29% of the total Russian combat vehicle fleet have been destroyed or captured.
Percentage casualty rate wise, this is the institutional equivalent of the III Armored Corps in Ft Hood 2/
... Texas catching a high yield tac-nuke for the US Army.
Per the Oryx visual compilations, Ukraine is losing one vehicle destroyed or captured for every 3.5 Russian vehicles.
If the current Ukrainian casualty rates match the 2014-2015 fighting.
3/