Sunday update. Looking at the Donbas, seems either the Russians are running short of vehicles or the Ukrainian Army is running out of the ability to destroy them. My guess the former--which explains a weird development in what the Russians are trying to do and what they cant do.
Overall, using Ukrainian claims of Russian losses at an indicator, there has been a real crop in combat intensity across Ukraine in the last week. Now fewer Russian losses are being claimed than before the Battle of Donbas started. Here are tanks and APC claims.
We are seeing a significant decrease in combat intensity, and much of that is in the Donbas. Its worth noting that between 55-65% of all claimed Russian losses are in this theater (thats from comparing Ukrainian communiques). This is a major theater drop.
My guess is that the Russians are simply running out of front line combat vehicles in that area (and much of Ukraine). Was interesting to see that the Pentagon on 26 May said they calculated Russian tank losses at approx 1000. defense.gov/News/Transcrip…
Pentagon estimates of Russian losses have actually not been high, so such a claim is worth noting. Its also considerably higher than osint photographic claims, while below Ukrainian claims of more than 1300.
This is a huge number in any rational understanding of modern war. I also think it indicates that the Russians are running short of vehicles (instead of the Ukrainians losing the ability to destroy them) because of what is happening in the Donbas.
First off, the great breakthrough at Popasna has basically stalled (its now been 10 days since it was claimed). Russians have been unable to capitalize on the opening their artillery made, and are once again having trouble moving. One map.
Since the breakthrough the Russians have moved barely 10-15 kilometres--and that was mostly at the start before stalling.
Maybe even stronger evidence of them running out of vehicles is that they seem to have abandoned the (sensible) plan of trying to cut off SDonestk before attacking. Indeed, they seem to be trying to take the city now with direct frontal assaults. Hard to see them preferring this.
@TheStudyofWar has recently released some good analysis of that assault. Dangerous, costly and not worth the effort for Putin except out of political desperation.
That you would assault a city before surrounding it, starving its defenders of supplies and even bombarding it more is a sign that they believe that they cant do this. My guess is that they cant do this as they dont have the vehicles to encircle the town soon.
Russian advances seem mostly artillery based (which limits their potential). They can at times blast holes in the Ukrainian lines, like they did in Popasna, but they dont have the vehicles to exploit, and those that they try to press ahead get chewed up by defensive firepower.
Think this also points to a real problem in war reporting in the Donbas. There is lots of talk about overwhelming Russian artillery in the Donbas--but in and of itself, that only tells a small part of the story.
I tried to think through some of these questions in this @TheAtlantic article. The destruction of tanks and APCs on the battlefield is returning these advances to WW1 levels from WW2. theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/…
And of course there is alot of macro evidence that the Russians are scraping the bottom of the barrel for front line armored vehicles. The movement of T-62s to the theatre has well documented, that is really desperate.
Long story short. Either the Ukrainians are basically on the point of collapse in the Donbas and the Russians are about to storm ahead--or the Russians are running very short of vehicles and getting a little desperate. My guess is the latter.
Does seem that the Russian move out of Popasna has really stalled, if Ukrainian claims are to be believed. There was talk of the Russians being about to cut this road more than a week ago.
Morning @GeneralStaffUA update has Russian attempted advances pretty much limited to the city of SDonetsk. Otherwise seems the Russians are having to regroup to try offensive movements again from both the North (Lyman) and south of the pocket. Otherwise using ranged weapons…
And very low number of Russian armored vehicles claimed. 11 tanks and only 12 APC. If the 11 tanks include the ones mentioned in the Kherson fighting, would have been a very low day for armored vehicle fighting in the Donbas. Otoh, a pretty high number of art/mlrs.
With the lack of movement in the Donbas pocket, talk of Russians having to regroup and reorganise and the small loss rates for armored vehicles, it’s a little more evidence that the Russians really are needing to be careful with their surviving vehicles.
Btw, this does not mean that the Russians lack the vehicles to launch more attacks, it’s just they can’t keep offensive operations going, but need breaks to try and reassemble enough fighting forces to press on. If you are on the offensive, you don’t want to take such breaks.
Russians are clearly throwing everything into trying to take this small bit of the Donbas. The question is whether when the dust settles it was worth it for them to make such an effort.
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@guardian First Edition has some information about my analysis of armored vehicle losses and what is might mean. (name misspelled, but that happens alot if you are called Phillips). theguardian.com/world/2022/may…
Refers to some other stories that Ive written including one before the war, when I thought the Russian military was being severely overrated because of an assumption it could undertake complex operations, when there was no evidence. Here is the screen shot.
Here is a screenshot to the January piece, when I was arguing that Ukraine should be more strongly supported as the Ukrainians were going to fight and we were greatly overestimating Russian military capabilities. thecritic.co.uk/the-new-appeas…
Here is the specific wording from the Ukrainian evening communique (last paragraph). Cant really understand too much from that about what is happening.
Ukrainian strategy in the Donbas has certainly been the subject of some discussion--primarily because they have taken the decision to fight for what seems like a shrinking pocket which the Russians are clearly trying to encircle.
It would not be surprising if they pulled out of SDonetsk and established a less threatened defensive line to the west around Kramatorsk, for instance, which could be more easily supplied, instead of holding on to S Donetsk which has only two rather vulnerable access roads
However, the Ukrainian strategy seems not only not to withdraw, but to reinforce the whole Donbas area. Was struck by this line in a just published @IAPonomarenko@KyivIndependent article. Ukrainian high command even reinforcing the far tip of the pocket.
Ugh, the U.K. auto industry is imploding right in front of us because of Brexit. U.K. has dropped out of the top 15 countries in the world and is losing all the crucial high tech battery investment. It’s disastrous.
To put the collapse in visual terms, this chart from the article is pretty telling. Brexit tarrifs seem to mean that almost all post pandemic auto investment is going elsewhere.
Look I know Brexit is done, but really it would be better to try and salvage something from the disaster by going back to at least Theresa May’s deal which would have ameliorated some of this. Battery technology is one of the keys to future growth…
Something that is interesting and might explain the very large failure rate of Russian cruise missiles. Ukrainians are getting better at destroying them in flight and now are claiming to be shooting them down with fixed wing aircraft.
This is something that there had been a little discussion about before the war. Shooting down the missile should actually not be that difficult, it’s finding it that was considered the challenge. popularmechanics.com/military/weapo…
Russian cruise missiles are, except for the super duper, war winning hypersonic missiles which we’ve heard so much about, pretty pedestrian subsonic or supersonic weapons that can be destroyed if caught.
There seem to be two completely different narratives emerging about the Battle of the Donbas, one on the micro level and one from the larger perspective, and its fascinating to see the differences. Thought I would try and summarize.
The more granular one (which by the way has been going on for a week now) is that the Russians have/are about to make a major breakthrough around Popasna as part of a campaign to role up the SDonestk pocket.
This breakthrough talk has been adopted widely, and we have other sources no portraying Ukrainian positions as either collapsing and on the point of collapse because of overwhelming Russian fire. podcastaddict.com/episode/140302…