Thread by @ABarbashin

Exactly 3 months today Russia started an invasion (re-invasion of Ukraine). Initial plan to "deal with Ukraine" in a mater of weeks failed, Putin has proven the words of Angela Merkel that he "lost contact with reality". But, neither his inner circle, nor masses have
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brought him back to reality. Why?
1. Russian political elites have shown signs of discord in first days of war were coerced back into compliance: approval or silence with some even deciding to use this war for their personal benefit, like Kirienko ridl.io/en/sergei-kiri…
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Broadly speaking there is a growing group of "party of war" - those that appear to be much bolder than president and display "proper" attitudes of loyalists - ridl.io/en/what-is-the…
This however does not mean you have large groups of Russian political, economic or cultural
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elites supporting war efforts. What is clear none of those groups so far are ready to risk self-organizing and tend to deal with their individual risk in individual mater. So far, a benefit of "Russia without Putin" is too distant/theoretical than getting arrested right now
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We should also note that the regime is going out of its way to include every single group it can in war-related efforts - so that in the eyes of the rest of the world, no Russian is "outside of the consensus", so that potential "traitors" risk loosing all at once.
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As @BenHNoble notes - unending talk of a coup is more telling of how we think of Russian political system (and how in fact it is built) - but so far most talk is premature (although, not groundless altogether)
ridl.io/en/rumours-of-…
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2. Russian society is divided at roughly a half that is ready to say they support the "special military operation" that they understand in propaganda-shaped narrative with estimates giving about 10% support the war as it is.
About 20% do not support the war at all but are
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so far not ready to act upon it, either because they are convinced they will fail or being afraid to risk everything now before the antiwar sentiment is more widespread.
Another 30% roughly say they support the war but most likely are either dishonest
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ridl.io/en/can-you-tru…

or simply join the majority because it is their way of hiding away from individual responsibility/need to deal with reality as is.
Moreover, the presumption that majority "supports the president" is reproducing - people keep repeating what is expected even if they think
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otherwise. ridl.io/en/on-the-harm…
As we don't have sociological data from other cases of nations waging an unjust aggressive wars in an environment of increasing repression and propaganda, maybe 20% of those who oppose war openly isn't that bad
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There are plenty of manifestations of antiwar sentiment across the country, including multiplying cases of military recruitment offices being burned.
Nevertheless, so far we are not seeing any prospects for an antiwar movement that could affect larger sentiment and state
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policy. Although, it is reasonable to argue that Russians' attitude made it impossible to call for mass mobilization that Russian army desperately needs. Lack of strong enough support and risk of radical change of attitude prohibit Putin from radically changing the mode of
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waring in Ukraine.
Aside form mobilization, another fact that can change how Russians perceive war is the cost of it. So far Russian economy has been able to avoid the most evident crashes, aside from record high inflation but it is a question of time.
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This "neither war nor peace" regime of economic management is something Russian economy was not ready for and as @ntrickett16 here points - creates a number of challenges ridl.io/en/russia-rsqu…
In the fall/winter those contradiction will be much more evident.
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Even if take it their would be no other factors negatively affecting Russian domestic process (which is highly unlikely), by same time next year RU economy would be a completely different beast ridl.io/en/back-to-the… - although even this scenario demands sharp increase
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in domestic repression to manage the rising dissatisfaction with Putin's politics.
3. There are no signs Moscow is seeking a ceasefire - Putin is still confident he can secure a military victory that would allow him to seek a politically satisfying exit/pause - way out
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One can even argue that so far, developments in Russian society, elite and economy exist in a semi-separate reality from what RU troops are doing in Ukraine. But it has only been 3 months. The longer Russia continues this war - the more all of those factors will merge.
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The obvious conclusion would be that Russia's war and Putin are the reasons Russian elites, people and economy are in the state of deep shit. No amount of propaganda will be able to hide it.
This is the message that needs to become widespread.
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