1/14
Those who follow the German discussion may have seen this article. The contents are accurate.
But the title *when shared on Twitter* is a serious falsehood: it says "NATO does not want to deliver tanks". Poland has delivered over 200.
2/14
Somebody at the public broadcaster decided that the original title "No tanks for Ukraine?" (see link) should be rendered on Twitter as "Informal agreement: NATO does not want to deliver tanks" (see tweet above).
A deliberately false statement in a headline for social media.
3/14
The contents of the article are accurate and carefully worded. It is clarified - correctly and importantly - that there are no NATO *decisions* on these matters, only informal consultations. And that each nation decides.
BILD and @JulianRoepcke were correct.
4/14
Important context is however missing from the article. Readers deserve to be reminded of the fact that Poland sent over more than 200 tanks. Knowing that, the logic that the govt says it has, and also attributes to other NATO Allies, falls apart.
5/14
Note this passage: (my translation)
"the existence of such an informal agreement was confirmed by GER govt sources (...) it is feared that Russia would deem the delivery of Western tanks and combat aircraft as an entry into the war"
6/14
Strange reasoning.
Poland sends tanks, fine.
But a different model of tanks = WW3?
Combat aircraft, this we do know from observation, no Ally crossed that line. Alright, that threshold is real.
But it looks like a creeping threshold: start with planes, throw in tanks?
7/14
Now go back to the attempt by the Permanent Secretary of the Def. Ministry to present the threshold of *Western* tanks *and IFVs* (more threshold creep) as something more formal than it is. Recall she implied going beyond it would be a matter for the North Atlantic Council.
8/14
We have now established that the Perm. Sec. was openly implying there is a need to do something that is in fact not required. Germany could send MBTs and IFVs right now, there is no need for a green light from the North Atlantic Council. So, what is Berlin up to?
9/14
What we have here is a reverse game of chicken with Vladimir Putin. In a game of chicken, team members egg each other on to be increasingly daring in the face of danger. In the reverse game, one participant seeks to be as timid as possible without being found out.
10/14
Step 1: split the group into two sub-groups, the daring (CEE Allies) and the big boys (US, UK, France)
Step 2: pretend the daring sub-group doesn't exist
Step 3: look for self-limitations in the big boys sub-group, construe and promote those self-limitations as group norms
11/14
Step 4: when challenged to do more, refer to the group norms that you have sought to create, and any other plausible narrative that justifies acting according to those invented norms.
12/14
I also contend that this pattern of behaviour has a longer and deeper lineage.
Since 1980, Germany (in green) has never been the largest European spender in current dollar terms and has tended to track France closely.
(Graph my own - data from SIPRI)
13/14
In the 1970s, however, there were years when Germany was the biggest spender. So GER doesn't always strictly self-limit based on comparisons with major Western Allies. Indeed, if Germany goes to 2% of GDP, this is likely to occur again, unless FRA & UK go to 2.5%-3%.
14/14
But CEE Allies are the new leaders now. And so it is high time that Germany matures to less convoluted thinking about its relative position within the Alliance.
Tips for Berlin: add Warsaw to the list of key capitals that define what is normal. And stop aiming low.
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1-11
Interesting logic. But UNSCR 1701 of August 2006 (yes, 18 years ago) was never implemented as concerns the obligations on Hezbollah, on the sponsors of Hezbollah, or on the hapless Lebanese government, which doesn't have de facto sovereignty precisely because of Hezbollah.
2-11
After UNSCR 1701 was adopted, it's fair to say that Israel was attacked from southern Lebanon an absurdly large number of times.
Quite the ceasefire implementation. Bravo UNIFIL!
3-11
Here's a list of strikes against Israel from southern Lebanon just in the month of October 2023, which kicked off just after Israel had been attacked by Hamas in the south, of course.
1-10
True, the Third World War started in 2022.
For American colleagues to reflect: historians generally accept that WWII started on 1 September 1939, two years before the U.S. became a belligerent. And that's a European view. One could argue for July 1937 (Japan invades China).
2-10
The fact that very few Western commentators, let alone governments, currently label current events as a World War doesn't mean we're not in one right this minute, at least in the early phases of it.
3-10
The fact that the United States is not at war is certainly nice for the United States, and Biden types can pat themselves on the back for avoiding war. But that hardly means the war isn't already there. Burning, devouring, destroying, more and more.
1-6 Veteran French diplomat G. Araud absolutely nails the Elon Musk problem in just one sentence.
In my experience it's not rare for highly competent people from other walks of life to think they understand matters of state policy - foreign or domestic - but to fail to do so.
2-6 It isn't rare to find people who refuse to understand that such matters need to be studied in their own right and that experienced professionals have a significant edge over them, thanks to their direct experience.
3-6 There is also the opposite phenomenon: there are amateurs who merely follow the news but somehow really get it and have very good judgment.
(But there are also many people who do that who have awful judgment, tbh.)
If you invade a part of Russia, Putin doesn't do anything.
Ukraine has proven it. They're in the Kursk Oblast.
So much for Moscow having "red lines".
I'll go further. I don't believe the concept of "red line" applies especially well to Russian state behaviour.
1-13
The notion of "red lines" is a very American way of thinking. American foreign policy discourse often features that expression. But how often does it appear in the foreign policy discourse of other countries? Has anyone ever checked?
2-13
At a very generic level, of course, both states and individuals have limits beyond which events will lead to a reaction. So it's not a bad concept per se. But making it central to a wide set of strategic considerations is excessive.
1-13
People who know how to think understood very quickly on October 7, at the latest on October 8, that the Hamas attack was from every perspective an act of war that needed to be responded to by going to war against Hamas with the aim of destroying it.
2-13
People who know how to think also remembered that Hamas was the state power and the de facto armed forces of Gaza. Hence, Israel had suffered an armed attack from the de facto country of Gaza.
3-13
People who know how to think knew that, given the political technology of Hamas & company to embed deliberately in built-up areas with civilians, Israel was going to kill a lot of Hamas, and also a lot of civilians. And that it would be partly lawful, but probably...
1-11
Disagree. It is plausible that the Supreme Leader of Iran knew, from 3 Oct. 2023, that something big was going to happen - but not necessarily when.
It is perfectly possible to meet in person and tell top-level people of a plan, and no foreign intel service will find out.
2-11
Another problem with the post is that it somewhat misquotes the Haaretz article: the journalist doesn't claim Tehran didn't know about the attack, he claims Tehran didn't know the specific date.
3-11
Another good reason for believing that Tehran had advance knowledge is that Hamas would have to be insane NOT to tell its chief sponsor of a very major operation ahead, an operation so large that it would logically be tantamount to an act of war.