The #XinjiangPoliceFiles show that the mass internments in Xinjiang were carefully planned & executed w/ Beijing's knowledge, based on a 5-year plan: 2017 to 2021.
We can now ascertain this plan's precise execution until Chen Quanguo's removal in 2021:🧵 chinafile.com/reporting-opin…
This plan was closely built around the person of Chen Quanguo.
In the files, Chen Quanguo admits that Xi Jinping himself "sent me to Xinjiang in order to make a stable Xinjiang arise."
Chen told Xi that he would be willing to be in Xinjiang for 10 years if necessary.
I previously argued that in 2016, Chen immediately hit the ground running, preparing the mass internments through massive police recruitments, the construction of 1000s of police stations, and the expansion of the surveillance apparatus.
Internal files support this assessment.
The 5-year plan then logically began with "year one" in 2017: "stabilize" the region. This started the mass internments.
The mandate for "year two" of the plan (2018) was to "consolidate" the achievements of the first year, i.e. the mass internments and the crackdown.
From witness accounts and satellite image analysis we know that the internments peaked at that time, as did internment camp floor space construction (see @alisonkilling's chart below - with 2018 highlighted).
"Year three" was supposed to lead to a "normalization" of the resulting state. In fact, in 2019, many lower-security re-education camps were desecuritized. The region showed camps to journalists and boasted that Xinjiang was now "stable."
Everything was going according to plan.
By "year five" (end of 2021 when counting from start of 2017), Xinjiang was supposed to have achieved reach “comprehensive stability.”
It did. The 5-year plan had been executed.
In December 2021, precisely at the end of the 5-year plan, Chen Quanguo, an expert for intensive cadre mobilization was replaced with Ma Xingrui, a technocrat with expertise in economic development.
That means the most intensive and high-handed phase of the crackdown is now...
...over, and being replaced with a more long-term institutionalized approach.
Similarly, in the Nankai Report, Chinese academics described the mass internments as a “drastic short-term measure” that was “absolutely necessary and effective.” jamestown.org/product/coerci…
But the academics argued that this "drastic" measure was not a long-term strategy. Instead, economic development, poverty alleviation & labor transfers were the long-term approach.
For this, Ma Xingrui will be well-placed.
In this speech marked "secret", Zhao Kezhi, China's minister of public security promised Beijing's support for the crackdown, which was ongoing and in its peak phase at the time.
Zhao bluntly said that the camps were "overcrowded."
But Xi Jinping had ordered regional authorities to:
“implement practical measures such as expanding the number of employed [staff in detention facilities], enlarging the capacity [of these facilities], and increasing investment [in these facilities] within the set time frame.”
Satellite images prove that this is exactly what happened: camp floorspace construction peaked - by a great margin - in the second half of 2018 (marked in red). [chart is same source as above]
Zhao said that thousands of police would be sent to Xinjiang from all over China. According to Han police witness Wang Leizhan, about 150,000 officers like him were brought to the region.
Zhao Kezhi also asserts in the speech that Beijing would “increase the strength of its support” for covering the “high costs” of operating and maintaining Xinjiang’s internment facilities.
Zhao also quotes Xi Jinping as charging the Xinjiang government with “bringing the Vocational Skills Education and Training Center management work into the orbit of legalization” (i.e., establishing them as legally operating facilities).
While the Xinjiang Papers contain secret speeches by Xi where he support the evolving crackdown and orientation towards securitization, the Zhao Kezhi speech directly implicates Xi and Beijing's leadership in the mass internments.
That makes this document the perhaps most important document of the entire #XinjiangPoliceFiles.
A big thank you to @susanjakes, Jessica Batke, @SegalWilliams for their helpful and very thorough fact-checking and editing of my work. It was a true pleasure to work with you. Thank you. chinafile.com/reporting-opin…
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On Saturday, China's Ministry of Civil Affairs casually announced new standardized Chinese names for 30 locations in "South Tibet" (藏南), together with an updated map (below).
"South Tibet" is India's state of Arunachal Pradesh.
Thread:🧵
India promptly responded, affirming that the state is an "integral" part of India.
This was the PRC MCA's 4th announcement, resulting in a total of 62 Chinese place names. Links in next post.
@SophieDRich Related op-ed by @benedictrogers, arguing that member states must be clear and specific in pointing out Beijing's egregious human rights violations. He suggests 10 points that could be raised. ucanews.com/news/chinas-ri…
BREAKING: U.S. sanctions first Chinese central government official over atrocities in Xinjiang:
Hu Lianhe, who defended the camps at the U.N. in 2018.
Hu is a deputy head of the central government's Xinjiang Leading Small Group and of the United Front. home.treasury.gov/news/press-rel…
The justification for sanctioning him follows closely my analysis of Hu's role in my research article from 2021.
The Xinjiang LSG he co-leads was closely involved in the De-Extremification Regulation, which justified the re-education camps. jamestown.org/program/eviden…
Specifically the Central Xinjiang Work Coordination Small Group (中央新疆工作协调小组办公室) was closely involved in supervising the draft of the original Regulation, published in March 2017, and its revision, published in October 2018. Thus, he had close knowledge of the camps.
New Xinjiang Police Files evidence shows that Uyghurs were sent from re-education camps directly to vocational institutions that organized job fairs with Volkswagen & advertise degrees with Volkswagen as a typical work destination. One victim: the Uyghur Adiljan Hashim. /1
Police records show that Adiljan Hashim was detained in October 2017, then placed into the Xinjiang Light Industry Technical College (新疆轻工职业技术学院) in January 2018. This "release" was highly controlled and based on pre-agreed conditions (担保释放人员).
The Xinjiang Light Industry Technical College offers majors in fields such as automobile manufacturing (汽车制造). The college lists examples of a cooperation with companies including FAW-Volkswagen Xinjiang on its website, and advertises Volkswagen as a graduate employer.
Pleased to publish another peer-reviewed article today on Xinjiang forced labor (4th this year), arguing why this forced labor requires reversing the burden of proof.
I would like to thank the Journal of Human Trafficking (@JournalOfHT) for publishing this article.
It's important to have work on Xinjiang forced labor published in a journal that specializes on forced labor, human trafficking, and modern slavery.
The article advances the to-date first systematic review of: (1) the evolution of ILO efforts to measure forced labor, and of (2) the suitability of the ILO’s 2012 Survey Guidelines in several Central Asian state-imposed forced labor contexts (XJ, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Taj).
Major investigative report uncovers how large corporations including @bp_plc, Hilton & Spotify bought carbon credits at direct risk of Uyghur forced labor.
My team provided crucial research findings, implicating the world’s largest carbon consultancy: 🧵 theguardian.com/environment/20…
The Bachu carbon project developed by the world's largest carbon consultancy @southpoleglobal in Kashgar burns cotton stalks to generate climate neutral power.
These stalks are sourced from a region with multiple coercive labor transfers targeting Uyghurs to pick cotton.
Bachu is part of Xinjiang's most coercive labor transfer policies, see .
Our research identified multiple specific local cases of coercive state transfer efforts within the 50km radius within which the plan sources cotton stalks.tandfonline.com/doi/permission…