Thread by @BretDevereaux

So, I find this article at @TheAtlantic really quite frustrating (theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/…).

On a point where the public needs clarity, it obscures more than it elucidates, fumbling both the historical analogs and the modern context. 1/

Let's start with the historical analogs. Centering Hampton Roads (March 8-9, 1862) as the moment wooden warships became obsolete ignores the more important European context. Monitor and Virginia weren't the first ironclads, Gloire (1959) and HMS Warrior (1860) were earlier. 2/

Far more crucial to demonstrating the vulnerability of wooden warships was the Battle of Sinop (1853) in which a Russian squadron with explosive shells utterly smashed a Turkish squadron without them.

"in one day" wildly overstates the importance of March 9, 1862. 3/

And the same is true with Pearl Harbor. If Dec. 7th, 1941 "settled the battleship-versus-carrier debate" than the decision to complete, launch (in '42-'44) and commission (in '43-44) the Iowa class would be truly befuddling. 4/

But actually, while it was clear that carriers and not battleships would provide the primary ship-killing power in the Pacific, BBs still fulfilled key functions through WW2, including shore bombardment, anti-air functions and yes, ship to ship actions. 5/

And while we're here, describing the BBs lost at pearl harbor as "the cream of America's battleship fleet" is also isn't wrong but it is a fudge. The 2 newest US BBs (-55 and -56, both commissioned earlier in '41) weren't there and of the BBs that were, most were older ships. 6/

Of the Colorado class (next newest, launched in '20-'21) 2/3 were damaged (Maryland, W. Virginia), but Maryland back in service Feb. '42.

The 2 ships totally lost by launch year were Arizona ('15), Oklahoma ('14). Heavily damaged were W. Virginia ('21) and California ('19). 7/

(Lighter damage Maryland ('21), Tennessee ('19) and Nevada ('14) all back in service in '42).

Sore losses, to be sure, but mostly older, dated ships that remained in service due to the Washington Naval Treaty and paired back naval spending.

The cream of a rather old crop. 8/

And you could argue these are just shades of nuance except that the rest of the article really depends here on a strong reading of 'obsolete' because the central argument is that the sinking of the Moskva justifies the current shift in the Marine Corps' force design. 9/

I present no arguments on Marine force design. Not my bailiwick. But this argument doesn't hold.

First, the Moskva ain't an Arleigh Burke - its systems are much less modern and there may have been both tech and crew training failures: oryxspioenkop.com/2022/04/neptun… 10/

Consequently it is a lot to read into the sinking of a single aged ship, operating without effective support (including air observation or cover), with likely technical and crew training deficiencies.

Nor is this the first time an ASM has sunk a ship! en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Sheff… /11

More broadly, the author's claims about Ukraine demonstrating an 'anti-platform' defense with javelins&stingers instead of tanks&artillery is consistent with the breathless reporting, but not with the more sober military analysis of what is actually happening in Ukraine. 12/

I wonder, for instance, how old the Seth Moulton quote used here, "top of the Ukrainin's wish list...it isn't towed howitzers" because "U.S. artillery supplies" were apparently item number 2 on the latest Zelenskyy wishlist! politico.com/newsletters/na… 13/

In fact Ukrainian requests shifted from supposed 'anti-platform' weapons to asking for...well...platforms, like self-propelled artillery, MRLS platforms, towed guns, IFVs, APCs and tanks weeks ago. politico.com/newsletters/na… 14/

Whatever is the right call for the Marines, who can after all, rely on the Army to cover some missions, the Ukrainians aren't 'divesting' their tanks, AFVs or jets - because you need those 'platforms' (can you tell I don't like this term?) to go on the offensive. 15/

And this - the fact that man-portable anti-tank and anti-air systems had a bigger media profile compared to their still significant, but not-war-winner combat profile - has been something you couldn't avoid learning paying attention to folks like @KofmanMichael or @RALee85 16/

That much of the fighting in Ukraine, especially after the initial weeks, was between two 'platform' armies making heavy use of artillery, airstrikes and armor is something you just couldn't miss listening to @KofmanMichael 's WotR podcast appearances: warontherocks.com/2022/05/counte… 17/

So the counter-argument here isn't obscure, but something readily apparent to anyone closely following the war in Ukraine: the Ukrainians aren't running a scrappy, anti-platform defense, but a conventional one, with fortified front lines in the Donbas. 18/

So the argument is a trainwreck: the sinking of a SINGLE technically deficient, 40-year old ship proves the advantages of an anti-platform approach as demonstrated supposedly by the Ukrainians, except they aren't actually using that approach or abandoning their 'platforms.' 19/

Frustratingly, the article then closes with a thin analogy to the Maginot line, which 'failed to account for' 'more advanced tanks, aircraft and combined arms doctrine' which is just...missing the role of the Maginot line in the Battle of France in 1940. 20/

The Maginot line was never supposed to stop a German advance, it was supposed to channel it through the Low Countries where the French army could meet and stop it in the field.

And it did! It was the French army that failed; the Maginot Line achieved its part of the plan. 22/

Instead we get a school-boy's version of the Battle of France, which imagines the French were surprised by the German push through the Low Countries. They weren't! That was the entire plan! (that it came through the Ardennes and not further north was the surprise) 23/

Again, I have no brief on Force Design 2030. Maybe the Marines should go this way, since the USA has another entire branch committed to large-scale land operations called the US Army which also does amphibious operations (Army, not Marines at D-Day, remember). 24/

But an argument for it - this ain't it. A general misreading of the conflict in Ukraine atop a simplistic reading of what happened to the Moskva layered atop an unsophisticated-at-best and simply wrong at worst reading of military history does not a strong argument make. 25/

Honestly, this isn't the first time nor probably will it be the last but seeing this sort of weak, pop-historical grasp of military history from current or former officers worries me greatly. Surely we can teach our lieutenants better than this? end/