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https://twitter.com/HN_Schlottman/status/16062722671676661762/ Somewhere between 10000 to 15000 Russian troops in Belarus. About half are probably at Obuz-Lesnovsky near Baranavichy. The rest are dispersed in approximately 500 to 1000 personnel groups across the country as described on Substack.



At this point in the conflict no one is close to full strength so the effort is mainly focused on the initial phases. There are a few English sources I've looked at (Russia Way of War by Bartles/Grau for one) but I've mainly used Russian sources.
"Approx. Strength in BTG" is cumulative for HQ units is total assessed for across its listed subordinate units. I'm not doing the individual BTG geocords at the moment (largely a lack of info and time required). I also need to further refine some methodology.


2/ First thing I did was count the # of pixels wide and high the box was. Important thing is the ratio: 530/90 = 5.8. It's at a bit of an angle, so it's hard to tell. If the latches at the top are included, the ratio is about 5.4, so that's the ballpark I went with.
https://twitter.com/MotolkoHelp/status/1540354447163146240@MotolkoHelp Some useful pictures of ammunition crates from the depot. Looks like artillery shells and rockets at first glance. berezacity.by/posts/15-istor…

2/ Changes for Kherson: Shifted forces north in response to UA bridgehead over Inhulets. Placed 2 BTGs of 20th GMRD back near Kherson city. They've likely been there since April, but I had previously removed them due to info they had withdrawn that turned out to be wrong
2/ This assumes that the numbers stated by Oleksandr Danylyuk and my estimates of number of artillery systems currently involved in fighting are accurate. subjected my system numbers to sensitivity analysis by +- 20%, shown in the range of estimates and slide notes.
@DefMon3 @Danspiun 2/ A few brief notes. Updates are running a little slower due to being sick and also prioritizing getting some other items done.
@DefMon3 @Danspiun 2/ Not much news from the Izium area over the past week, but at this point, I think many of the units (1st GTA, 20th CAA) formerly there have moved back into Belgorod Oblast. Fairly low confidence estimate at this point and is based on UA General Staff statements primarily.
https://twitter.com/HN_Schlottman/status/1527724568328212489T-72B3M's assessed to be from 150th MRD in Popasna. Further reflections on Telegram supported this. h/t @Danspiun
https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1529723506749063169
https://twitter.com/John_A_Ridge/status/1528907746971684864Russia started reactivating and refurbishing T-62's a number of years ago to supply to Syria. In Zapad-21, they moved several hundred of these from a reserve storage base near Ukraine at Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy: rochan-consulting.com/zapad-2021-str…

2/ Actual resupply for ammunition is likely to measure on their end by units of fire (Боекомплект) which can vary by system, but the truckload metric at least gives us a rough idea of how much truck capacity may be needed.
https://twitter.com/HN_Schlottman/status/15253496101930967052/ Russia's short term aim over the next 7 days appears to be to seize Bakhmut (Бахмут) and to continue widening the Popasna salient.
https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1526164608238624769
@DI_Ukraine @dupuyinstitute 2/ It's very interesting to see the relatively low rate of casualties compared to equipment lost. @oryxspioenkop's site had roughly 40% of T-80U's destroyed, the rest were abandoned.