It increasingly looks like ๐ฉ๐ช Bundestag vote for #heavyweapons to ๐บ๐ฆ has achieved nothing โ perhaps even the opposite of its intended objective: gov line of hesitation & caution appears unchanged, but pathways to amending this line have narrowed down due to vote. Short ๐งต (1/8).
Many observers (incl. I) assumed that gov felt hindered by a lack of parliamentary mandate to step up weapons support or at least, would change course when receiving mandate. But voices inside & outside ๐ฆ coalition doubt there has been a change ๐ (2/8).
I wonโt speculate about the reasons for inertia โ just assume that significant forces in gov are not willing to do as much as possible & demanded by many MPs. So what can be done now? Ironically, Bundestag vote for #heavyweapons legitimizes & consolidates hesitant gov line (3/8).
1. Text of vote conditions deliveries on other factors eg. ๐ฉ๐ช NATO duties & capabilities ๐. Essentially, it thereby validates gov previous claims to send whatever *itself* deems โpossibleโ โ by own assessment. Debatable how much material change vote implied in first place (4/8).
2. Bundestag vote for #heavyweapons has now created faith in the assumption that ๐ฉ๐ช is (will be) delivering such weapons (eg. in survey qโs ๐): if Bundestag said so, it must happen! It diverts attention from the question of whether gov is *actually* doing what it could do (5/8).
3. If gov doesnโt want to change approach itself, only way to enforce a more robust approach is further Bundestag action โ either by threatening gov survival or binding gov hands legislatively. Given last monthโs vote for #heavyweapons, both pathways are more unlikely now (6/8).
Many MPs will feel that first vote delivered enough (cheap talk) to save ๐ฆ face in public, incl. some MPs willing to pass a more substantial vote a month ago. Problem is: any piece of legislation now would reveal that Bundestag doesnโt control gov & earlier vote failed ๐ฃ (7/8).
In other words, while effective legislation would have been an easier option last month, the stakes are much higher now: what looked like a policy disagreement btw gov & parl. majority then, would now reveal a deep rift btw gov & its parl. support.
German Greens are really in a precarious position now. There is no party in ๐ฉ๐ช parliament who got more right on ๐ท๐บโ they had warned about ๐ท๐บ (esp. NS1/2) for years & decades. Usually, thatโs the penalty kick when you expose the mistakes of the others & collect electoral supportโฆ
โฆ& in this case, it wouldnโt be cheap exploitation of otherโs failures, it would just be showcasing your competence โ they had a better, more accurate analysis of the situation. A great opportunity! But so far Greens leadership has decided against bc it would mean exposing SPDโฆ
Their current & favorite coalition partner. Demanding investigations into ๐ท๐บ connection & criticizing SPD leaders publicly could end the coalition. SPD could try to portray Greens as unreliable & reckless. Huge risks for party & short-term stability of gov. But the dangers ofโฆ
This Easter we will hear everyone wishing peace for ๐บ๐ฆ. And while "peace" is the word that for us all symbolizes hope & a better future, something we don't have to explain, understand instantly, there are different forms of peace. So which peace are you talking of?๐งต 1/8
1) The Ukrainian peace. This peace has ๐ท๐บ withdraw from / being forced out of all Ukrainian territory (perhaps save some concession, ie. Crimea), ๐บ๐ฆ democracy survive & being guarantueed by own & others' military capabilities. For some it also means NATO and/or EU membership. 2/8
2) The continued "peace". This is a continuation of what Westerners called "peace" since 2014. Parts of Ukraine are occupied, annexed & russified by Russian troops (eg. incl. new territories), intensity of conflict is lower. ๐บ๐ฆ will be unable to become part of NATO or EU. 3/8
Reading ๐ฉ๐ช commentators on Twitter & online forums on #steinmeier many say ๐ฉ๐ช is one of biggest donors of ๐บ๐ฆ, delivers weapons, has done โZeitenwendeโ & many demand that gov should โdraw conclusionsโ from ๐บ๐ฆ uninvite. What they donโt mention: ๐ฉ๐ช has sent & is sending more ๐ดโฆ1/5
for energy to ๐ท๐บ than anyone else & was (is?) key supporter of allowing ๐ช๐บ depend on ๐ท๐บ energy โ financing Putin. Normally, if you enable war you are not invited or applauded but must go through humiliation & make up for what you have doneโฆbefore even being talked to again. 2/5
Out of all countries ๐ฉ๐ช should know about this from its history. But perhaps thatโs precisely why it is hard to admit to oneself that one bears (some) responsibility (much less than in past) for war โ again. Itโs hard to see what โ by your identity โ is not allowed to happen. 3/5
Do parties' failures to represent voters fuel populist sentiment? Using a 12-country survey experiment during 2019 EP elections, @b_castanho & I find that they do - at least among those who were not populist pretreatment. Now out at @PSRMJournal ๐(1/9) cambridge.org/core/journals/โฆ
While many explanations of populism focus on economic & cultural grievances, one partially alternative, partially complementary argument is about parties' inability to represent voters' policy positions. If voters feel no party represents them, they may become more populist (2/9)
Causal inference (esp. simultaneity) is a key problem here: "poor" representation may make people more anti-elitist, think with a Manichaean outlook & demand "power to the people". Alternatively, populist attitudes may cause people to (mis)perceive representation as worse (3/9)
Out now in @AJPS_Editor "Multidimensional Representation" with Fabio Wolkenstein. This is a paper about *HOW* we should study political representation. Basic motivation is that there is a gap between theoretical and empirical work on representation. (1/8)
While recent theoretical work (e.g. by Mansbridge, Saward, Rehfeld), which we call the *NEW WAVE*, has highlighted various important & exciting dimensions of representation, empiricists have not incorporated these theoretical insights in their designs. Check these tables: (2/8)
Analyzing a random sample of empirical articles on representation, we find that most do not engage with theory at all, or draw on Hanna Pitkin's conceptions of representation (in particular, substantive & descriptive representation). "New wave" is absent in empirical work. (3/8)
Out now in @PolBehavior with @FabianNeuner! Using three conjoint experiments, we explore which exact components of populist ideology draw voters to populist politicians, focusing on the case of Germany and Bundestag elections. (1/5) link.springer.com/article/10.100โฆ
We identify key "thin" populist ideology components: people-centrism, anti-elitism, proclamation of crisis. As well as "thick" populist ideology components: anti-refugees, anti-EU, anti-globalization & pro-redistribution. We operationalize all as candidate attributes (2/5).
Results show that political candidates in Germany can increase expected vote shares with anti-refugee & pro-redistribution as well as people-centric appeals, but not with anti-elite or anti-globalization/anti-EU messages. (3/5)