Thread: I completely disagree with this article's conclusions, and I think it stems from a misinterpretation of the data. Tanks, fighters, and ships are not "being pushed into obsolescence" and we are mostly seeing incremental changes in warfare.
theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/…
theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/…
If you are going to make a bold claim like "we are seeing the very nature of combat change" you need extraordinary evidence, which this article lacks. Instead, the successes and failures of the Russian and Ukrainian militaries can be explained by well-known principles of war. 2/
In Ukraine most casualties are coming from unguided artillery, Soviet-era air defenses are countering modernized Soviet-era aircraft, infantry are fighting infantry in trenches with rifles and grenades, tanks are being destroyed by AT mines, and most equipment is decades old. 3/
UCAVs and loitering munitions are playing a role, but they're not decisive and they aren't replacing manned aircraft or artillery. COTS UAVs are significant, but they are mostly being used to facilitate artillery, ISR for advancing units, and supporting existing capabilities. 4/
Russia has lost a lot of tanks in Ukraine but this is mostly a result of poor strategy and employment, not a deficiency of tanks themselves. We haven't learned much new about tanks from this war, except the well-know lesson that tanks are vulnerable without combined arms. 5/
Re: Oryx's figures, of the 741 recorded Russian tank losses, 306 (41%) were found abandoned by their crews. Many of the destroyed tanks on the list were also abandoned and destroyed by UA forces who could not capture them. >50% of Russia's tank losses may have been abandoned. 6/
Those data do not indicate that tanks are obsolete, they indicate that tank units were poorly employed. Russia's invasion plan presumed little resistance, and its forces were not well-prepared to deal with resistance. Ground units focused on moving long distances too quickly. 7/
They did so by moving without proper support, such as artillery, EW, logistics, ISR, etc. and often did not move as cohesive BTGs. These units became rapidly overextended and were poorly positioned to handle resistance from the Ukrainian military or guerrilla tactics. 8/
The initial phase of Russia's invasion was not combined arms. The Air Force and Ground Forces fought separate campaigns and aviation didn't really support the ground advance. This left ground forces vulnerable. We should not try to draw sweeping lessons about warfare from this.9/
Tanks are vulnerable without combined arms support. This has been known for 100 years. Russia did not have enough infantry in this invasion and Russian tank regiments changed their T/O by reducing their motorized rifle battalions to a 75-man company. This was insufficient. 10/
How do you protect tanks from modern ATGM teams? You push UAVs and ground reconnaissance ahead of tank units and deploy sufficient infantry to protect tanks, particularly in urban areas. Russia didn't do this in the beginning, and tank units suffered as a result. 11/
VDV, motorized rifle, and spetsnaz units suffered similar problems at the beginning of the war. They made rapid dashes without combined arms support and sustained heavy casualties in many areas, including Hostomel, Bucha, Irpin, Sumy, Kharkiv, etc. 12/
https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1497878028898160641
There is ample evidence of the poor employment of tanks or tank units without sufficient infantry and other support that led to heavy losses. 13/
https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1501895374939774977
Russian units had little warning they were going to war, which is critical for logistics planning and ensuring proper maintenance. Many of Russia's tank losses happened in the 1st 2 weeks because of maintenance and logistics issues. Others got stuck. 14/
https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1504015894292451331
There was a particular issue with T-80 tanks because they didn't have enough gasoline for their gas turbine engines. Notably, Russia has adapted its TTPs and is fighting more competently in the Donbas and we are seeing fewer tank losses as a result. 15/
What is the alternative to tanks? Tanks are still important in urban warfare, counterattacks, exploiting success, and for supporting infantry assaulting well-defended and entrenched positions, which is what Russia is doing in the Donbas now with some success. 16/
Indeed, both Russia and Ukraine still clearly see the benefit of tanks and armor. Ukraine is asking for more armor, and they are using tanks in their counterattacks. They are likely using tanks to reinforce their defenses in the Donbas as well. 17/
https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1524861947577274369
People declared tanks were obsolete after the Nagorno-Karabakh war as well. But that was a misinterpretation of the data. Armenia lost a lot of tanks, but, imo, that showed that the side that loses its tanks will likely lose a ground war instead of showing they were obsolete. 18/
Tanks weren't Armenia's problem, its lack of air defenses to counter TB2 UCAVs was. People blamed the wrong system. Once Armenia lost those tanks or couldn't use them, Azerbaijan had success because Armenia couldn't reinforce its defenses with armor. 19/
https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1310628502903947266
Indeed, tanks were critical to Azerbaijan's success in penetrating Armenian defenses. It is no coincidence that Azerbaijan made its breakthrough in the south where the terrain was flatter and Azerbaijan could maximize its advantage in armor. 20/
https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1317838003310678016
No, this war does not show that tanks are obsolete, it shows that they need to be employed with proper support in a combined arms operation, which is part of US/NATO doctrine. It is true that Russia invaded with too many tanks, but tanks were still important in OIF 1. 21/
The Moskva was essentially an un-modernized 40+ year-old ship. It had very old air defenses (possibly non-functional), it didn't have modern CIWS comparable to US Navy's, it had conscript sailors, and it should have had newer ships providing close-range air defense for it. 22/
The loss of the Moskva was a blunder by the Russian Navy's leadership through complacency to the threat from Ukrainian anti-ship missiles. Such a large ship with old air defenses should not have been so close to the Ukrainian coast. It doesn't mean US Navy ships are obsolete. 23/
I think this part about aviation vs air defenses is wrong too. Ukraine has mostly Soviet-era S-300PT/PS, Buk-M1, and Osa air defenses (which are playing a bigger role and influencing Russian air ops more than than MANPADS). These aren't cheap systems but they are old. 24/
If Ukraine only had MANPADS, Russian aviation would be operating more effectively. Russian aircraft have changed their TTPs, putting them at greater risk to MANPADS, because they assess the threat from S-300 and Buk-M1 is greater and because of issues with targeting systems. 25/
This part isn't true. Russia is having success conducting air strikes in the Donbas because Ukraine can't afford to push valuable S-300 and Buk-M1 systems into the Donbas salient where they could be targeted by Russian artillery. MANPADS are not sufficient here. 26/
The US Air Force could conduct an effective SEAD/DEAD campaign against Ukraine's air defenses because it is better trained, has better aircraft (including reconnaissance aircraft), and has better PGMs than the Russian Air Force. Those capabilities are expensive. 27/
I fundamentally disagree that any technology we've seen in Ukraine proves the balance of modern warfare has changed "very much against the attacker." There is plenty of modern equipment and different TTPs that can be used by the attacker to give them the advantage. 28/
The increasing capability of UAVs helps both the defender and attacker. Advances in air defenses can be offset by longer-range munitions and UAVs launching those munitions. Assuming this development will only aid the defender is questionable. 29/
Much has been made of Russian tank losses to ATGMs (even though artillery has destroyed more of them), but plenty of Russian tank losses were not K-Kills. Whereas, there aren't many cases where Russian BMPs, BTRs, or MT-LBs withstood a direct ATGM hit that wasn't catastrophic.30/
The lesson from this war isn't that NATO militaries should do away with armor, it is that they need to employ them correctly through combined arms. We should be wary of anyone saying there have been revolutionary changes that should drastically change the structure of militaries.
Before anyone says this, I think the US Marine Corps was right to divest from tanks, but the US Army and most other NATO armies should not. The USMC has a specific and unique challenge and it needed to find savings for new investments that could only come from vertical cuts.
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