On Russophobia, a healthy response to aggressive colonialism
Russia has been accusing the world of Russophobia for years now. Some useful idiots abroad have picked up the message and actively assist the Kremlin by parroting the rhetoric.
It is an "accusation in a mirror," defined as "when the speaker accuses the intended victim of wishing to perpetrate the kind of violence the speaker is requesting of third parties." papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf…
The definition formally applies to genocide incitement. It should apply to propaganda as well. Propaganda is an integral part of psychological preparation to perpetrate atrocities. This means that Russia by accusing the world of Russophobia mirrors their Worldphobia.
And I don't mean agoraphobia. The Russians define Russophobia as hatred of everything Russian. Hence, by Worldphobia I mean hatred of the world. The Kremlin tried to create fortress Russia hating the world as they think the entire world is against them. economist.com/finance-and-ec…
Their hatred of the world, especially the Western world, reached its apogee now with the invasion of Ukraine. They did not start hating the West for helping Ukraine. The Cold War-era hatred for the West had never died out.
It had lurked under the surface in the 1990s and Putin started to cultivate it when he took over. But their hatred for the West does not even compare with their hatred for their former colonies, aka ex-Soviet republics, stemming from the idea of their ethnic exceptionalism.
Western pundits call it "national exceptionalism," but remember in the Russian language nationality does not stand for what it does in English. Nationality, or rather национальность, means ethnicity. Here is a full explanation for your information:
In a 2013 article, David Satter explains the idea of Russian exceptionalism quite well. However, he argues that it is the exceptionalism of the Russian state. The Russians view themselves as the "Third Rome," granting them "the quasi-divine status." fpri.org/article/2013/1…
Putin's messianic speeches are not shocking if you've been following Russia for at least a few years. Putin is a symptom of the deeply rooted ideas of exceptionalism in the Russian psyche.
Hence, I argue that it goes far deeper - it is not that the Russians think that their state is exceptional it is that their ethnicity is exceptional. It is reflected in their ethnocentric rhetoric promoted within Russia. The poster below is a telling example.
Literally, it translates as: "I am Russian, not Russian!" Nonsense, right? Well yes, it actually says: "I am an ethnic Russian, not just a citizen of Russia!" It is not unique to modern Russia, it is a consequence of centuries of the colonial imperial policy of ethnocentrism.
That's why nationalism horrifies the Russians so much. Historically it has the connotations of "separatism" or national liberation movements. Lenin understood that. He was smart enough to realize that to preserve the Russian Empire he had to reach a compromise with the colonies.
In his 12/30/22 article on the need for autonomies, Lenin describes the Russian state of mind vividly: the colonized need to be protected from "the true ethnic Russian man, velikoross, chauvinist, and, in essence, a scoundrel and a rapist, that is the typical Russian bureaucrat."
He adds: "There is no doubt that the insignificant number of Soviet and Sovietized workers would drown in the sea of chauvinist velikoross scum, as a fly would in milk." What is a velikoross? Velikyi russky, a great Russian. lenin.rusarchives.ru/dokumenty/stat…
Lenin was not a minority rights activist, but he understood that to prevent the collapse of the Russian Empire and rebirth it as the USSR, non-ethnic Russians had to be "appeased" at that critical time. I have no doubt that he later planned to strip everyone of their autonomy.
However, the West never completely understood the Russian exceptionalism mentality and is too quick to hail the seeming Russian opposition.
Alexander Solzhenitsyn, a Soviet dissident popular in the West, was a typical Russian chauvinist believing in ethnic Russian exceptionalism. He laid out a plan for non-Soviet Greater Russia incorporating Ukraine, Belarus, and northern Kazakhstan in 1990. theatlantic.com/international/…
And he is not a one-off. Sadly Aleksey Navalny, the flagbearer of the Russian opposition, is worse. What the western press does not mention are Navalny's far-right views that were laid bare in 2008 during the Russian invasion of Georgia. georgiatoday.ge/navalny-a-lege…
Navalny openly called the Georgians "rodents," an ethnic slur in Russian, and openly called for a more destructive war against Georgia. Some people also had some more personal interactions with Navalny that confirm his extreme views (e.g. @kamilkazani). aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/25…
Do I need to mention Navalny's attendance at the "Russian Marches," far-right ethnic Russian demonstrations that usually chant "Russia for ethnic Russians?" Navalny now tries to ride the anti-corruption ticket to get the coveted presidential seat in the Kremlin.
These characters are not some isolated instances, but a symptom of a deeply rooted worldview among the Russians. Let's consider more examples. Oleg Tinkov, a Russian billionaire, who was recently vocal about being against the invasion of Ukraine, is another Russian chauvinist.
While the system suited Tinkov he supported Putin. He went as far as claiming that Putin should be proclaimed tsar. Some will object saying that the claim is ripped out of context, that "he meant that Putin is a tsar anyway so make it formal." Ok... ft.com/content/63e034…
...there is more. Tinkov's Russian chauvinism was laid bare in 2014 and 2015. He openly gloated over Ukraine's plight and used ethnic slurs against the Ukrainians on Twitter. He is no longer on Twitter. medialeaks.ru/0505rgg-str-ti…
Again, these people are not isolated incidents. I did not even discuss the most obvious examples such as Aleksandr Dugin, Konstantin Malofeev, Dmitry Rogozin, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, or Aleksey Zhuravlev. I'll leave it up to you. There are just too many in the Russian government.
Non-Russians are frequently shocked that the Russian PMC, Wagner, is a neo-nazi organization. But it is all part of the Russian system. The PMC formally belongs to Yevgeny Prigozhin, Putin's chef, called so for his "catering contracts" with the government.
The Russian Church serves the same message of Russian exceptionalism and is fully integrated into the Russian state. I will post more translated speeches by the Russian clergy in the future all carrying the same message.
I focused on individuals and organizations in Russia but racism and xenophobia in the country are well documented. It is part of the state's policy, a response to the will of its people. Somethings gotta give in a corrupt dictatorship. wilsoncenter.org/publication/th…
The gov and the people have a social contract - the Kremlin continues to remain in power and enrich themselves in exchange for security and propagation of the Russian exceptionalism sentiment: "There is no rise in mass xenophobic feelings in Russia." bbc.co.uk/news/world-eur…
The Kremlin actively uses maskirovka. They "leaked" some information about the deployment of the widely recognized neo-nazi Rusich and Russian Imperial Movement "volunteer" groups. By deploying actual nazis, they divert attention from the rest of Russia. rferl.org/a/russian-neo-…
Russia's obsession with the Azov bat/reg is also understandable. First, it is part of the decades-long Russian victory-death cult where German Nazis are the enemy. Azov are subbed for German Nazis. Second, it is yet again an accusation in a mirror, or simply put projection.
So is Russophobia bad? No, it is a response to the deeply-rooted Russian aggressive nationalism that has now evolved into full-blown nazism.
End of thread.
Over the past week, we have witnessed the Armed Forces of Ukraine providing humanitarian aid and treating with respect Russian civilians in the occupied territories of Kursk Oblast. The same civilians that Moscow abandoned. 1/
The civilians who managed to flee deeper into the Russian territory had to do so on their own. Though the Kremlin promised to pay them 10,000 rubles (~100 USD) many still struggle to get a government paycheck. 2/
The Kremlin introduced the KTO (Counter-Terrorism Operation) regime in Kursk and other oblasts bordering Ukraine putting Bortnikov, head of the FSB, in charge of the situation in Kursk. 3/
There are many threads explaining the political implications of Ukraine's advance in Russia. It is too early to say anything meaningful and the situation is very fluid. However, let's get some misconceptions out of the way. 1/
1. Civil discontent in Russia - does not matter. "Goryaschie perdaki" [upset] Russian war "journalists" and influencers - do not matter. There is panic in Kursk, Lipetsk, Bilhorod oblasts. Moscow's population seems to be unphased, yet. And it is the city that matters the most. 2/
So, the logic of civil discontent, caused by the Ukrainian advance, leading to a revolution is wishful thinking. There are however some inklings of the FSB being displeased by Putin's lackluster response... 3/
Russian mainstream media is still figuring out how to spin the Ukrainian advance into Kursk. The Kremlin so far provided little commentary. Much like with Prigozhin's mutiny, it would seem that they didn't plan for this contingency.
Here's an evolution of their headlines on Lenta, a Russian news aggregator, over the past three days. 1. lenta.ru/news/2024/08/0…
Given the increasing number of strange incidents across Europe, here is an ongoing thread "Guess the perpetrator: Finland edition."
Compiled with the help from @Nina_Lindfors 1/
June 2023, mass poisoning of pets. CEO of the company distributing pet food, David Rönnberg, was at one point a candidate for sanctions by Ukraine. He previously was on the board of directors of Detsky Mir, a large Russian retailer. 2/yle.fi/a/74-20058877
October 2023, Balticonnector, an undersea pipeline and communications cable, was damaged in a deliberate attack. 3/theguardian.com/world/2023/oct…
The strong sense of irredentism and imperial revanchism in Russia has been laid bare to the world. To most since 2022, to some since 2014, and to few since 1994. 1/
The Russian invasion of Ukraine makes no economic sense and Russia's national security concerns have been debunked repeatedly (e.g. ). 2/chathamhouse.org/2021/05/myths-…
It is also important to discuss how Russian irredentism is expressed outside of the context of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. 3/
10,000-foot view of the current situation in the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine 🧵
The Kremlin’s objectives in Ukraine remain unchanged: 1. Maximize territorial gains in Ukraine. The bare minimum was expressed in the sham referenda of September 2022 aiming to absorb the Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts in addition to...
Crimea occupied since 2014. The ideological narrative maintained since 2014 and reinforced since the start of the full-scale invasion indicates that the Odesa oblast is also part of the minimum objectives.