The #AUKUS Submarine Rotational Forces-West is the most important near-term contribution to bolstering deterrence in the Western Pacific in the entire AUKUS construct--and one of the most significant US and allied force posture steps in recent years. A short 🧵1/ From 2027, the US and UK will build a rotational force of 4 Virginias & 1 Astute at HMAS Stirling in Western Australia. Assuming US subs come from CONUS -- rather than Guam -- and all 5 subs are present, this would double the number of allied SSNs west of the dateline by 2031 2/

1/ This year's #AUSMIN is a wrap. On Indo-Pacific defence and security, its a lop-sided outcome. Ongoing progress on force posture integration, but little on AUS' push for US support to empower its defence industrial base in aid of the alliance. Short 🧵: defense.gov/News/Releases/… 2/ As expected, AUSMIN fleshed out some of the big force posture enhancements laid out in 2021. Progress here is incremental. For Air Force, it's more of the same infrastructure buildup and rotations. For Navy and Army, no specifics are agreed to yet, which is surprising.

1/ This year’s Australia-US Ministerial Consultations (#AUSMIN) are taking place today with a focus on collective deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. I expect the alliance to accelerate down this path. But it must also attend to the challenges this involves 🧵
smh.com.au/politics/feder… 2/ For context, the Australia-US alliance has become the pace setter for regional efforts to balance China’s power, bolster America’s eroding strategic position, and deepen integration btw allies and partners to collectively defend the Indo-Pacific order. iiss.org/publications/s…

A lot of breathless chatter about B-52s in Australia. For such an important bilateral force posture initiative, this isn't helpful for public understanding or debate. I given my own analysis to @4corners. But sensationalism is taking over. So a brief 🧵1/
abc.net.au/news/2022-10-3… The story's headline is misleading. It’s not a US Air Force plan to deploy B-52s. It’s a joint Australia-US decision. Or, more accurately, a series of decisions Canberra has made with Washington since 2011. You can trace these on @DefenceAust's website: 2/ defence.gov.au/Initiatives/US…

Biden’s National Defense Strategy (NDS) is finally out. From an Indo-Pacific standpoint, it can be summed up as follows: China's the priority threat, the US can’t deter it alone, so much more is required from allies and partners. My initial thoughts: 1/ media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/20… NDS deserves credit for frankness about the demands of competition w China/Russia. This requires accepting risks in other areas, deeper reliance on allies/partners, and reform to broken DoD processes (ie R&D, acquisition) and defence ecosystem (ie export controls, innovation) 2/

The Biden admin’s National Security Strategy is finally out. It’s far too late to meaningfully set policy direction, serving instead as a fairly predictable strategic messaging exercise. Some initial takeaways from an Indo-Pacific security perspective🧵 1/ whitehouse.gov/wp-content/upl… First, this is maximalist strategy out of sync with US means, as @EmmaMAshford has noted. In fact, only thing taken off the agenda is regime change in Middle East. A strategy that doesn’t make hard choices isn’t a strategy. Those choices will, instead, be made by circumstances 2/

My 2c: I’d call AUKUS a “work in progress” set of defence industrial and tech sharing/development initiatives.

Agree, it’s more than an arms deal, more than just military, builds on existing cooperation, and is *not* an alliance or vehicle for foreign/defence policy action.

1/

https://twitter.com/bill_hayton/status/1547601140686016512

This isn’t necessarily good. AUKUS (advanced capabilities, not subs) is at risk of overstretch because it means different things to different bureaucratic actors within and between 🇺🇸 🇬🇧 🇦🇺 — which is why we have all these well-informed debates about *what it is* on Twitter.

2/

I’m pleased to share my new @IISS_org analysis with @jamescrabtree on the state of US defence strategy, alliances and partners in the Indo-Pacific, launched at #SLD22.

It’s a sobering read. A🧵on why we’re so worried about the trajectory of US strategy. 1/iiss.org/publications/s… Some good news first: the Biden admin recognises the Indo-Pacific should be its top priority and China its pacing challenge.

It realises the US can’t uphold a favourable balance of power vs China by itself (see graph) and its trying to advance a strategy of collective defence 2/

Watching the Ukraine crisis unravel arguments for an “Asia first” US strategy is unsettling, especially when ppl claim Asian states want to see greater US military resolve. They don’t.

Let’s be clear: US credibility and position in Asia depend on military restraint in Europe 1/ This doesn’t mean US should not do more to deter Russia. US should have approved efforts to make Ukraine as prickly as possible well before now. It should have done more to forge united front with Europe on punitive economic repercussions too. 2/

BIG NEWS: There's a force posture nugget in #AUSMIN presser.

Looks like new Australia-United States military bases are on the horizon, which will include a naval component for sustaining combined submarines and surface fleet. The just-released #AUSMIN statement reinforces this.

Major expansion of allied force posture initiatives to include AIR, LAND and SEA elements. Latter is overdue and critical for regional security.

The focus on logistics, sustainment, maintenance is essential for US position.

THREAD: After yesterday’s #AUKUS plan to deepen defence industrial base integration tailored to Indo-Pacific priorities, today's #AUSMIN presser signals an ambitious collective defence agenda — much of which we have recommended in @USSC reports. 1/
ussc.edu.au/analysis/state… Big things flagged by Austin and Duton:

1) Major force posture initiatives to expand US access and presence in Australia

2) Agree to take immediate steps to improve interoperability through deeper integration

We cover extensively here: ussc.edu.au/analysis/avert… 2/

China’s use of coercive statecraft against Australia — disinformation, economic threats, covert foreign interference etc. — is and will remain the day to day reality of international affairs in our region. It’s not the product of a mishandled... 1/ abc.net.au/news/2020-06-1… ...China relationship; it is the way Beijing seeks to advance its interests against countries, like Australia, that do not comply with its preferences and are active in defending their own. So we must approach this grey zone challenge in a bipartisan and whole of society way. 2/

Australia’s move to upgrade RAAF base Tindal for advanced fighters and long-range bombers is a solid investment in our strategic depth and ability to support conventional deterrence. Thx @australian⁩ for noting our @USSC report called for such boosts 1/ theaustralian.com.au/nation/defence… In Averting Crisis, we argued that in light of the growing mismatch between US strategy and resources, “Canberra should increase security cooperation with Washington and other likeminded partners to advance a strategy of collective regional defence.” 2/ussc.edu.au/analysis/avert…

The loss of a second Secretary in less than six months is a major blow for the US Dept. of Defense.

It’s likely to hurt implemention of the National Defense Strategy, which calls for prioritising resources for major power competition in the Indo-Pacific. nytimes.com/2019/06/18/us/… All of the key policy architects and stewards of the NDS have now left the Pentagon — Jim Mattis, Elbridge Colby, Jim Mitre and Pat Shanahan — meaning others will need to pick up the baton. This may happen, but it will be a disrupting process.

Quick take on @VP Pence speech at APEC: Strong affirmation of America’s enduring commitment to Indo-Pacific. But US resources and policy still not well aligned with strategy. On the positive side: new deliverables on smart cities, digital infrastructure, development finance... 1/ regional transparency initiative and Manus military base. These — along with existing progress on BUILD and infrastructure partnerships — point to whole-of-government strategy edging in right direction. On negative side: uncompromising rhetoric on bilateral trade focus... 2/

So many Australians are calling for a rethink of our foreign policy and US alliance because of Trump. While this makes sense it's only part of the story. Trump's antics are a confidence killer. But relative power changes in Asia are the real worry. 1/
brisbanetimes.com.au/world/north-am… America's enduring ability to maintain its leading role in Asia was in doubt long before Trump took office. It's relative economic weight has been declining for decades, and its military -- while the world's largest -- is globally stretched. 2/