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Henry Schlottman Profile picture
Henry Schlottman
@HN_Schlottman
Independent OSINT/Operations Analyst. Contributor for @NZZ. DM box open.
Lanny Ziering Profile picture chris Matthew Profile picture Josef Böhm Profile picture Ruben Chagaray Profile picture Novaxx Djocovid 🌻 Profile picture 24 subscribed
Apr 12 • 18 tweets • 4 min read
1/ Some thoughts on ASD Wallander's comments yesterday on Ukraine's targeting of RU refineries below. GEN Cavoli also provides valuable insight throughout. Here is the full Armed Services Committee hearing to follow along: 2/ The first exchange over Ukrainian targeting occurs at 53:55. Scott (R - Georgia) asks why Ukraine should not attack Russian oil & gas infrastructure when Russia is doing the same to Ukraine.
Feb 18 • 5 tweets • 1 min read
1/4 Some people (mainly tankies TBH) seem to have the impression that the Avdiivka withdrawal consisted of hundreds of Ukrainians leaving all at once and getting hit in the open. It's now apparent the retreat lasted for several days at least and consisted of mostly small groups. 2/4 Making some rough assumptions: if the Avdiivka grouping was ~2000 people, and the withdrawal consisted of small groups of about 20 people leaving every 30 minutes, the entire withdrawal would take 50 hours. Assuming nighttime movement only, a little over a week.
Jan 19, 2023 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
Yep factcheck.org/2022/02/russia…
Dec 23, 2022 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
1/ Outlining the points I made on Substack briefly in Tweet format: currently, I still believe it is unlikely Russia or Belarus will launch a ground offensive from Belarusian territory this winter 2/ Somewhere between 10000 to 15000 Russian troops in Belarus. About half are probably at Obuz-Lesnovsky near Baranavichy. The rest are dispersed in approximately 500 to 1000 personnel groups across the country as described on Substack.
Nov 9, 2022 • 7 tweets • 2 min read
Hi all, been a while so figured it would be a good time to give an update on what I've been working on. Basically a ground level up study on supply requirements for Russian units and an effort to understand potential issues in Russian force design. At this point in the conflict no one is close to full strength so the effort is mainly focused on the initial phases. There are a few English sources I've looked at (Russia Way of War by Bartles/Grau for one) but I've mainly used Russian sources.
Sep 14, 2022 • 9 tweets • 2 min read
1/ A couple of somewhat brief opinions/thoughts on the successful Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast. 2/ Hundreds of Russian vehicles were lost, most being abandoned. At least 200, more will be counted over the coming days. Based on others' work on analyzing Oryx's data with captured Russian documents, I generally assume the # we count on social media is 70% of the actual total.
Aug 30, 2022 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
Finished an update for 27 August for uawardata.com. A few significant changes/improvements: Added both a notes and a sources field. Strength in BTG for HQ units includes subordinate units in parenthesis, Unlocated subordinated units have an asterisk. "Approx. Strength in BTG" is cumulative for HQ units is total assessed for across its listed subordinate units. I'm not doing the individual BTG geocords at the moment (largely a lack of info and time required). I also need to further refine some methodology.
Aug 18, 2022 • 18 tweets • 6 min read
1/ TASS: Executive director of Kurganmashzavod (KMZ) appears to have been asked by the Russian MOD to resume production of "earlier generation BMPs", likely meaning BMP-2's (overhauls and possibly new builds). Currently, they produce mainly BMP-3's/BMD-4M's. Possible explanation 2/ Original sources here:
tass.ru/interviews/154…
tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/1…
Obligatory caveat: Russian state media.
Aug 15, 2022 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
1/ Hi all, haven't tweeted in a while. I've had some exceptionally bad luck with health recently. I'm fairly confident I got food poisoning over the weekend so I'm out of commission again. I never really expected to get this many followers and I know some of you reached... 2/ out asking where the updates are. I've been working on some projects, but the main thing troubling me lately is a certain lack of rigor when it comes to my sourcing my own analysis. The lack of sourcing would no doubt make most 350F's shudder...
Jun 29, 2022 • 10 tweets • 5 min read
1/ Gone through quite a few materials, now reasonably sure this is a case for 2x 122mm rounds plus charges that was pictured being loaded, apparently at Bronnaya Gara, Belarus several days ago. How I came to this conclusion to follow. ImageImageImage 2/ First thing I did was count the # of pixels wide and high the box was. Important thing is the ratio: 530/90 = 5.8. It's at a bit of an angle, so it's hard to tell. If the latches at the top are included, the ratio is about 5.4, so that's the ballpark I went with. Image
Jun 27, 2022 • 14 tweets • 6 min read
1/ Thanks to @DAlperovitch for having me on last night, a few elaborations on what I said on a couple points which I may not have communicated very well in the moment @DAlperovitch 2/ A mid 90's congressional report put the total number of US artillery projectiles stored at about 25 million (20.8 Army, 400k Marines). This number is available here: govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GA…
Jun 25, 2022 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
From @MotolkoHelp about the loading of ammunition in Belarus. Depot mentioned is at 52.612887, 25.066014 near the town of Bronnaya Gara. Not sure how significant this is yet, but interesting enough to do some research on the depot (what it stores and how much) this morning. @MotolkoHelp Some useful pictures of ammunition crates from the depot. Looks like artillery shells and rockets at first glance. berezacity.by/posts/15-istor…
Jun 17, 2022 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
1/ Update for 13 June done on uawardata.com
Data: github.com/simonhuwiler/u…
Some refinements for assessed Russian forces in Kherson Oblast and near Izium Image 2/ Changes for Kherson: Shifted forces north in response to UA bridgehead over Inhulets. Placed 2 BTGs of 20th GMRD back near Kherson city. They've likely been there since April, but I had previously removed them due to info they had withdrawn that turned out to be wrong
Jun 14, 2022 • 16 tweets • 4 min read
1/ Last week's statements of 🇷🇺 firing 50-60k shells/rockets for every 5-6k 🇺🇦 shells presented a unique opportunity to quantify 🇷🇺 current artillery advantage in terms of rounds fired per system and draw some preliminary conclusions. See attached picture /brief thread hopefully 2/ This assumes that the numbers stated by Oleksandr Danylyuk and my estimates of number of artillery systems currently involved in fighting are accurate. subjected my system numbers to sensitivity analysis by +- 20%, shown in the range of estimates and slide notes.
Jun 6, 2022 • 8 tweets • 5 min read
1/ Update for 05 June done on uawardata.com
Data: github.com/simonhuwiler/u…
Limited gains by either side over past week, conflict is increasing attritional. h/t
@DefMon3 @Danspiun @DefMon3 @Danspiun 2/ A few brief notes. Updates are running a little slower due to being sick and also prioritizing getting some other items done.
May 28, 2022 • 6 tweets • 5 min read
1/ Update for 27 May done on uawardata.com
Data: github.com/simonhuwiler/u…
🇷🇺 likely continued to redeploy forces towards the Popasna area and secured Lyman over the past week. Heatmap because officers like heatmaps. h/t @DefMon3 @Danspiun @DefMon3 @Danspiun 2/ Not much news from the Izium area over the past week, but at this point, I think many of the units (1st GTA, 20th CAA) formerly there have moved back into Belgorod Oblast. Fairly low confidence estimate at this point and is based on UA General Staff statements primarily.
May 27, 2022 • 5 tweets • 3 min read
Returning to this, VDV unit is almost certainly 76th Guards Air Assault Division (likely 1 or 2 battalions). Elements of 150th Motorized Rifle Division is now moderate confidence. Rest unchanged. Still likely 8 BTG equivalents or so in the Popasna grouping of variable strengths. T-72B3M's assessed to be from 150th MRD in Popasna. Further reflections on Telegram supported this. h/t @Danspiun
May 24, 2022 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
If the UA General Staff is accurate on this one, T-62's are going to start showing in Ukraine pretty soon. Russia started reactivating and refurbishing T-62's a number of years ago to supply to Syria. In Zapad-21, they moved several hundred of these from a reserve storage base near Ukraine at Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy: rochan-consulting.com/zapad-2021-str…
May 22, 2022 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
1/ Made a more refined take on BTG logistical requirements, now taking into account fuel and ammunition packaging size. If spaced out daily, it still came to about ~14 truckloads + ~3 7,500 L tanker trucks (deleted the 1st thread because Twitter didn't like PowerPoint) ImageImage 2/ Actual resupply for ammunition is likely to measure on their end by units of fire (Боекомплект) which can vary by system, but the truckload metric at least gives us a rough idea of how much truck capacity may be needed.
May 20, 2022 • 9 tweets • 2 min read
1/ Update for 20 May done on uawardata.com
Data: github.com/simonhuwiler/u…
Assessment: As mentioned last week, 🇷🇺 shifted towards an offensive out of the Popasna area in order to achieve its operational goal of isolating Severodonetsk. A few more thoughts to follow. 2/ Russia's short term aim over the next 7 days appears to be to seize Bakhmut (Бахмут) and to continue widening the Popasna salient.
May 17, 2022 • 4 tweets • 5 min read
1/ I've gone through the original posting by @DI_Ukraine and looked at losses for each unit. I've made a graphic listing a couple of the key ones, as well as some comparative rates from Lawrence's "War by Numbers" (@dupuyinstitute) @DI_Ukraine @dupuyinstitute 2/ It's very interesting to see the relatively low rate of casualties compared to equipment lost. @oryxspioenkop's site had roughly 40% of T-80U's destroyed, the rest were abandoned.