Due to the 1/6 report, 2A legislation & economic issues, details of Donbas battles & the illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine are not at the forefront.
UA isn't "losing" & the action isn't stalled. It remains a slugfest in the east.
Here's a new 🧵on equipping UA. 1/21
As I said in past threads, the "new phase" of the fight (which started in early April), brought change.
-RU focus is on massing artillery, attempts at breakthrough.
-UA focus is logistics, active defense & maintaining will.
I've used this slide to describe the major shifts. 2/
In the last few days, the @nytimes, @washingtonpost, @WSJ & others have reported Ukraine's demand for more combat equipment.
UA needs support, lots of it. It's important to understand the scope of their "asks," the art of the possible & the associated logistics requirements. 3/
I'll provide some of context for all that, from a soldier's perspective & battlefield experience as a Division Commander.
Some of what I say will be met with "they know more than you on what they need."
So please understand I'm just giving my perspective. 4/
Many reports today said the west is "lagging" & "indecisive" in providing equipment.
Those reports also say Ukraine needs nations to provide 1000 howitzers, 300 MLRS, 500 tanks, 2000 armored vehicles.
I'd offer some context for those requests. 5/
Let's talk artillery.
There are 10 active US Army Divisions. Depending on the "type" division (Armored, Infantry, Airborne, Air Assault, Light), each one is equipped differently.
Each has a Division Artillery Brigade -called a "DIVARTY"- which normally has 3 Battalions. 6/
During combat, each artillery battalion in DIVARTY isattached to the 3 combat brigades of the Division.
Each of those arty battalions has between 16-24 howitzers (either self-propelled M109A7 or towed M777) & usually 9 different "types" of rocket artillery (MLRS or HIMARS). 7/
To make it easy for math purposes, let's round up and say each Division has 24 howitzers & 9 rocket systems.
That's a TOTAL of 240 howitzers & 90 rocket systems in all ten of the active US Army Divisions .
That's an indicator of the scope of the UA "asks." 8/
The US provided 108 M777 to UA a few weeks ago, the equivalent of almost 5 artillery battalions. Those came with 200,000 rounds of ammunition.
The US also sent 4 HIMARS as a proof of principle. There will likely be more of those in the next tranche. 9/
NATO countries are also sending cannons & ammunition, some w/ different chassis, fire control systems, training requirements.
They wont match RU guns 1:1, as western militaries have other methods to counter the RU artillery threat. (That is hard to explain in a thread). 10/
Part of the "ask" that is required but usually not discussed in the requirement for support for all this equipment. Parts, mechanics, maintenance, etc.
That comes from elsewhere.
Along with a "DIVARTY," each US Division also has a Division Support Command, or "DISCOM." 11/
The DISCOM is a very large organization w/ mechanics, part suppliers & parts, truck drivers, fuelers, equipment handlers & all other things that are part of supply chain operations.
That DISCOM "supports the supporters" that exists internally to each battalion/brigade. 12/
What these soldiers do is ensure each piece of high-tech equipment continues to work, is supplied with ammo/fuel/spare parts/electronics.
When delivering cannons...there's requirements to deliver all the "stuff."
There's more supporters than trigger pullers in a US Division.13/
It's relatively easy to train soldiers to operate cannons. But there's also the need for EXTENSIVE training of mechanics, suppliers, & other supporters.
And...you must ensure the supply chain (including the route for all this to take place) operates smoothly. 14/
It's an estimated 400 miles from Ukraine's western border to Kyiv...another 200+ from Kyiv to the front lines.
The military calls that a "line of communications" or LOC. Keeping LOCs secure & open in combat is tough work, but it's required. 15/
Add to this, the different kind of equipment Ukraine is requesting is coming from a variety of NATO and non-NATO nations.
Not all of it is the same. That exacerbates parts & maintenance requirements. This compounds supply chain & LOC challenges. 16/
In this thread, we've talked just artillery.
Now multiply cannon issues to fielding new & technologically advanced tanks, infantry vehicles, aviation, etc.
In effect, UA is wanting to field a new army, w/ western equipment, w/unfamiliar processes, while fighting a war. 17/
As a division commander in combat, I fielded several weapons systems -some complicated, some not- during a 15-month deployment.
The easy fieldings took weeks...hard ones took longer. Units are pulled off line & trained. Mechanics learn their stuff. Supplies are restocked. 18/
And I had the advantage of a great DISCOM, practiced processes, secured supply lines, soldiers that knew what they were getting, the ability to pull folks offline and replace them with others while equipment was fielded.
UA has none of that. 19/
Make no mistake, UKR requires support from the US & NATO.
The courage & tenacity UA has shown is exemplary & they are fighting for all of us.
UA will win, but it will be a tough fight.
And...supporters ought understand the dynamics of what they're facing. 20/
Sorry if this thread has pissed anyone off, but these are the challenges associated with transforming and modernizing an army...and it requires more than just people saying "give them everything they need." 21/21
Correction, not 240 but 720. I had a math brain cramp. Please correct that math.
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Woke up to several texts from journalists asking my thoughts on "West Point dropping duty, honor, country from their motto?" and one wrote "does this mean the Academy has gone 'woke'?"
My first thought: "let me get a cup of coffee before addressing this craziness."
A 🧵 1/9
This week, graduates received a letter from LTG Steve Gilland -the Superintendent (the USMA college president)- of @WestPoint_USMA informing of changes in the MISSION STATEMENT (NOT the motto).
The letter specifically said the MOTTO "Duty, Honor, Country" has NOT changed. 2/
Now, I know LTG Gilland well. He's a great soldier, terrific leader, and a common-sense guy.
As any leader - general or business CEO - knows, you have to continuously assess and analyze your mission statement.
In fact, I teach this to MBA students in leadership classes. 3/
Many of you have heard me say this multiple times with respect to the war in Ukraine.
Now we'll start seeing the same in Gaza with JLTOTS pronounced "Jay-Lots" for the media).
A 🧵 1/9
"Logistics determine the art of the possible."
Many of you have heard me say this multiple times with respect to the war in Ukraine.
Now we'll start seeing the same in Gaza with JLTOTS pronounced "Jay-Lots" for the media).
A 🧵 1/9
Airdropped humanitarian aid is precise and speedy, but it's limited in it's capability and capacity for certain kinds and large amounts of supplies. It's also relatively expensive.After you deploy expensive parachutes and GPS devices into the area, it's hard to get them back! 3/
On 24 Feb 2022, I scribbled some thoughts about what I believed were Putin's strategic objectives in invading Ukraine (see chart).
In the 1st 18 months of the conflict, Ukraines' action, NATO collaboration & US support caused him to fail.
We're at an inflection point. A 🧵1/
Addressing each: 1. Zelenskyy is still strong 2. Ukraine's army is still fighting 3. Ukraine's population is resilient 4. Ru does not control the Black sea ports 5. The west - especially the US - has returned to being divided, and NATO may now take fewer risks. 2/
Putin now knows that Ukraine's continued capability will - for the short term - continue to require support from the west.
So he is pulling out all stops, w/ mobilizations (over 400k new (untrained) soldiers as "meat" for attacks), a ramped up industrial base, & oppression. 3/
GEN Zaluzhnyi is 51 y.o., extremely young for a Commander of any nation's Armed Forces. Most 4-star generals are in their 60's with much more experience.
Since Feb '22 he's been the tactical, opn'l & strategic leader of the toughest fight we've seen in the 21st century. 2/
Here's what I mean by "tactical, opn'l, strategic" commander:
1. He commands the 2000+ mile tactical front 2. He coordinates each battles into an operational campaign plan 3. He "plays" in the strategic arena with his nation's leaders & over 50 supporting nations. 3/
Deterrence defined: The action or actions used to discourage an event by means of instilling doubt or fear of the consequences over time.
Many say deterrence against Iran & its proxies is failing.
It's too early to tell. 1/8
DETERRENCE is one technique that MAY contribute to national security strategy.
Some define strategy as the use of different MEANS in specific WAYS to reach on END STATE or OBJECTIVE.
I agree with that definition...and it's sorta like deterrence. 2/
In National Security Strategy, MEANS equates to difference tools at the nation's disposal (diplomancy, information, economics, military). WAYS is the approach you use to make those tools effective (think maneuver with military, economic sanctions, condemning actions, etc). 3/