The Russian military’s stumbles in Ukraine do not end at technical equipment issues, poor training, or corruption. Something is still wrong within the force, no matter how extensively it has been modernized. My latest, below. (1/x) foreignaffairs.com/articles/russi… via @ForeignAffairs
The Russian military’s stumbles in Ukraine are linked by a core underlying theme and unresolved problem: the continued disregard for the lives and wellbeing of its personnel (2/x)
In the war so far, Russia has struggled to accomplish basic functions like retrieving the bodies of its dead, or treating scared Russian military families with dignity. (3/x)
With indifference so vast that Russian commanders can * actually shrug* in the face of a grieving father, what other core warfighting competencies is that military culture indifferent to ? (4/x) mil.in.ua/en/news/parent…
With an antipathy and annoyance to the tears of grieving mothers--that has largely continued unchecked over multiple conflicts for 40 years-- how can the Russian military claim it is capable of learning and evolving? (5/x)ft.com/content/15e8c7…
With a distrust of its subordinates so deep that it kept its invasion plans a secret from many of its rank and file soldiers until the night before, how can the Russian military expect them to be combat effective? (6/x)
(This story is no longer posted at Novaya Gazeta due to crackdowns in Russia - it can be found here 7/x) ukrrudprom.com/digest/Mama_ya… )
The problem for Russia’s military is not necessarily the modernized and functional equipment abandoned in Ukrainian fields. The problem is a culture of indifference to their own human capital, despite their efforts to improve over the last decade (8/x).
If the Russian military disregards the wellbeing of its troops, what else does it not care about? Inadequate planning, logistics, poor unit discipline, for starters. With horrific results for Ukrainian civilians that it encounters in a war zone (9/x)
In Russia there are patriotic banners, military funerals, and vigils for the dead. More telling is how the military behaves when it thinks no one is watching: antipathy and failures to treat many Russian soldiers’ families with dignity continues. (10/x) meduza.io/en/feature/202…
The Russian military stands to lose more than the all the destroyed equipment. Its professional enlisted personnel program is barely 20 years old and relies on the prestige of military service and social trust that the MOD worked on for 10+ years. (11/x) rand.org/pubs/research_…
It is still too soon to tell how much jeopardy Russia’s professional enlisted program is in or if recruitment and retention will be affected, or if Russian families will return to the old ways of keeping their sons safe from the draft. (12/x) theguardian.com/world/2022/mar…
This intercepted call from a soldier to his wife, if authentic, holds a warning to Russian leaders. He’s worried he might not survive and is discussing his last wishes for their young son (13/x) t.me/SBUkr/4083
Excerpt: "You have to make sure he doesn’t join the Army […] Ask Mom to get Uncle Gena involved to do everything within his power to make sure he doesn’t join the Army. This will be my last…thing that I want.” (14/end).
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📣📣 New report with many relevant insights on Russian Air Force capability and operational patterns. Road to Damascus: The Russian Air Campaign in Syria: 2015 to 2018. rand.org/pubs/research_… via @RANDCorporation.
From research in 2019: “ Russia’s reluctance to invest in expensive precision-guided munitions,underdeveloped targeting and penetrating ISR capabilities, and lack of inter-theater tanking could be liabilities in future campaigns with a larger area of operations…”
Much commentary about Gen Gerasimov’s presence in Ukraine & Russian military command. I wanted to open up the vault about his previous experience as a field commander and how that’s relevant too. (Below in Chechnya). /1
It’s surprising to many here in the west that someone of his rank would go to the front. There are larger issues and implications here at play about his visit, and I think @MarkHertling covered them well here /2
Gerasimov was a field commander in Chechnya and led combined arms armies and multiple military districts in his career. He is not what some would call a General Staff “arbat general” - a pejorative for staff officers with little field experience.He has been there a while though/3
Now that more Russian military personnel are moving into position near Ukraine, the Kremlin and military’s continued silence & disregard to their own troops and families is unsustainable and may backfire. Signs of early cracks and other considerations below: 👇(/1)
A majority of Russia’s professionally manned BTGs and soldiers are likely deploying near Ukraine or Belarus now, with no national address to the Russian people or little discernible info to soldiers’ families about why —other than training.(/2)
The MoD has pulled contract soldiers from all over Russia, conscripts cannot be used in a combat zone. So that’s a clue. Brass has a history of pressuring conscripts to sign contracts, that news tends to trickle out as it did in 2014/15. 3. apnews.com/article/356ae5…
On my mind: with half the Russian army deploying near Ukraine, there are few errant social media posts for such a large force. Whether this force is contract (or even conscript), little is coming from the families or remaining Russian NGOs. Silence is odd but many factors why 👇
Phone policy: The MOD has spent years cracking down on unauthorized soldier phone use, especially on deployments. I believe they recently offer their own MOD smart phones to certain groups, and encrypted phones to intel types (/2)
Law: foreign agent laws target and bully media, NGOs for several reasons, causing many to stop or reorient their activities (like committees of soldiers mothers).This matters b/c when conscripts are sent illegally into battle these locations are where the families can report (/3
MOD collegiums are not usually a forum for launching major updates. Mostly they are updates mil policy and modernization. Today's event was a little different and Putin again laid down his thinking on Ukraine. Storm clouds gather. My observations below (1/x).
1st: Putin's remarks are not new but lately but when you hear the tone and the alignment of forces behind it - it's an old pain & old frustration w/the security situation near Russia's border. Through his "doorstep" remarks he's all but saying he's unwilling to be cornered(2/x)
Shoygu's assessment that 120 American PMCs in Donetsk w/chemical weapons of some kind. Pardon my skepticism but don't Russian proxies and or Russian intel or others control that area? If so why would they NOT seize said actors for the PR alone? Unless it's a total canard. (3/x)
Lots to unpack from today’s Military Times interview - Ukrainian Military Intelligence assessment on Russian forces and what they might do. They predict a winter-spring offensive (/thread)
Ukrainian Intel predicts an offensive January and February. Some of the items on this map I am assuming are future assessment — for example multiple airborne forces in Belarus (/3)