On or about 9 April, as RU claimed they were entering "phase 2," I mentioned we'd start seeing a different sort of combat.
Arty barrages, recon in force (RIF) & attempted breakthrough by RU...w/ hasty defense, counterattacks & some withdrawals by UA.
What's happening? A 🧵 1/9
Some analysts have called this a "stalemate." Ive attempted to avoid that phrase, because there is LOTS going on.
RU is, as predicted, attempting to use their artillery to open up the front line. They follow w/ small units doing RIF, if they see advantage they push through.2/
RU sees some success, destroy some cities, gain some ground. In a few cases, they've been able to reinforce w/ larger units.
RU is forcing bridgeheads across rivers & key logistics hubs that will allow them to force further attacks.
Key terrain & log support: Critical. 3/ t
Make no mistake, UA is fighting back. Hard.
As I said 4/9, UA must be mobile, agile, & strong.
Counterfire now a factor. Mobile reserves & quick reaction force important to "plug holes." Counterattacks (especially vs river crossings) required, but must be timed precisely. 4/
Other factors starting to play a part:
RU is bringing in regenerated forces (& old T62 tanks) to secure gains in cities. But they must now play for the "long haul." Not good.
UA gets new weapons daily, but they're fatigued on E front & must now conduct guerilla/SOF fight. 5/
Near Kharkiv, RU are improving defense, bringing in Air Defense, relocating regenerated forces. That fight has drained them, much like Kyiv.
Near Izyum, RU are trying to resume the offensive & are relocating forces near Slovyansk & attacking several cities. Also draining. 6/
In Donetsk, RU attacks toward Lyman & Sieveronetsk, needing river crossings. Proving difficult so far for them, but it appears their main effort. I'm watching this closely.
The UA is, so far, countering & repulsing these attacks.
Fighting is tough. NOT a stalemate. 7/
While I wont get into it, I'd add...the UA is also concerned about RU secondary efforts in the south (continued attempts at the S. supply line between Rostov to Kherson and Crimea) & especially the threats against Mykoloaiv & Odesa remain.
There is still a RU Navy threat. 8/
The Ukrainian political leadership - as well as the UA generalship & mid-small unit leadership - is proving itself.
While there are tough fight ahead, and there will be UA battlefield defeats & victories, I believe few RU advances in the E will turn out to be significant. 9/9
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WRT national security & global threats, an extremely dangerous time re US "foes." -Massive Russian strikes in Ukraine -Georgia's "frozen conflict" heating up. -Moldova dealing with Russian troops in Transnistria -Russian economy collapsing...due to Putin's wars --Assad flees to Russia 1/4
-China intimidates Philippines, assaults Hong Kong's autonomy, represses Tibet & Xinjiang, threatens Taiwan, blocks international trade routes -N. Korea troops & weapons in Russia, increases missile capabilities -Hamas destroyed, but Hezbollah, IJ, MB & the Africa terror groups still active. 2/4
-Piracy increases in Persian Gulf and Red Sea regions -US, Mexico & Philippines rated as most active human trafficking countries -Draughts, famine & other climate change factors + outcome of conflicts causes increased migration into US & Europe. -Domestic terrorism indicators rising. 3/4
Watching the Israeli operations in S. Lebanon today, as the IDF releases numerous photos of arms caches found in & near homes. 1/7
These are similar to what US forces found throughout Iraq when we were there.
Using civilian locations provides terror organizations w/ unique advantages:
- difficult to find
- difficult to target
- when found, striking/destroying results in civilian casualties. 2/
This morning, the IAF also struck a 3.5 km tunnel complex between Syria & Lebanon that provided a means of bringing those weapons to Hezbollah.
Between 0900-1100 hrs local time today, Hezbollah launched over 100 rockets & drones into N. Israel. 3/
A few thoughts on what occurred in two different conflicts yesterday...the use of "killer pagers" by Israel and Ukraine's attack on the large ammo cache at Toropets military base 300+ miles inside Russia.
A short 🧵 1/12
First, the pagers.
In this article (gifted) from the @nytimes, the author claims there "no clear strategy" for this coordinated attack.
I disagree. Having used electronic & signals countermeasures in Iraq, the strategy is clear. 2/
Terrorist organizations - unlike conventional militaries who have encrypted signal capabilities - must find ways to communiate. It is important to continue to disrupt & counter this ability.
In Iraq, terrorist use of cell phones allowed US and ISF to glean valuable information & disrupt their networks. 3/