So yeah, more on my concern of how possible Ukrainian MIM-104 Battery can be a threat to Russian AEW. So there seems to be indication of deployment of A-50U AEW into Black Sea Fleet. Image
This aircraft provides excellent coverage, particularly against conventional targets at ALL altitudes. This is the coverage of A-50 aircraft, flying at 9100 m AGL vs conventional target. Image
That also means along with ground based radar and early warning assets deployed in Crimean peninsula, they can monitor NATO patrols. As well as ensure situational awareness on Black sea fleet ships.
If one interested the following is a table of range of several AEW's working in S-band. Which i compiled from some Yefim Gordon's book, SAAB brochures and Globalsecurity website. Later extrapolated using 4th root rules and assumed valid for PD =50% Image
It's unfortunate that open source rarely mention PD (Probability of Detection) and let alone PfA (Probability fo False Alarm). Russian brochures so far and radar textbook that i read often mention typical value of 10^-6. and PD 85-90% for tracking purpose.
While for reference RCS. typically Early warning radar will quote 2 sqm as reference. Which then we will use for some calculations.
Naturally, A-50 can patrol outside of the expected Patriot Coverage, which for PAC-2 and PAC-3 is about 160-200 km. Here depicted estimated coverage in Odessa against the A-50 which flies at 9100 m ceiling. Image
The engagement area were happen to be coincide with this news which quotes declassified US intelligence on Russian naval Blockade at Black Sea

washingtonpost.com/national-secur…
However one thing that complicates the matter is possibility of either Neptune still exist OR US do supply long range Harpoon missile. and antiship missile can easily have Low RCS.
One example i simulated back in the day allows 0.05 sqm RCS in Frontal aspect. Low RCS of the missile will degrade the detection and later tracking range of the A-50's. Forcing her to actually close to engagement envelope of Patriot.
Now what's the range then ? If we assume PD-90% for proper tracking and designation for fighter intercepts or accurate early warning for say, pre-emptive Shtil fire from Grigorovich class. The following is simple calculations. Image
The equations are referenced from following :
-Detecting and Classifying Low Probability of Intercept Radar.
-Radar performance modelling 2nd Edition by George M Siouris.
As can be seen that the low RCS missiles degraded the detection and of course tracking range of the A-50U down from about 300 km for conventional target to just 125 km. This will impact the operational capability. Especially if AEW cover for Snake island is desired.
I made myself a graphics depicting the degraded coverage A-50U for low RCS target vs coverage of Patriot which assumed to be located in Odessa. Notice how the A-50 have to enter the engagement envelope of Patriot to cover snake island and Russian ships operating there.
The Graphics is animated just bit slow x-x sorry. Now Russian forces have several options :

1.Patrol outside the envelope but lost coverage for low RCS target attacking Snake Island
2.Accept the risk and increase suppression attempt on Patriot
The third option would be beefing up Snake island but without taking the coastline, Snake island is vulnerable to Ukrainian conventional artillery.
Option #2 might be more likely. Of course if Harpoon have larger RCS than 0.05 sqm or Ukrainian received older batch of Patriot that would give lesse headache for the Russians.
But well, im not having any intelligence on what kind of Patriot would be deployed so well. who knows. Russians however may put more careful approach. I have seen people assuming them always dumb and make mistakes. Unfortunately that's not always true.
Loss of an AEW tho is i consider a major propaganda and rather immense punch on the Russians as ISR Assets are expensive, rare and take years to build. You cant just print AEW like cars. This is true for both "Western" and "Eastern" power.
Without patriot tho, or anything that can engage Russian AEW's. subsequent effort on missile attack on Russian ship may have lower probability of success as Russian ship have A-50 eye in the sky that gives them situational awareness.

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More from @Flankerchan

Jun 16
Still with my cruise missile. previously i said that the "spikes" from the engine can get some improvements. so here it is. The extra suppression includes "fins" and absorber treatment around the inlet. ImageImage
The "suppression fins" kinda similar as one found in B-1B inlet to shield her fan face from radar.

modelingmadness.com/review/mod/kol…
I found that solution as F/A-18E or Su-57 style Radar blocker may not work due to space constraint inside the cruise missile.
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Mar 30
I posted this elsewhere already. but guess it's fine to bring it here ? It's about Ass. yeah Ass.. Aircraft Ass. Particularly Stealth fighter's Ass.

Do you guys know that F-22 and F-35 have "special" afterburner section which acts as Radar blocker ?
Those special "stealthy afterburner injector " Are apparently shaped like curve, more like an extension of turbine stator with multiple points of injection. Of course i tried to model one. Due to reference limitation, this shape is speculative.
This blocker might be made out of "high temperature" radar absorber, based on carbide based material. It may also be actively cooled by bleed air from compressor.
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Mar 28
This Ukrainian ATGM should deserve more credit.

the Stugna/Skif ATGM, it has one feature which sets it apart from other ATGM's. Namely the separate firing console. Thus allows the ATGM's to be fired remotely.

Credit to :
armyrecognition.com/ukraine_ukrain…
This feature is not new as in fact the Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger) missile have it but it's very rudimentary and still exposes the operator to threat as depicted below.
Such weaknesses wont present in Stugna as its targeting system are entirely located within the launcher. The gunner can be safely camouflaged while view and guide the missile remotely. like this example.
Read 9 tweets
Mar 25
So, before visiting Russian drone.. maybe we can do a visit on F-16's Clean one. The simulation includes the radome + radarset which assumed to be radiotransparent on all frequencies.

as expected RCS flared out. S-band is about 26 sqm.
One may ask tho how it got so big. and from what aspect.. the answer is it's an average value found from the RCS distribution data from the simulation. It shows this pareto. about 95% of the data "points" indicates value between 0.01-52 sqm.
Why i am not using the usual Swerling 1 PDF ? Because it gives unrealistic value. This is to be expected however if such happen one should use the histogram of the RCS data to make decisions on what value to use.
Read 4 tweets

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