Edward Hunter Christie Profile picture
Senior Research Fellow @FIIA_fi. PhD @VUBrussel & Belgian Royal Military Academy. Former @NATO official 2014-2020. Views my own.
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Oct 21 11 tweets 4 min read
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Interesting logic. But UNSCR 1701 of August 2006 (yes, 18 years ago) was never implemented as concerns the obligations on Hezbollah, on the sponsors of Hezbollah, or on the hapless Lebanese government, which doesn't have de facto sovereignty precisely because of Hezbollah. Image 2-11
After UNSCR 1701 was adopted, it's fair to say that Israel was attacked from southern Lebanon an absurdly large number of times.
Quite the ceasefire implementation. Bravo UNIFIL! Image
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Oct 16 10 tweets 2 min read
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True, the Third World War started in 2022.
For American colleagues to reflect: historians generally accept that WWII started on 1 September 1939, two years before the U.S. became a belligerent. And that's a European view. One could argue for July 1937 (Japan invades China). 2-10
The fact that very few Western commentators, let alone governments, currently label current events as a World War doesn't mean we're not in one right this minute, at least in the early phases of it.
Oct 13 6 tweets 2 min read
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Veteran French diplomat G. Araud absolutely nails the Elon Musk problem in just one sentence.
In my experience it's not rare for highly competent people from other walks of life to think they understand matters of state policy - foreign or domestic - but to fail to do so. 2-6
It isn't rare to find people who refuse to understand that such matters need to be studied in their own right and that experienced professionals have a significant edge over them, thanks to their direct experience.
Oct 12 13 tweets 2 min read
If you invade a part of Russia, Putin doesn't do anything.
Ukraine has proven it. They're in the Kursk Oblast.
So much for Moscow having "red lines".
I'll go further. I don't believe the concept of "red line" applies especially well to Russian state behaviour.

1-13 The notion of "red lines" is a very American way of thinking. American foreign policy discourse often features that expression. But how often does it appear in the foreign policy discourse of other countries? Has anyone ever checked?

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Oct 7 13 tweets 3 min read
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People who know how to think understood very quickly on October 7, at the latest on October 8, that the Hamas attack was from every perspective an act of war that needed to be responded to by going to war against Hamas with the aim of destroying it. 2-13
People who know how to think also remembered that Hamas was the state power and the de facto armed forces of Gaza. Hence, Israel had suffered an armed attack from the de facto country of Gaza.
Oct 3 11 tweets 3 min read
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Disagree. It is plausible that the Supreme Leader of Iran knew, from 3 Oct. 2023, that something big was going to happen - but not necessarily when.
It is perfectly possible to meet in person and tell top-level people of a plan, and no foreign intel service will find out. 2-11
Another problem with the post is that it somewhat misquotes the Haaretz article: the journalist doesn't claim Tehran didn't know about the attack, he claims Tehran didn't know the specific date.Image
Sep 24 19 tweets 4 min read
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It's mainly Eastern European colleagues, and also colleagues from the Caucasus or Central Asia, who dare to delve into more fundamental critiques of the Russian national culture. But the quote below comes from a Russian, Valeria Novodvorskaya (died in 2014). 2-19
There is an inherent nervousness in Western culture to make any statement, or even to think any thought, that would amount to a blanket generalisation of an entire population.
That's generally a good thing: it's a check against xenophobia and racism.
Sep 20 7 tweets 2 min read
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A chaotic bunch of reactions here.
The fact is, @OzKaterji is respected and is taken seriously by many analysts, myself included.
I am, on the other hand, troubled by the careless comments made by @LailaAlarian and @Leila_MA Image 2-7
I see an attempt to blur the distinction between targeting, i.e. who/what one intends to hit, versus damage, i.e. who/what gets hit.
It is of course unlawful to aim to hit the child of a terrorist commander. But that's not what the pager operation did.
Sep 14 6 tweets 1 min read
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I lean conservative in terms of my political values. And it is precisely because I value order, obedience to higher principles, and respect for human dignity, that I oppose Moscow's revisionist aggression and criminality. My position is the correct conservative position. 2-6
If you identify as a conservative and yet do not strongly oppose Putin's criminal regime and its criminal foreign policy, you are not a conservative but a proto-fascist, or at the very least a pro-fascist collaborator. The kind of coward who became pro-German in 1940-42.
Aug 23 18 tweets 3 min read
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Some shocking sentences at the end of this Politico article on U.S. restrictions on how Ukraine's use of Western weapons:
Presented with the notion that the Biden Administration may have a negative legacy of not having done enough...

politico.com/news/2024/08/2… 2-18
... Politico reports that "that framing has at times angered senior officials in the White House who insist Washington has done more than any other country to help support Kyiv and that it shouldn’t have to risk its own national security for Kyiv." (!!!)
Jul 30 10 tweets 2 min read
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The time has come to plan for certain worst-case scenarios regarding Hungary.
I wouldn't have voiced these before -- they seemed remote and/or could've been seen as suggestions. But the dam is breaking given Orban's planned import of large numbers of Russian nationals. 2-10
So what is a worst-case scenario?
Quite obviously that the Orban regime invites Russian, Belarussian, possibly also Chinese, security forces and perhaps even military personnel to station themselves in Hungary.
Jul 17 11 tweets 3 min read
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Quite some meltdown around Boris Johnson's claim that Trump would actually back Ukraine.
Notably from pro-Kremlin accounts, who are clearly fearful this might be true.
And from decent political liberals who dislike both men.
But the former is more interesting. 2-11
Ukraine is a legacy issue for Johnson. It is the one big thing he did which he knew was right, that the country knew was right, that the world knew was right. And he continued to argue for Ukraine after leaving office.
Jul 15 10 tweets 2 min read
Trump has picked JD Vance as his running mate.

This confirms the nationalist-populist and proto-authoritarian nature of a possible 2nd Trump term, which would be acutely dangerous to Ukraine, to European security, and to any small or medium-sized nation anywhere.

1-10 JD Vance has repeatedly broadcast hostile views regarding Ukraine's righteous struggle to defend itself and regarding America's commitment to European security.

=> he is Moscow's dream VP pick

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Jun 17 8 tweets 2 min read
A feature of French politics almost never discussed outside France -- because it would require knowing the language and consuming French media -- is that it has acquired a large right-wing media ecosystem in the last 8 years, notably television.

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This trend has co-accelerated with the continued success and diversification of less moderate right-wing views, ranging from a French version of 'national conservatism' to the positions of the far-right National Rally party (former National Front, of the Le Pen dynasty).

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May 30 8 tweets 2 min read
A crucial data point:
Danish Foreign Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen says the Danish F-16s headed to Ukraine soon are authorised to "target installations on the attacking party's own territory" including, for example, "weapons depots" ✔️

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kristeligt-dagblad.dk/udland/loekke-… The line is simple, it's International Law: Ukrainians shouldn't target civilians in Russia, even though Russia does that against Ukraine.
And so DNK's position is without caveats: targets may be on the ground or in the airspace (or the waters) of the aggressor state ✔️

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Apr 26 24 tweets 4 min read
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I've read Macron's speech in full.
It is actually quite good.
As is common with Macron, nothing is incorrect.
And there is also an emerging coherence to everything he touches on.

elysee.fr/front/pdf/elys… 2-22

Summarising the speech would make this a 50+ post thread and I won't go there. But here are some essentials:

- Europe needs stronger defence capabilities, and more of them home-grown and self-reliant, based on a stronger, more coherent European defence industry
Apr 23 15 tweets 3 min read
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Velina makes a relevant point, namely that Polish President Duda's private meeting with Donald Trump likely had an important positive impact for what followed.

Note that the Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda also believes that this was the case (link follows). 2-15

Trump met with Duda on Thursday 18 April and stated to journalists that "we're behind Poland all the way".

reuters.com/world/trump-sa…
Apr 22 8 tweets 3 min read
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We need to talk about another facet of American and America-focused propaganda: the weaponisation of the issue of drug addiction.

I believe this is a major blind spot in American discourse, with multiple core elements that are misunderstood 🧵
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First, it is traditional anti-American propaganda, dating back to the days of the Soviet Union, to suggest to American voters a trade-off between money spent at home to alleviate social misery, notably homelessness, and money spent abroad, notably for military purposes.
Apr 17 15 tweets 3 min read
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Very important press conf. at NATO with 3 Prime Ministers: Netherlands, Denmark, Czechia.

DNK PM Frederiksen: "[all of us] are we not better off sending a few of our own AD systems to Ukraine at a time where they, not we, are struggling daily..."

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"...to fight off never ending Russian attacks? We know we have systems in Europe. Some of them need now to be delivered into Ukraine. And I think the answer to this question is of course a yes."
Apr 10 11 tweets 3 min read
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"I mean it makes sense to me that we should destroy'em" ✔️

The right conclusion regarding Russia's refineries from U.S. Rep. Austin Scott (Republican, Georgia).

As for Celeste Wallander's legal reasoning, I believe it is incorrect in light of previous U.S. actions 🧵 2-11

Wallander stresses the civilian nature of the refineries and implies that civ. infra should not be hit.
Here, Scott's reaction missed the mark: for legal scholars, an enemy's IHL violations don't justify responding with IHL violations (and rightly so).
Apr 8 4 tweets 1 min read
"Trump is already partially in power and stabbing Ukraine in the back". My view of what Trump and his political associates are effectively doing, featured in the Norwegian newspaper Dagbladet [in Norwegian].

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dagbladet.no/nyheter/frykte… Translated extract:
"This blockage has been going on in full for months, which is a very long time in a high-intensity war like we have in Ukraine. I mean, it's pretty sick."

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