Thread by @MarkHertling

Travel & work have limited my ability to comment & provide updates on Russia's invasion of Ukraine from a "ground commander's" perspective.

But I've continued to watch actions -especially in the E & S- & several followers have asked for me to provide thoughts.

Here's a🧵 1/

First, a caveat.

It's easier providing thoughts on operational & strategic movements & actions than commenting on tactical battles.

Even w/ feeds from units or S2/J2 (intelligence) assessments, the "fog of war" skews the assessment of the up-close fight.

2/

At our Army's training centers, "observers/controllers" (the O/Cs or trainers) have receive a common operational picture (COP) of BOTH sides of the battle.

O/Cs see what friendly AND enemy forces are doing, hear communication from both sides, sense the state of troops. 3/

That changes in real war.

At the strategic/operational level, make assessments from intel: satellites, signals, tracking of units, reports.

But in tactical fights, that changes. A "commander" needs all that, but also needs to be there: to see, hear, smell, and sense.
4/

In war, good commanders travel the battlefield, look subordinates in the eyes, hear their thoughts on the plan, get a feel for the terrain, sense the level of fatigue/morale in a unit.

Commander's call this "battlefield circulation" or "battlefield circ."

It's a requirement! 5/

That's a long prelude to say my current assessment is based on 6 things:
1. The current situation
2. How Russia fights
3. How Ukraine fights
4. Knowledge of terrain & objectives
5. A lack of clear intel
6. A gut feel 6/

1) CURRENT SITUATION

On 2/24 I posted a long twitter thread on why I thought Ukraine would win. On 4/4 I posted another on what to expect in Russia's "phase 2." On 5/26, I provided additional details on how RU plans were (& weren't) playing out.

I've summarized them. 7/

In April & May, there's been a lot of movement on the battlefield by both forces. The attached @TheStudyofWar map shows just how much.

What's important, Ukraine's strategy & operational goals have not changed: Defend the country/culture/people, regain territorial integrity. 8/

On the other hand, RU strategic goals & operational objectives have changed significantly & that confuses commanders and troops on the ground.

Truthfully, I knew RU's strategic & operational objectives when the war started...I don't know what they are now....9/

I *think* (guess?) RU operational objectives are:
-Expand stronghold in Donbas
-Gain & expand foothold in 3 other Oblasts (Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Kharkiv)
-Control all Black/Azov sea ports

Not sure what Putin's *new* strategic objectives are...but they are beyond reach. 10/

A critical difference in objectives:

Ukraine's strat & oper'l objective are focused on destroying the Russian invaders (thus defending their land)

Russians strat & oper'l objectives are focused on gaining territory.

This distinction is important for the will of the army. 11/

2) HOW RU FIGHTS;

In other posts I've described a RU army that:
-uses massive & imprecise artillery/air
-has not trained on & has difficulty executing combined arms maneuver (i.e., coordinating tanks, infantry, artillery, air, engineers, logistic support).
-is poorly led 12/

At the end of phase 1, the RU army has also been increasingly plagued with
-a need for regeneration of forces
-the death of high/mid level leaders
-increasingly low morale
-unwilling conscripts/mercenaries to fight
-numerous battlefield defeats, very few temporary victories. 13/

RU continues to use imprecise artillery & indiscriminate air force/helicopter attacks.

Make no mistake, these assist in breakthroughs, terrorize the population & physically/psychologically affect UKR soldiers.

These attacks do prepare the way for RU gaining ground. BUT...14/

Once RU "lifts & shifts" arty & their recon forces move to take ground, the inability of the RU to conduct combined arms operations is glaringly bad.

It's VERY HARD to fix that during combat...it takes years to train this.

Evidence: multiple failed river crossings. 15/

For all those amateurs saying "this is the end of tanks on the battlefield," I'd suggest you not judge the future by the way the RUs are executing their campaign.

Tanks are part of an infantry, artillery, air, air defense, SOF, engineer, logistics TEAM. 16/

3) HOW UKR FIGHTS:

UKR is currently overmatched in numbers of pieces of equipment.

That's bad...and good (think resupply/maintenance of heavy equipment).

They are using ever-increasing & PRECISE counter-fire, drones, and air attack (very different than RU). 17/

UKR leadership, incorporation of battlefield intel, use of dismounted infantry (with AT & AA weapons) & mission focus is good-to-excellent. UKR logistics operations if fair, but getting better.

RU use of tanks/infantry, is bad; logistics support is terrible; leadership awful.18/

Of note, regarding the artillery duel in Donbas.

A smart force, when attacked with massive artillery, will pull back (withdraw, not retreat). When the arty stops, they return.

If attacker doesn't have arty/air supporting their attack & the defending force has prepared...19/

defensive positions to move back into, the attacking force will face a buzz saw.

Combine that with a requirement by the attacking force (RU) to seize & occupy urban areas (like Sievierodonetsk, w/a population of 100k)...well, you see the problem. 20/

4) KNOWLEDGE OF TERRAIN & OBJECTIVES

A key tenet of warfare: the defender usually (though not always) has a home field advantage. They know the terrain.

The home team knows rivers, roads, ground undulation, weather, line of site, hide positions, dust, hills, etc. 21/

While important in cities (@SpencerGuard) also important in rural fights.

Watch films of RU tanks, moving down rural roads.

They're slow, hesitant...don't move off roads.

They know there are many ways to die: AT ambush, artillery, drones, mines. 22/

While @ISW (and other) maps are great, they don't tell the entire terrain story.

Example: Here's the Luhansk salient.

What isn't shown:
-the width/bends in the Donets River, west of Sievierodonetsk
-undulating terrain & overwatch positions
-rural roads
-the M04 motorway 23/

5) CLEAR INTELLIGENCE

On today's intense battlefield, every soldier/leader in any good unit fights for intelligence.

There is a need for planning, driven by "intel-based operations," and "intel-based targeting. 24/

When commanding forces in Iraq an intel SGT introduced me to "Leroy Jenkins."

He said some of our units were better than others in avoiding this kind of unplanned, not-based-on-intel operations.

It's very telling...but it's gaming, not life and death.

Ukraine is getting some great intel, gathering a variety of techniques & incorporating unique resources (drones, satellites, human intel, etc). 26/

6) GUT FEEL.

The fight today isn't a stalement & it's not stalled.

My gut (& reports) tell me the Donbas fight is a slugfest, with RU using artillery to set conditions they can't follow up on.

UKR is smartly using limited forces and precise targeting. 27/

I won't predict how long this will go on, but there are some factors that may influence what's next.

I've put some considerations on this chart. 28/

IMHO, anyone suggesting appeasement of Putin's illegal operation doesn't understand him, his world view...or what he may do next.

Anyone suggesting Ukraine give up any inch of their sovereign territory is violating our US national values.

But that's just me. 29/29