1/ Despite Baremetrics being the "first-mover" and arguably inventing 1-click SaaS analytics back in 2013, ProfitWell (just sold for $200m!) and ChartMogul (who passed us in revenue early on and will almost certainly sell for 8-9 figures) became much larger.
Why? 🧵👇
2/ At the risk of oversimplifying things, I believe starting Baremetrics as a side project was probably the single biggest reason we had a drastically lower financial outcome.
This "side project" mentality, in hindsight, affected a lot of early decisions.
3/ It was quite literally just me for the first 6-months and the foundational decisions made then ultimately had a massive effect for years to come on everything from tech to funding to business development.
4/ Every opportunity or decision was viewed through the lens of "hey if this works at all, it's amazing!" because...side project. It wasn't until a year or two in that I honestly started shifting my view away from that to "building a real business."
5/ The tech decisions I made in the early days attached us directly to Stripe. And undoing that decision meant many months of work making the system agnostic.
6/ Those same decisions made it very hard to scale in the early days, preventing us from trying the "freemium" route that ProfitWell had so much success with.
7/ And similar scaling issues meant ChartMogul was able to come in as a "more stable" alternative while we had to spend the better part of a year rewriting massive parts of the product.
In large part because I didn't view this *from the start* as something I wanted to scale up.
8/ In addition, the source of our funding was in partnership with Stripe and with that came an exclusivity agreement. So on top of all those early tech decisions, we weren't even able to support all of the huge companies that were on other payment providers.
9/ In hindsight, that exclusivity deal just didn't play out like I thought it would. Yes, we got $500,000. But there were other things that I was led to believe would come from our agreement that simply...didn't. Things that would have made it a much more lucrative deal.
10/ It was frustrating but not surprising. They were growing at an obscene rate. Nearly all the contacts I had when we made our deal were gone within a year, so there wasn't anyone there to really follow through with.
11/ So we found ourselves with our hands tied due to a mix of poor tech decisions early on and a business agreement that ended up being far more one-sided than I imagined.
12/ And in that time, both PW and CM were starting their companies (focused on building actual "companies" and not "side projects") enabling them to make better tech decisions and without the restraints of exclusivity.
13/ It's one of the reasons I was *very* intentional about NOT just sort of poking around on @maybe as a hobby and instead focusing on building a proper business right out of the gate. We're focusing on building something huge. Because mindset matters.
@maybe 14/ To be clear, I can't complain AT ALL about the Baremetrics outcome. I literally made millions of dollars.
But I do think it's helpful to do retrospectives on these things as there's a lot to learn and because Baremetrics wasn't my last rodeo.
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tl;dr We paid a designer ~$70,000 to create some 14,000 stock market icons for us (think AAPL, VTI, SPY, etc). We've only received ~1,500 of them and he's now ghosting us.
Buckle up...here's how that played out and where we're at now...
Back in March I tweeted that I was looking for someone to create these icons for us and paying $5 per icon.
Not particularly difficult work but definitely tedious. Got a decent number of inquiries.
Picked a guy who appeared to have quite a bit of experience, is active on twitter with a decent following, has a design podcast where he's interviewed some notable designers, quickly replied to emails...basically passed the overall gut check of legitimacy.
1/ now that @maybe is top-of-mind for a lot of people, let's talk about why it failed last year (or at least my hypothesis) and why i think it's got a solid chance of succeeding *now*.
this thread may get lengthy so...buckle up?
2/ when i started poking around on @maybe in early 2021, the market was...different. thanks to both a stock market that was exploding & a crypto + NFT market that made it feel like there was free money everywhere, there was excitement around being more hands-on with your money.
3/ raising money in that market was incredibly easy. reg cf (crowdfunding) had recently taken off, and everyone was looking for somewhere and something to invest in.
we raised $1.45m in a pre-seed round from over 1,300 investors at a $10m cap.
A week ago I started researching the world of website flipping. I've been curious about the practice essentially as a way to diversify my investment portfolio.
Today I purchased my first site to flip.
Site is currently doing around $250/mo in revenue from display ads + affiliate sales.
I purchased it for $6,500. So, 26x monthly revenue (which appears to be the metric folks use in this space).
Some potentially interesting data points about the site...
1. DA of 47 (much easier to make SEO moves) 2. Stable traffic of ~15k pageviews/mo for the past 2 years (no Google penalties) 3. 150+ articles, w/ a solid mix of "review" and "how-to" (makes it much easier to monetize)
Hi potential investors! I'm Josh, CEO of @maybe. And this is a pitch thread as we're working on raising a $5m seed round!
Interested? DM, josh@maybe.co or 205-470-4803
🧵👇🎉
Real, meaningful financial planning and wealth management is currently reserved for people who are willing to pay %-based AUM fees and stay in the dark on how to actually grow their wealth.
With @maybe, we're building the tools and insights so you can do it yourself without paying anyone a % of all your assets to run a simple playbook...forever.
You'll become financially literate in the process and have control over your wealth for the rest of your life.
1/ We're no longer pursuing building @maybe around part-time/fractional employment.
Here's the note I sent to the team last week.
While I'm still bullish on the concept, I no longer believe it can work for *new* product/software companies. At least it didn't for us.
🧵👇🏻
2/ What I traded away on "managing people" I replaced with infinitely more work around "managing projects". There was just so much overhead to get even basic things done.
We instantly had to try to assemble tons of processes and it just slowed progress to a crawl.
3/ Many of the major problems we're trying to solve require deep thought and focused effort on difficult programming issues.
Having folks drop in a few hours here, a few hours there just meant everyone avoided the really difficult things as they didn't have time for it.