Ok, it’s time for my quarterly review of the pro forma disaster of a financial science project called Sunrun ($RUN). Here is their 1Q cash flow statement:
(2) $RUN The Company loves to present their own metrics like Customer Additions, Net Subscriber Value and Megawatts Installed. Profits and Cash Flow(for obvious reasons), not so much. Here is their Loss Statement:
(3) So if we’re going to make up metrics at $RUN, the one to watch is Leasing NOI, which I define as Leasing Gross Profits + Depreciation & Amortization. Basically the cash flow from the leases in place, before any marketing, SG&A and depreciation costs.
(2) $CVNA burned $800M in cash BEFORE any inventory (and related payables) build. Wow.
(3) And this disclosure related to the announced $CVNA offerings seems to imply the banks walked away from financing the deal directly. Still, $3.3B of net new debt/pfd being added.
Over 5 pts of $IBM total revenues from $KD. Less than 3% revenue growth without. Software revs up less than 4%, ex-KD. FCF only $1.2B. Financial engineering at its finest.
(2) Also they once again recast (lower) 1Q 2021 Software Revenue (from $5,317M to $5,138M), which added another 3 pts of “growth” for Software this quarter, with the stroke of their magic $IBM accounting pen. Same old, same old.
(3) Put another way, $IBM software revenues grew 8.6% vs the pro forma 1Q Software division revenues restated post the $KD-spin($5,772 vs $5,317M), of which Kyndryl represented “over 8 pts”. So ex the spin and two restatements, non-affiliated software really didn’t grow in the Q.
A year ago, at $10 per share, $AMC had a total enterprise value of $11.0B ($4.7B market value + $6.3B in net liabilities, ex-leases). The 2022 EBITDA estimate then was $540M, or 20x next year’s EBITDA. Expensive, but not crazy.
(2) Today at $29, $AMC has a TEV of $20.7B ($15.2B + $5.5B), or 33X the 2023 EBITDA estimate of $630M. That’s getting crazy, given it still means AMC will be unprofitable through 2025.
(3) As a sanity check, Cinemark ($CNK) has a TEV of $4.7B ($2.1B + $2.7B), or only 7x its estimated 2023 EBITDA of $640M!
Those of you who follow fintech ($AFRM, $SOFI, $SQ, $UPST, etc) know how important Cross River Bank in NJ is to the entire industry. They are the actual bank that makes and securitizes most of the fintech-originated loans.
(2) And some of you know that Cross River is under Congressional (and probably regulatory) scrutiny for a disproportionate amount of fraud in the PPP lending program.
(3) But I bet few know that Cross River’s founder was previously the CFO of pre-GFC mortgage originator First Meridian Mortgage. Why is this important? (Via @nytimes)
(2) If this former CFO truly believes that the “monthly churn is less than one percent”, then $PTON shareholders are still going to be unpleasantly surprised going forward.
(3) It is very clear from $PTON’s definition of churn, that they basically use a simple average of net Connected Fitness cancellations divided by total current subscriptions. Digital subs are not in this calculation. Anyone see the basic problem here?