Just a morass of poorly thought out ideas that I think will serve as a jumping off point for some comments about doctrine and what has changed since Soviet times. /1
Broadly speaking, Cold War doctrine fell roughly into 2 camps - attrition and maneuver. For the early part of the Cold War NATO was very heavily attritional, moving more towards maneuver with the AirLand battle and the like in the later phase. USSR always emphasized maneuver. /2
A lot of this was borne from the experience of WW2. While the Western front saw the US and allies push out slowly in N. France, the east saw grand offensives with large encirclements and annihilation battles. USSR had to cover a lot of distance and had to push offensives deep. /3
As such, artillery's role wasn't for constant creeping bombardment to cover a methodical advance. It was to blow gaps into enemy lines so that large maneuver formations such as tank armies can pour in to weak havoc. This was especially important in nuclear battlefields. /4
Since getting your troops behind enemy lines, moving quickly, was critical to limit the potential use of tactical nuclear weapons. Artillery preparations were to do damage in the shortest amount of time possible, hence the emphasis on rocket artillery. /5
Long bombardments have the effect of forcing defenders to hide in entrenchments where they are harder to kill and also chew up terrain and infrastructure, making it difficult for the attackers to maneuver and conduct deep operations. /6
Thus the "inflexibility" of Soviet artillery was more an emphasis on centrally-directed fires, to blow holes into front lines the first hour by concentrating all fire support on key breakthrough sectors. This is how the "big one" is fought. /7
That said, it's also not true to say that Soviet maneuver units didn't have artillery support, because it was a heavily mechanized army with self-propelled artillery in every regiment that is meant to keep up with the advance. Remember, maneuver doctrine. /8
Precision artillery rounds like Krasnopol and Smelchak also had their introduction during the Soviet period, well before counterparts in the West, showing perhaps how important artillery was overall to the Soviet military. /9
With the end of the Cold War, across the world, you saw the reduction of personnel in militaries. Divisions became brigades, and the brigadiazation of various militaries was presented as a measure for cost saving and flexibility. /10
It is easier to deploy a brigade of 3-4k men than a division of 15k, so in order to make these units "complete" and self-supporting, what had been divisional fire support assets were pushed down into the smaller formations. There are variations, but this is generally speaking /11
Smaller flexible units were more suited for the new era of counterinsurgency. In Russia, since the motor rifle and tank regiments already contained their own organic self-propelled artillery, brigadization just meant a straight shrink of the old divisions. /12
Nowadays, "Battalion Tactical Group" has become a kind of buzz word (BTG), which people often use without understanding how it is distinct from just a regular battalion. The concept is roughly equivalent to task forces in the US military /13
Which are ad hoc formations created by brigade commanders tailored to solve a specific mission. In the case of the Russian BTG, this is sometimes called a reinforced battalion, as it is a maneuver battalion reinforced by brigade fire assets and other support. /14
So far this has been just descriptive, but here I'll offer a little more of my own opinion. These downsized post-Cold War formations are not meant to fight in the style of the Cold War. They are fundamentally incapable of it. /15
By pushing arty into smaller tactical units and leaving fire support discretion to the tactical commanders, it is harder to coordinate the concentrated fire required in a large scale conflict. In fact the US army has reinstated artillery HQs as a half nod to this problem. /16
"We lost the DIVARTY headquarters, and the division cmdr lost that comdr who synchronized operational Fires for the division."
The idealized application of artillery during the Cold War was large-scale and operational fire-to-maneuver. Speed was king, especially on a nuclear battlefield. However, there's a giant fucking difference between a tank corps and a brigade or even a battalion. /18
What has become the case in the Ukraine conflict, and this has implications for all downsized militaries, is that battalions and brigades don't have the resiliency to absorb multiple meeting engagements and continue the advance. In order to protect them, arty must be thorough /19
Without the mass to maneuver, all these units can really do is claw forward using their firepower advantage to the fullest. Mind you I think this is a perfectly valid solution to this problem, because there is no nuclear threat pressing the need for speed. /20
However, the result is a conflict that in many ways more resembles WWI with its trench warfare and methodical grinding. Without maneuver all one has is attrition. It may be efficient attrition, but it is attrition nevertheless. /21
So whenever you see talk about how there aren't any rapid advances and how it's a tragedy that so many men are ordered to sit in trenches and slowly die as each square inch of said trenches are worked over with artillery, understand it probably can't be any other way. /22 END
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Since I've been talking about artillery systems today and since there seems to be some interest in the topic, I'm going to take this opportunity to talk about one of the most overlooked segments of the global arms market - Chinese MLRS.
Pictured: PHL-16, public reveal 2019 1/
The PLA's adoption of MLRS artillery came with the economic assistance from the USSR in the years following WW2, with deliveries of BM-13 132mm Katyusha systems. These served in the war in Korea. /2
Owing to the poor industrial base, especially after the Sino-Soviet split, indigenous developments for a time focused on towed, short range MLRS systems. The first of these was adopted in 1958 as the Type 58. It fired American-style 114mm rockets with a range of 5km. /3
Now that we know what's in the "Ukraine" funding package, I think I will finally weigh in on the recent Scott Ritter controversy. Recently, he has seemingly made an apparent about-face where he now thinks Russia will be stuck in a quagmire as western aid will change the balance.
However, as we see, only a tiny portion of the 40 billion will actually go towards Ukrainian arms. And that includes training budget which will go into pockets of American PMCs. Funds for the Kiev govt will also be massively stolen. All in all not the gamechanger Ritter thinks.
Thing to remember with packages like this is that this money is stimulus for the corporates. They always eat first, which keeps the money inside the US economy. This is the logic of the US MIC.
The gear sent to Ukraine will be second hand with logistical issues I've laid out.
Now, what is in that $40B package supposedly for Ukraine?
-8.7B for replenishing US weapons stockpiles
-3.9B for USEUCOM
-5B for global food supply chain
-6B for weapons and training for Ukraine
-9B economic assistance to Kiev
-0.9B for Ukrainian refugees
There are some other miscellaneous items, but these are the important ones. What strikes me is that this is first and foremost economic stimulus to the United States, with the bulk of it heading towards the US MIC. This is not all that burdensome for the US economy...
...as it is a backdoor cash injection into the corporate economy. But it is politically burdensome because American public still behaves as if the current fiscal regime still operates as a hard specie economy, ie the useless bickering about debt.
Well, since I teased it, and since there was a rather positive reception to my thoughts on ancient warfare, I’m going to do a lit analysis of the Mesopotamian Epic of Erra, which, like the Iliad, was another one of those mythologized retellings of the Bronze Age Collapse. /1
In addition, there is this paper from A. R. George on the poem that I also draw from, though my conclusions deviate somewhat. eprints.soas.ac.uk/17171/1/Warfar… /2
Unlike Assyria, whose political stability and powerful army allowed it to became the unchallenged hegemon of the Levant (before it ran into problems at the end of the 11th century BCE), Babylonia fell into hard times, toppled again and again by invading tribes and dynasties. /3
A good reminder of why equipment delivered isn't necessarily equipment on the battlefield. Heavy military equipment is like an F1 racecar, requiring constant attention and servicing to keep functional. These are USAF readiness rates under more or less ideal conditions.
This is why many have speculated a large portion of the equipment delivered to Ukraine won't leave the western region, where they can operate close to repair depots in Poland. Without that constant maintenance, they risk breaking down and getting stuck in the field.
I remember at the start of the GWOT, some of the US tank units, particularly those equipped with the older M1A1s manufactured in the 80s, were unable to achieve 70% readiness. You can imagine the logistical nightmare this hodgepodge of older equipment will create for Ukraine.
Again, not the focus of my feed, but I need to point out again how many layers upon layers of bullshit the Ukrainian propaganda army puts out. Here they edit a Z onto a Ukrainian vehicle, using a smoke effect to hide the digital artifacting. This is why my focus isn't footage.
And again. The entire documentary history of this conflict has been distorted to such a degree because many of these are just accepted uncritically by "respected" sources.
And these guys, murdered by the Volkssturm, still reported in western media as Russians, despite wearing Ukrainian army uniforms and being confirmed as Ukrainians.