Russia is running out of tanks. That's the inescapable conclusion from reports that it's transporting some of its reported 2,500 stored T-62s to support its war in Ukraine. What does this mean logistically and operationally? A 🧵 with some observations and deductions. /1
The T-62 is a very old tank indeed. Designed in the late 1950s to compete with the UK Chieftain and US M60, some examples in Russian storage bases are likely to be approaching 60 years old. Production ceased in 1975 after which it was largely relegated to reserve service. /2
Having said that, it's unlikely that Russia is reactivating its very oldest T-62s. It's more likely that the tanks being transported to Ukraine are T-62Ms, modernised in 1983 with protection and mobility improvements and a new fire control system. /3
@John_A_Ridge has a useful thread here on some of the implications of this development, which is worth reading. Let's first consider how the Soviet Union/Russia has used T-62s operationally in the past. /4
T-62s were heavily used in Afghanistan in the 1980s and Chechnya in the 1990s, suffering heavy losses - according to US sources, nearly 325 T-62s were lost in the Soviet-Afghan war. Russia last used T-62s in combat in 2008 during the brief war in Georgia. /5
Russia renovated an estimated 60-120 T-62s to participate in the 2018 Vostok military exercise held in Siberia and the Russian Far East. A Russian blogger has posted an interesting photo essay of the renovation work being carried out at Arseniev. /6 altyn73.livejournal.com/1318124.html
Some of these T-62s were likely subsequently shipped to Syria to replace the Syrian Army's substantial war losses. Several thousand more T-62s are still in use around the world. 900 were reportedly designated in Russia as a mobilisation reserve. /7 oryxspioenkop.com/2017/02/replen…
The Ukrainians haven't specified how many Russian T-62s are being reactivated. Many stored units are likely in a very poor condition. In the thread linked below, I highlighted a range of problems including storage conditions, theft and corruption. /8
In particular, it's very unlikely that stored T-62s have modern optics or fire control systems. Russia may have cannibalised unserviceable examples of more modern stored tanks such as T-72s or T-80s to retrofit their systems onto the T-62s it's reactivating. /9
Russia certainly wouldn't be doing this if it wasn't losing huge numbers of T72s/80s/90s. Ukraine claims that Russia has lost over 1,200 tanks. A plot of claimed losses shows how unsustainable this is - as many claimed lost in 1 month as in the entire Soviet-Afghan war. /10
T-62s are inferior in every way to more modern Russian/Soviet tanks. They have a smaller gun (115mm vs 125mm), thinner armour, no autoloader, obsolete fire control systems and radios, no night combat capabilities, lower speeds and a slower rate of fire. /11
The T-62 also presents significant logistical difficulties. The T-72, T-80 and T-90 all have a shared heritage with common parts and ammunition and a high degree of interoperability. The T-62 has a completely different lineage, descending from the venerable T-55. /12
This means that Russia will find it far harder to maintain, repair and resupply T-62s in the field. The tanks will need their own supply chain of ammunition and parts, completely separate from that of the T-72/80/90. With logistics under strain, this will be a challenge. /13
In the anti-tank missile-saturated environment of Ukraine, where modern T-90s have proven vulnerable, T-62s are likely to be death traps for their crews. They are unlikely to resist even old anti-tank missiles and have horribly exposed ammunition stowage within the hull. /14
It's been speculated that Russia may seek to replace its battalion tactical group (BTG) armour losses by padding them out with reactivated T-62s. I don't think this sort of frontline use is likely, due to the tanks' vulnerabilities. They didn't perform well in Syria. /15
Instead, Ukraine's General Staff say that the T-72s are to be used to equip reserve battalion tactical groups. I suspect they may be used in rear areas to reinforce checkpoints and suppress resistance - perhaps also to provide insurance against Ukrainian breakthroughs. /16
Even old tanks can still be formidable in such support roles. As old as the T-62 is, Russia may still nonetheless find it a useful asset in this war, albeit in a tightly limited capacity well away from Ukraine's arsenal of Javelins, NLAWs and Stugnas. /end
Russian advances in the Donbas are prompting a lot of commentary, including some irrational enthusiasm and gloom. It's worth looking at the bigger picture, as @ian_matveev (follow him!) has done in a thread which I've translated below with his permission.
From @ian_matveev: The Russian army has struck four heavy blows and breached Ukraine's defenses near Popasna. In a short thread, I will try to explain how in my opinion this will affect the war in the near future, and what to expect next.
To begin with, let's take a sober look at the situation. Two of the four strikes were assaults on Liman and Severodonetsk with massive artillery and MLRS support. This is nothing unexpected. These attacks have been prepared for a long time.
T-62s have been spotted being transported across Russia by train. The models visible are T-62Ms with applique armour and T-62MVs with Kontakt-1 explosive reactive armour. These upgrades date to 1983 and 1985 respectively. @TankDiary /2
According to Ukrainian media, they were transported from the 943rd Mobilization Deployment Support Center in Novoozerne, Crimea, and brought to the occupied southern Ukrainian city of Melitopol in Zaporizhzhia region. /3
In a now-famous thread on Russian Army tires, @TrentTelenko highlighted problems that likely arose from failures in vehicle maintenance. That got me thinking: how does Russia store its vehicles and what does this imply for how many usable tanks it actually has? A (long) 🧵. /1
According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies "Military Balance", Russia has 2,800 tanks and 13,000 other armoured vehicles (reconnaissance and infantry fighting vehicles) in current use with another 10,000 tanks and 8,500 armoured vehicles in storage. /2
Stored vehicles can be mobilised and put on trains for transportation to wherever is needed. In the months leading up to the war in Ukraine, trains carrying tanks and other armoured vehicles were a frequent and highly visible sight across Russia. /3
Video from Ukraine today shows what's claimed to be UK-made Brimstone missiles striking two tanks in rapid succession somewhere in the Donbas. A 🧵 on why Brimstone's arrival in Ukraine is a potential game-changer. /1
What is Brimstone? It's a British alternative to the better-known US Maverick anti-tank missile, but is far more capable than the Maverick. It looks somewhat similar externally, but it's the electronics inside that make the biggest difference. /2
The missile is capable of being fired in two modes - direct attack or 'fire-and-forget'. It's the latter that is most remarkable: it can be fired in salvoes that seek out targets on the ground autonomously and work together to destroy them, defeating all known armour types. /3
This is a scenario I wondered if we'd get to see - a Ukrainian drone getting caught in the blast of a catastrophically exploding tank (watch until the end). Interestingly, this drone uses 4 munitions on 1 tank - it's likely one of the large indigenously-produced R18 octocopters.
Given that the commander and gunner had already bailed out, it's quite possible that the last munition went straight through an open hatch and exploded on top of the ammunition carousel. No wonder it exploded. Thread on T-72 vulnerabilities here:
Here's a close-up of the munition - possibly a converted grenade, though the shape seems wrong for the RKG-1600s and VOG-17s I've previously seen. Possibly a mortar round? Does anyone know what it is? (@ian_matveev, any ideas?)
"Anything you can do, I can do... worse?" An interesting video has emerged of (pro-)Russian forces in Ukraine carrying out an attack with a drone. It's unintentionally revealing of the Russian side's likely limitations. A 🧵 with comparisons to Ukraine. /1
The munition shown in this video (thanks to @ian_matveev for drawing it to my attention) is a curious and very crude improvisation by forces of the separatist DNR. It comprises a hand grenade taped into what appears to be a tin can with a wire handle for carrying it. /2
Not surprisingly, the accuracy is lousy: it's not aerodynamic at all. The pilot aims at a group of cars - presumably used by Ukrainian forces - but the munition lands dozens of metres away behind a building. It likely bounces before exploding, further reducing accuracy. /3