Thread by @PhillipsPOBrien

A brief, somewhat nerdy thread written because of an belief on US public opinion and war expressed in this @nytimes editorial--which is widely shared but actually has little evidence to support it. That is that US public opinion loses interest in wars. nytimes.com/2022/05/19/opi…

The idea that US public opinion on war is fickle and has a short attention span is widespread. The editorial is a argues that Ukraine needs to make concessions because US public opinion could do just that.

The real problem with this assumption is that there is almost no evidence for it beyond people thinking its true. There has actually been a huge amount of academic work on US opinion and wars, which shows a few things that puncture this lazy assumption.

One thing is that US public opinion is far more 'sticky' than people think. This study by John Mueller on US public opinion and the war on terror argues that the public actually is not easy to manipulate once it has made up its mind. jstor.org/stable/resrep3…

This is just one example of a broad field of scholarship on US public opinion and war. We have studies showing the impact of partisanship, media framing, identity, victory/defeat, casualties, etc on US opinion. However, there is little evidence that US opinion gets loses interest

When it comes to changing US public opinions and war, Ive always thought the arguments by Peter Feaver, Richard Gelpi and Jason Reifler in Paying the Human Costs of War are really interesting. press.princeton.edu/books/paperbac…

They argue that actually what determines US public opinion towards war is not casualty levels (or lack of interest) but perceptions of victory. In other words the US public will stick supporting a war they have committed to, as long as it is winnable.

There is strong evidence for this. Its worth noting that even their critics argue not against their ideas on pro-war feeling, but more that the US public is generally indicative of a latent pro-war support in the US, as in this review article. jstor.org/stable/4500363…

I delved into this lit in detail for an article I wrote on US public opinion at the outbreak of war in Europe in 1914, which discovered that the US public, far from being shocked and anti-war in 1914 (as was widely argued) was excited and drawn to the war. academic.oup.com/dh/article-abs…

Here are the first three pages, if you want to see the different visions. I tried to lay them out. You know can see what I meant by nerdy.

Long story short--in all the research there is no evidence of the US public losing interest in wars out of boredom or distraction. Far from it. US public opinion seems fascinated with war, and the most convincing evidence is that it changes if it thinks a war in not winnable.

This helps explain what we see in US public opinion so far. That there is strong support for helping Ukraine win and that Russia is a threat that extends outside of Ukraine and needs to be confronted. pewresearch.org/politics/2022/…

So, when it comes to US public opinion the real point is not that the US public will lose interest, its more that it will turn against the war if it thinks Ukraine cant win. Thats whats important and what those pressing for Ukraine to make major concessions dont get.

By making Ukraine look weak because of fear that Russia will be embarassed, the opposite in US public is more likely to happen, that the US public will think Ukraine is weak and cant win.

IOW, helping Ukraine win is the way to keep support for the war and allow Ukraine to emerge victorious. Forcing it to compromise is more likely to lead to a bad result.....Nerdy enough for you?

And in no way was that brief. Apologies