The 🇺🇦 mayor of Kramatorsk: “Let me give you my professional opinion as mayor: if we don’t get heavy weapons in two or three weeks, we’re fucked.” newyorker.com/news/dispatch/…
Russian commanders are rotating forces on the frontline.
„The Russian Army has split its forces into smaller groups, which it uses, along with a sizable fleet of drones, to identify and target Ukrainian positions, hitting them with artillery and air strikes.“
„When a particular zone or village has effectively been levelled, ground troops—a mixture of regular Russian soldiers, Wagner mercenaries, & fighters mobilized from the Russia-backed separatist territories in Donetsk & Luhansk, Tarnavsky said—move in to try to seize the rubble.“
According to Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavsky, the deputy commander of Ukrainian forces on the eastern front, Ukrainian forces lack skill & experience as a result of heavy losses among the most experienced Ukrainian troops.
„..Ukrainian infantry rarely see the enemy. Rather, battles are often fought at distances of ten miles or more. The war has become, as one soldier told me, a game of ‚artillery Ping-Pong.‘“ Great piece by @yaffaesque
"In areas where battles have been the most intense, Russia has had, by his count, a five-to-one manpower advantage. Tarnavsky also estimated that Russia has an advantage of up to seven-to-one in artillery batteries and a similarly large stockpile of munitions."
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🇺🇦defense minister: „We need heavy weapons, primarily MLRS. We also need artillery tanks, aviation, anti-ship complexes, new UAVs, anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense systems. We need them fast. We need them in the numbers matching the scope of the challenge we face.”
Deliberations take days and weeks, literally measured in Ukrainian lives...we need simplified and expedited procedures” to forward new and different weapons for the evolving battlefield,” 🇺🇦defense minister said.
As the Russians advanced on Kyiv in late February, Ukrainian defenders enlisted a 15-year-old civilian drone pilot and his commercial off the shelf drone to pinpoint a column of military vehicles approaching the capital from the west.
Ukrainian forces provided the "information where approximately the Russian column could be,"the boy said. "Our goal was to find the exact coordinates and provide the coordinates to the soldiers."
“It was one of the biggest columns that was moving on the Zhytomyr road and we managed to find it because one of the trucks turned on its lights for a long time," he added.
A tactical road march consisting of MBTs& APCs (+mounted/dismounted) is a fairly rudimentary combined arms manuever for mechanized forces. The level of MBTs/APCs integration is impossible to tell from this 10sec. video.
Looks more like the end of a training exercise. I don‘t know where/when this was taken. APCs (plus mech infantry)/MBTs, plus self-propelled howitzers and short-/mid-range air defense systems would constitute the core of the mechanized reserve brigades 🇺🇦 is generating.
"While many aspects of the Ukraine war echo past major wars....there are several new dimensions. One in particular, likely explains the Siverskyi Donets River crossing debacle: ubiquitous surveillance of the battlefield." warontherocks.com/2022/05/would-…
Good point: "Neither Russia nor the West has had operational or combat experiences relevant to the war in Ukraine in over a generation, if not actually since World War II."
"By operational experience I mean practice in deploying, maneuvering, and supporting large, multi-echelon formations in joint operations against a competent, well-armed enemy who is determined to fight and capable of doing so."
"Three suggested explanations for the Russian shortcomings merit attention. The first is that the invasion was based on political wishful thinking in the Kremlin regarding the public mood in Ukraine, Ukrainian versus Russian military capabilities and the reaction of the West."
"The second explanation is that Russia’s military leadership had overdosed on ideas of next-gen. warfare, whereby subversion and psychological operations in combination with long-range precision strikes would weaken the enemy so that little conventional force would be needed."
"The third possible reason is that the rot in the Russian Armed Forces revealed by the Russo-Georgian War in 2008 was never removed, but simply painted over."
(All 3 explanations are carefully caveated in the article.)
An initial assessment of Russian military capabilities post-February 24 im the new @SurvivalEditors👇 Bottom line: Russian armed forces def. underperformed: lots we still don’t know; no reason for Western self-complacency. tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.10…
This is most likely true for many European militaries: How „well Western forces would perform if similarly challenged remains to be seen. Some of the flaws exposed within the Russian Armed Forces may well lie dormant within Western military forces too.“
„Several reports indicate that European forces are hollow in several respects, such as personnel strength, equipment, supplies and training.The war so far has been a merciless inquisition for the Russian military.“