Back from a break to finish my Ph.D. focused on violence and instability of non-state actors at @WPI. Looking forward to share as its relevant to both #RussiaUkraineWar and the recent #Buffalo terror attack. Here is a blueprint of my dissertation. Links to papers in the 🧵. /1
Chapter 1:
“Profiles of Violent Radicalization: Analysis on key criteria of over 4,600 terror incidents in Western Europe and the United States from 1995-2018,” doi: dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3…. /2
Chapter 2:
“Root Causes of Violent Radicalization: The Terror Contagion Hypothesis,” doi: dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3…. 3/
Chapter 3:
“Contingencies of Violent Radicalization: The Terror Contagion Simulation,” Systems, vol. 9, no. 4, p. 90, Dec. 2021, doi: 10.3390/systems9040090. 4/
Chapter 5:
“Theory of an Emerging-State Actor: The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Case †,” Systems, vol. 6, no. 2, p. 16, May 2018, doi: 10.3390/systems6020016. 6/
Chapter 6:
“Application of Emerging-State Actor Theory: Analysis of Intervention and Containment Policies †,” Systems, vol. 6, no. 2, p. 17, May 2018, doi: 10.3390/systems6020017. 7/
1. In both conflicts cited showing the effectiveness of tanks, Russia (or Russian proxies) was the competitor against Turkey (or Turkish proxies). We know Russia isn't effective at this new style of combat that may not be a realistic test.
2. Ukraine was not a peer-equal of Russia at start. Their use of these capabilities shows a progress curve. A peer-equal manned/trained/equipped in these methods (e.g. Turkey) could've inflicted significantly higher losses.