It’s not particularly surprising that at this point in a grinding, bloody war @nytimes, and some American think tanks as well as in the French, German and Italian governments look for a way out with a compromise that will dismember Ukraine further. 1/4
The spirit of appeasement and surrender will always be with us; the willingness to sell out people fighting for their freedom and their lives will always be with us; the fear of success in defeating dictators will always be with us. 2/4
There are plenty of hardheaded reasons to arm and support Ukraine to the maximum - indeed, it would be catastrophic on purely geopolitical grounds to sell them out. But this is also a moral issue. 3/4
The good news is that the Ukrainians are resolute, the US is doing the right thing, and the key allies - front line states above all, but also UK, Canada, and others - are in it to win. For the rest, they get the reputations of a Duranty or a Chamberlain. Deservedly. 4/4
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If it is true that General Gerasimov is assuming direct command of combat operations in Ukraine from a forward headquarters there are, as ever, two possibilities. 1/6
The first is that as the Russians launch the decisive maneuver(s) of the war, they want their very best field commander to complete these heroic tasks, orchestrating fire and maneuver, land air and sea as only a superb field commander can. And obviously, he’s the best! 2/6
The second is that maybe he is not the reincarnation of Suvorov, Zhukov, etc. but a guy who has been the top staff job for over a decade. And things are going badly. Maybe very badly. Or at least potentially very badly. 3/6
This excellent thread by @MarkHertling got me thinking about a question: why has the analysis of this war by retired generals such as him, @general_ben and @edwardstrngr, and first rate military historians such as @PhillipsPOBrien been superior to that of the Russian military.1/8
.analytic community? This requires serious research, & am helping launch some, because its an important question. But here are some initial hypotheses: experience, particularly of high level command in a shooting war sensitizes one to all the intangibles mentioned 2/8
.in @MarkHertling’s thread. And to the nitty gritty detail that those in the back room of war making, such as @TrentTelenko also provide. They look for different things, and detect different things than the analysts. 3/8
Latest arms package for Ukraine — 72 155mm howitzers, 144k rounds, more UAV’s — much more like the scale we need to be operating on. One always wishes it had happened weeks ago, but this is an important step forward. Bravo Biden administration & Pentagon. 1/5
Important phenomenon here: we see the Ukrainians can use heavy weapons well and have a real chance, so we provide more; other countries e.g. Netherlands even Spain step forward; reluctant countries e.g. Germany begin to catch up. Healthy competitive dynamic. 2/5
And to deliver it the enormous logistical capacities of the US military. When we want things to move quickly, we can do it. Moreover, Ukraine now has secure rear areas in Eastern Europe for training, recovery, maintenance, medical care, etc. 3/5
If the Russian offensive has not begun, it is about to. What’s needed now isn’t conceptually complicated: it is arming the Ukrainians to the max and as fast as possible with long range fires (howitzers and rocket systems), air defense systems (radars, missiles, etc.), 1/6
Armored vehicles to move troops around, aircraft & helos. There have to be creative options open - by sea as well as by air & land. And equally important, we (led by the US) need to make it clear that (1) we will do this without stinting; (2) we will go as long as it takes; 2/6
(3) we will do it fast and at an order of magnitude greater effort than heretofore. $10s of billions not a 1 $billion here & there, not 18 howitzers but 180, not 40k shells but 400k. All of that will take longer but the need will be there in the months ahead. 3/6
Two possible narratives here. Narrative #1. After a surprising setback the Russian General Staff, drawing on the traditions of Suvorov, Zhukov, etc. regroups, switches its line of effort, and focuses on closing the Slovianka pocket, trapping most of the UA regular army. 1/7
Cue words like “Kesselschlacht,” “deep maneuver,” “fire sack” etc. etc. They seize Ukraine’s Black Sea coast (up to Odessa) and Russia imposes a compromise, frozen armistice, in which Moscow walks away with some gains, though not overthrow of Ukrainian government. Success! 2/7
Deep Russian military competence has reasserted itself. But then there is Narrative #2. The Big Boss is hopping mad that he was lied to about what was doable, but neither he nor the generals really know the situation on the ground particularly well. He tells them to deliver… 3/7
Talk of whether sanctions are ‘proportional’ or can deter further Russian criminal behavior is pointless. The purpose of sanctions now is to throttle the Russian economy, which, together with battlefield defeat and high losses are the only thing that can stop Putin. 1/4
Equally pointless is discussion about giving ‘offensive’ vs. ‘defensive’ weapons to Ukraine. Ukraine is fighting a defensive war, so whatever weapons it uses are therefore defensive. Again, the purpose is to ensure and accelerate Russian defeat. 2/4
As often happens, commentators of various kinds are outsmarting themselves with spurious distinctions. This is a war, and war is a test of endurance. The Ukrainians have the will, the skill, & a just cause. It’s up to us to arm them and cripple their - our - enemy’s economy. 3/4