Eliot A Cohen Profile picture
Professor at JHU SAIS; Arleigh Burke chair at CSIS. Contributing writer @TheAtlantic. Personal opinions only; retweets do not imply agreement.
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Nov 1, 2023 6 tweets 2 min read
I don’t normally respond to the folly of colleagues & not in this forum. This is an exception. I wish to address the second sentence of that paragraph @Vali_Nasr celebrates: “The European, ethno-nationalist settler colonial project in Palestine has entered its final phase.” 1/6 This is eliminationist rhetoric. The only way the author could be satisfied is by the destruction of the State of Israel, which was, let us remember sanctioned by the United Nations in 1947. And we know what elimination of the state means - or should. It means massacre. 2/6
Feb 14, 2023 8 tweets 3 min read
A number of layers of folly in this piece; strong thread to follow, beginning with the deliberate leak to the press of a dangerous view. washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/… 1/8 “We will continue to try to impress upon them that we can’t do anything and everything forever.” Whichever senior official said this to a reporter is either committing gross strategic malpractice, or something worse. 2/8
Sep 11, 2022 4 tweets 2 min read
I believe it was Moshe Dayan who said that every enemy soldier fleeing the battlefield carries with him a deadly germ of infectious panic. We may be seeing this in Ukraine as well. If so, a broader process of Russian collapse may be under way. 1/4 Way, way too much of Western military analysis has focused on the tangibles - the things you can count. In the end, the things you can’t count - courage or fear, cohesion or distrust, leadership or its absence - matter just as much and some times more. 2/4
Jun 1, 2022 4 tweets 1 min read
Since I’m seeing lots of articles saying, in essence, the West is giving up (or should) on pushing Russia back at least to the 24 February line, I am re-upping this piece: 1/4 theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/… There are people who should know better: who should know that we are barely three months into a bitter war; that the other side is feeling the strain too; that sticking it out is hard, but that giving up is a lot worse. It is foolish, and it is weak. 2/4
May 31, 2022 4 tweets 1 min read
Some people unhappy with my criticism of POTUS’ excluding shipping weapons to Ukraine that can hit Russia. Two thoughts: (1) I take the President at his word. If the WH wants to clarify, let them hurry up and do so. “Of course he doesn’t mean it” is not much of an excuse. 1/2 What, precisely, would be wrong with giving the Ukrainians ATACMS, if that’s all that has been ruled off the table? The more heavily armed the Ukrainians are, the sooner the war ends, and the sooner the suffering stops. 2/2
May 30, 2022 4 tweets 1 min read
Until now I had thought that the Biden administration had somewhat recovered from the appalling incompetence of its Afghan withdrawal decision. Until now. 1/4 The President’s statement that the US will not give the Ukrainians weapons capable of taking the war into Russian territory is an act of strategic incoherence and incompetence. It is morally reprehensible as well. 2/4
May 20, 2022 4 tweets 1 min read
It’s not particularly surprising that at this point in a grinding, bloody war @nytimes, and some American think tanks as well as in the French, German and Italian governments look for a way out with a compromise that will dismember Ukraine further. 1/4 The spirit of appeasement and surrender will always be with us; the willingness to sell out people fighting for their freedom and their lives will always be with us; the fear of success in defeating dictators will always be with us. 2/4
Apr 29, 2022 11 tweets 3 min read
If it is true that General Gerasimov is assuming direct command of combat operations in Ukraine from a forward headquarters there are, as ever, two possibilities. 1/6 The first is that as the Russians launch the decisive maneuver(s) of the war, they want their very best field commander to complete these heroic tasks, orchestrating fire and maneuver, land air and sea as only a superb field commander can. And obviously, he’s the best! 2/6
Apr 25, 2022 8 tweets 3 min read
This excellent thread by @MarkHertling got me thinking about a question: why has the analysis of this war by retired generals such as him, @general_ben and @edwardstrngr, and first rate military historians such as @PhillipsPOBrien been superior to that of the Russian military.1/8 .analytic community? This requires serious research, & am helping launch some, because its an important question. But here are some initial hypotheses: experience, particularly of high level command in a shooting war sensitizes one to all the intangibles mentioned 2/8
Apr 21, 2022 5 tweets 1 min read
Latest arms package for Ukraine — 72 155mm howitzers, 144k rounds, more UAV’s — much more like the scale we need to be operating on. One always wishes it had happened weeks ago, but this is an important step forward. Bravo Biden administration & Pentagon. 1/5 Important phenomenon here: we see the Ukrainians can use heavy weapons well and have a real chance, so we provide more; other countries e.g. Netherlands even Spain step forward; reluctant countries e.g. Germany begin to catch up. Healthy competitive dynamic. 2/5
Apr 18, 2022 6 tweets 2 min read
If the Russian offensive has not begun, it is about to. What’s needed now isn’t conceptually complicated: it is arming the Ukrainians to the max and as fast as possible with long range fires (howitzers and rocket systems), air defense systems (radars, missiles, etc.), 1/6 Armored vehicles to move troops around, aircraft & helos. There have to be creative options open - by sea as well as by air & land. And equally important, we (led by the US) need to make it clear that (1) we will do this without stinting; (2) we will go as long as it takes; 2/6
Apr 6, 2022 7 tweets 2 min read
Two possible narratives here. Narrative #1. After a surprising setback the Russian General Staff, drawing on the traditions of Suvorov, Zhukov, etc. regroups, switches its line of effort, and focuses on closing the Slovianka pocket, trapping most of the UA regular army. 1/7 Cue words like “Kesselschlacht,” “deep maneuver,” “fire sack” etc. etc. They seize Ukraine’s Black Sea coast (up to Odessa) and Russia imposes a compromise, frozen armistice, in which Moscow walks away with some gains, though not overthrow of Ukrainian government. Success! 2/7
Apr 3, 2022 4 tweets 1 min read
Talk of whether sanctions are ‘proportional’ or can deter further Russian criminal behavior is pointless. The purpose of sanctions now is to throttle the Russian economy, which, together with battlefield defeat and high losses are the only thing that can stop Putin. 1/4 Equally pointless is discussion about giving ‘offensive’ vs. ‘defensive’ weapons to Ukraine. Ukraine is fighting a defensive war, so whatever weapons it uses are therefore defensive. Again, the purpose is to ensure and accelerate Russian defeat. 2/4
Feb 27, 2022 11 tweets 2 min read
Stipulating that we have no idea how this will turn out, it is worth tallying some of the surprises thus far. Apparent lack of punch in Russian initial attack, to include on Ukrainian air forces; ineffective airborne assaults and spetsnaz raids; ferocity of Ukrainian resistance in depth. 1/