1/ Made a more refined take on BTG logistical requirements, now taking into account fuel and ammunition packaging size. If spaced out daily, it still came to about ~14 truckloads + ~3 7,500 L tanker trucks (deleted the 1st thread because Twitter didn't like PowerPoint)
2/ Actual resupply for ammunition is likely to measure on their end by units of fire (Боекомплект) which can vary by system, but the truckload metric at least gives us a rough idea of how much truck capacity may be needed.
3/ Obviously, they aren't necessarily expending all their ordinance for every system, and consumption may be more than expected for others (artillery mainly), so allocation of truckloads may vary.
4/ I tried to use a roughly "typical" BTG to determine requirements, the vehicle counts are on the first graphic. If a BTG is reduced because of losses, obviously it would consume fewer supplies. On the other hand, if it had a second battery of 2S19s, it would consume more.
5/ I wasn't able to find ammunition packaging sizes for all munitions and the actual arrangement of the ammunition within the trucks may be less or more efficient than I depicted or be mixed differently /end for now
6/Addendum, made a typo in BM-21 Grad weight, its 100 kg each for the round and packaging. Corrected it here.
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1/ Some thoughts on ASD Wallander's comments yesterday on Ukraine's targeting of RU refineries below. GEN Cavoli also provides valuable insight throughout. Here is the full Armed Services Committee hearing to follow along:
2/ The first exchange over Ukrainian targeting occurs at 53:55. Scott (R - Georgia) asks why Ukraine should not attack Russian oil & gas infrastructure when Russia is doing the same to Ukraine.
3/ 54:20 - Wallander responds the Biden administration has concerns about the targeting of civilian infrastructure. "Ukraine should follow the laws of armed conflict and that's one of the elements of being a European democracy."
1/4 Some people (mainly tankies TBH) seem to have the impression that the Avdiivka withdrawal consisted of hundreds of Ukrainians leaving all at once and getting hit in the open. It's now apparent the retreat lasted for several days at least and consisted of mostly small groups.
2/4 Making some rough assumptions: if the Avdiivka grouping was ~2000 people, and the withdrawal consisted of small groups of about 20 people leaving every 30 minutes, the entire withdrawal would take 50 hours. Assuming nighttime movement only, a little over a week.
3/4 Properly dispersed, such movement would have been difficult for the Russians to stop with artillery and drones alone; direct fire and direct physical control over the routes would have, but this wasn't established until relatively late in the process (on or about 16 FEB).
In case its not utterly clear, yes, Russia would've invaded regardless eventually of whatever guarantees Ukraine had given them. Hard to believe otherwise when Russia's leadership believes and has repeatedly stated Ukraine shouldn't exist as an independent country
1/ Outlining the points I made on Substack briefly in Tweet format: currently, I still believe it is unlikely Russia or Belarus will launch a ground offensive from Belarusian territory this winter
2/ Somewhere between 10000 to 15000 Russian troops in Belarus. About half are probably at Obuz-Lesnovsky near Baranavichy. The rest are dispersed in approximately 500 to 1000 personnel groups across the country as described on Substack.
3/ Russia had somewhere between 2 and 3 times that amount for the first offensive on Kyiv, with many VDV units
Hi all, been a while so figured it would be a good time to give an update on what I've been working on. Basically a ground level up study on supply requirements for Russian units and an effort to understand potential issues in Russian force design.
At this point in the conflict no one is close to full strength so the effort is mainly focused on the initial phases. There are a few English sources I've looked at (Russia Way of War by Bartles/Grau for one) but I've mainly used Russian sources.
Much of what I'm doing is confirming the setup of MTO battalions in Russian maneuver brigades and comparing it to what we've seen. Preliminary evidence suggests MTO battalions are substantially understrength via captured docs, footage, and imagery, but much work still to be done.
1/ A couple of somewhat brief opinions/thoughts on the successful Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast.
2/ Hundreds of Russian vehicles were lost, most being abandoned. At least 200, more will be counted over the coming days. Based on others' work on analyzing Oryx's data with captured Russian documents, I generally assume the # we count on social media is 70% of the actual total.
3/ While there were no doubt Ukrainian losses, we would be seeing more if they were anywhere as significant as the Russian losses. Framing this as anything other than a significant victory, potentially altering the course of the war, would be a mistake.