Thread by @edwardstrngr

Previously I asked whether we were seeing a split between 'Old' and 'New' Europe in their approach to Russia. Recent events in the Donbas allow us to view that through the lens of strategic 'staying power'. 1/22

https://twitter.com/edwardstrngr/status/1523936302835679232?s=20&t=swDOCfWEKtbOuvrb0WcNLg

Staying power requires a long-term view, to not knee-jerk to the vicissitudes of the current tactical battle. There is no campaign I have been involved in that has not swung to and fro tactically, and taken longer than expected: GW1, Libya, Kosovo... 2/22
samf.substack.com/p/how-long-wil…

This always leads many commentators of all stripes to lament, quite quickly, that initiative has been lost. This is usually assumed to be permanent. But the battlefield is not where wars are decided, it is where relative national power is revealed. 3/22

The toll of attrition must be compensated by relative recuperation of combat power. What might appear a tactical stalemate is actually altering the strategic balance - eg, ISW reports critical Russian losses in combat that will be hard to replace. 4/22
understandingwar.org/backgrounder/r…

There are phases in all campaigns where dogged persistence is required while the balance is altered; few are resolved by a brilliant Cannae moment. To calculate that power balance one has to look at national socio-economies, will to fight, and the geopolitical context. 5/22

Which is where the generational split comes in. It would appear that Old Europe is reverting to atavistic assumptions of Russia as an eternal Great Power: Macron, Scholz, Orban, Draghi are all reflex-genuflecting to Putin's putative status. 6/22
politico.eu/article/europe…

The intellectual basis for this 'Realpolitik' was laid out by Kissinger. His speech contains much that is sensible. But the premise of the argument is the continuity of the balance of the great powers over centuries. This idea has animated his life. 7/22

thetimes.co.uk/article/043a02…

Those neighbouring countries with an understanding at least as visceral as cerebral treat Russia very differently. Witness Kallas' clear-eyed take on what is at stake for us all. Her (EST) assessment is based on current evidence and recent experience. 8/22
nytimes.com/2022/05/16/wor…

SWE, FIN, POL, LAT, LIT are equally determined in supporting UKR. They combine both a realistic strategic net assessment of what they are actually witnessing with an absolute moral clarity over what is acceptable in international relations. 9/22
ft.com/content/c95018…

As with all campaigns, this one will ebb and flow, but the underpinning moral, and conceptual components of UKR fighting power remain stronger. It has support from around the globe while Russia is isolated and even CHN now appears a reluctant ally. 10/22
theguardian.com/commentisfree/…

Even if its grinding 'bite and hold' campaign bites off The Donbas RUS will find it very difficult to hold - UKR citizens are motivated by war crimes as RUS armed forces are, eventually, corroded by them. 11/22
spectator.co.uk/article/why-pu…

My posts have long said that we mustn't be seduced by 'plucky little Ukraine' tales. It needs every help to capitalise on its inherent strengths. If it gets it, despite tactical setbacks in Donbas, it can defeat Russia's invasion aims. 12/22

https://twitter.com/general_ben/status/1529444622384119808?s=20&t=swDOCfWEKtbOuvrb0WcNLg

And behind its creeping success in Donbas there is evidence that RUS is running out of combat power. And we do not know what is being discussed in quiet corners of the Kremlin as the longer term implications of RUS' strategic position gradually dawn. 13/22
spectator.co.uk/article/the-ru…

Buoyed now by high commodity prices, RUS economy will eventually be eroded by sanctions. Its economy is circa Spain's, its demography is awful, it makes nothing beyond rentier returns on a mono-crop economy. Now its military is revealed as weak. 14/22
nytimes.com/2022/05/09/bus…

My judgement is that the Baltic and Scandi nations have assessed Russia correctly. The supporting EU coalition can help Ukraine prevail; but it will require unity, a sense of long-term purpose and some sacrifice - sacrifice in its own interests. 15/22

RUS is no superpower. The only thing that can save it is if Western nations fold severally in return for cheap gas. If RUS is allowed to take some of UKR and hold the rest hostage it remains a threat to us all - esp small states. We will all be spending fortunes on Defence. 16/22

With 'might is right' legitimised by the very G7 nations charged with defending the 'rules based order' many other Taiwans emerge. Western resolve will have failed its first major post-Cold War test. 17/22

And where would the EU be in such circumstances, lead by a Germany that insisted on austerity for the poorer nations in 2008, but which will not take any commercial hit itself to preserve the physical security of smaller EU nations now? 18/22

If this came to pass those smaller nations would, rightly, question the foundational basis of the EU and reconsider where their security could best be guaranteed. Such an outcome is not in the best interests of the combined western economy - which underpins all security. 19/22

So my conclusions have not altered since I pinned my Tweet of 1 April. The West is intimately involved in the confrontation in Ukraine. If Ukraine negotiates terms from a position of military strength then Russia is shown to be the middling power it has become. 20/22

We are in this for the long haul. We should look at the revealed evidence and shrewdly assess real RUS power as the Baltic and Scandi nations have, and deal with RUS accordingly. We must arm and sustain Ukraine to defeat RUS's invasion. 21/22

@PhillipsPOBrien

@LawDavF apologies for not crediting.