I’m pleased to share my new @IISS_org analysis with @jamescrabtree on the state of US defence strategy, alliances and partners in the Indo-Pacific, launched at #SLD22.
It’s a sobering read. A🧵on why we’re so worried about the trajectory of US strategy. 1/iiss.org/publications/s…
Some good news first: the Biden admin recognises the Indo-Pacific should be its top priority and China its pacing challenge.
It realises the US can’t uphold a favourable balance of power vs China by itself (see graph) and its trying to advance a strategy of collective defence 2/
But the US has not matched its Indo-Pacific rhetoric w the actions and resources needed to bolster its strategic position
Despite some progress, the Biden admin is lagging on the three key elements of US defence strategy in the region: prioritisation, posture and partnerships 3/
On prioritisation: Biden did well to extract the US from Afghanistan and avoid direct conflict w Russia over Ukraine.
But this hasn’t advanced a pivot to Asia. The are still 47,000 troops in the Middle East. And Ukraine has become a major drain on attention and resources. 4/
A big US focus on Europe and ME would be OK if: a) Asia was also getting defence resources en masse, and b) DoD’s budget was rising.
But this isn’t the case. It’s a fight to get tailored defence funds for Asia. And DoD is falling well short of its 2018 3-5% real growth target 5/
On posture: while China’s military buildup is making rapid advances, US Indo-Pacific posture is only inching along
Projects on Guam/Australia are good but insufficient. The Pacific Deterrence Initiative needs more funds/focus. Biden’s posture review made no decisive shifts. 6/
Posture takes time and what’s needed now — ie a more resilient and distributed set of operating locations — should have started 10yrs ago.
Friction w allies has caused some setbacks. But disagreement on military strategy and spending inside US is arguably the bigger obstacle. 7/
On partnerships: while the Biden team has emphasised the need to work w allies to share more of the collective defence burden, its not yet doing enough to empower them.
The pace of defence industrial cooperation between the US and Australia, Japan, ROK, India bears this out 8/
Long-standing obstacles like US export controls, restrictions on tech transfer, Buy American rules and intel-sharing barriers all need reform if the US is to successfully bolster the high-end deterrence capabilities of key Asian partners.
Even AUKUS — Biden’s flagship… 9/
…alliance initiative — will need such reforms to succeed.
Much has been done (ie Quad) to advance a collective policy agenda. But as US can’t deter China alone, it must do more to help allies help themselves — ie by building own strike capabilities, industrial bases etc 10/
So where does this leave US Indo-Pacific defence strategy?
After yrs of neglect, the US is doing more to strengthen priorities, posture and p’ships in the region. But efforts aren’t keeping up w the deteriorating strategic landscape. Collectively we must do better, and fast. 11/
Our sincere thanks to @CorbenTom and Alice Nason for their research assistance, and to the @IISS_org team who produces this outstanding volume, esp @LynnKuok and @DrTimHuxley.
Watching the Ukraine crisis unravel arguments for an “Asia first” US strategy is unsettling, especially when ppl claim Asian states want to see greater US military resolve. They don’t.
Let’s be clear: US credibility and position in Asia depend on military restraint in Europe 1/
This doesn’t mean US should not do more to deter Russia. US should have approved efforts to make Ukraine as prickly as possible well before now. It should have done more to forge united front with Europe on punitive economic repercussions too. 2/
But the admin’s basic approach to rely cost imposition and European allies (who haven’t sufficiently stepped up) is probably the least bad strategy. After all, Ukraine is a secondary US interest in a secondary theatre; and a relatively declining US must prioritise key stakes 3/
BIG NEWS: There's a force posture nugget in #AUSMIN presser.
Looks like new Australia-United States military bases are on the horizon, which will include a naval component for sustaining combined submarines and surface fleet.
The just-released #AUSMIN statement reinforces this.
Major expansion of allied force posture initiatives to include AIR, LAND and SEA elements. Latter is overdue and critical for regional security.
The focus on logistics, sustainment, maintenance is essential for US position.
Leveraging Australia's strategic geography to support a more robust US forward military position in the Indo-Pacific is important for ensuring a favourable balance of power in light of China's rising A2AD challenge. This @USSC map shows why.
THREAD: After yesterday’s #AUKUS plan to deepen defence industrial base integration tailored to Indo-Pacific priorities, today's #AUSMIN presser signals an ambitious collective defence agenda — much of which we have recommended in @USSC reports. 1/ ussc.edu.au/analysis/state…
Big things flagged by Austin and Duton:
1) Major force posture initiatives to expand US access and presence in Australia
2) Agree to take immediate steps to improve interoperability through deeper integration
China’s use of coercive statecraft against Australia — disinformation, economic threats, covert foreign interference etc. — is and will remain the day to day reality of international affairs in our region. It’s not the product of a mishandled... 1/ abc.net.au/news/2020-06-1…
...China relationship; it is the way Beijing seeks to advance its interests against countries, like Australia, that do not comply with its preferences and are active in defending their own. So we must approach this grey zone challenge in a bipartisan and whole of society way. 2/
The government is right to pursue multiple internal and external groupings to boost Australia’s resilience and reduce our dependence on China where possible. Five eyes is one promising venue for promoting new tech and R&D partnerships while protecting this from Chinese ties. 3/
Australia’s move to upgrade RAAF base Tindal for advanced fighters and long-range bombers is a solid investment in our strategic depth and ability to support conventional deterrence. Thx @australian for noting our @USSC report called for such boosts 1/ theaustralian.com.au/nation/defence…
In Averting Crisis, we argued that in light of the growing mismatch between US strategy and resources, “Canberra should increase security cooperation with Washington and other likeminded partners to advance a strategy of collective regional defence.” 2/ussc.edu.au/analysis/avert…
The Tindal upgrade is a step in this direction. Given its strategic location outside the range of conventional long-range Chinese missiles, but close enough to flashpoints in Southeast Asia and the Pacific etc, Tindal offers value in terms of dispersal, strike and op support. 3/
The loss of a second Secretary in less than six months is a major blow for the US Dept. of Defense.
It’s likely to hurt implemention of the National Defense Strategy, which calls for prioritising resources for major power competition in the Indo-Pacific. nytimes.com/2019/06/18/us/…
All of the key policy architects and stewards of the NDS have now left the Pentagon — Jim Mattis, Elbridge Colby, Jim Mitre and Pat Shanahan — meaning others will need to pick up the baton. This may happen, but it will be a disrupting process.
Crucially, it will require strategic discipline within Defense and across the national security establishment to (1) work with Congress/Services on properly resourcing the strategy, and (2) say no to requests by Combatant Commands that don’t serve priorities (ie. buildup in Iran)