Russia simply has to fight here for Crimea to remain viable.
So, important reason # 1.
This development forces Russia to move forces & more importantly refocus it's artillery ammo supply chain from Donbas to Kherson or risk losing Crimea's water.
2/8
Important reason #2
Filling the Russia-to-Kherson logistical supply line for the same daily rate of shell usage as Donbas requires more shells to fill all the transport between Russia & Kherson.
3/8
Important Reason #3
The Russian Army is on the horns of a dilemma. A decision to reinforce Kherson _now_ will cause a logistical pause where neither Donbas nor Kherson will have enough shells and Ukraine knows it.
4/8
Important Reason #4
There are four key distances Russia has to keep Ukraine more than a) 15 km, & then b) 8 km from Downtown Kherson and the Nova Kakhovka dam.
15 km is the range where Ukraine's drone directed 122mm guns start killing Russian vehicles.
8 km is the
5/8
...range Ukrainian drone directed 125mm tank gun indirect fire starts doing the same thing.
Important reason #5
Russia has got to commit its airpower to the South right now, whatever decision it makes on artillery ammo, because of those four range numbers, & Ukraine knows
6/8
...this too.
That is, Ukraine has pushed SF teams with mines, drones, mortars, ATGM, & MANPADS to work with Ukrainian Partisans in those southern areas, no matter the choice Russia makes.
7/8
Shaping operations are about giving your opponent nothing but bad or worse options.
Ukraine seems to have a nasty one in progress.
8/End
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So, it looks like the Atlantic Council was right and I was wrong writing the following because they knew the utterly pathetic levels of GMLRS ammunition the Biden Administration was going to provide.
I don't have the words to express how militarily _Silly_ the Russian Air Force standoff missile strike shown in the tweet below is. So I'm going to drop some WW2 photos to calibrate your eyes to the silliness.
I was interviewed by Dan Michaels of the Wall Street Journal about US versus Russian logistics.
The article containing some of what we talked about was published in the 14 June 2022 issue today. wsj.com/articles/the-1…
1/
The 1st of my two quotes:
Instead of the heavily mechanized logistics system used for decades by Western businesses and militaries, Russia’s military relies on bountiful conscript labor to move gear, much of it packed in unwieldy coffin-size wooden crates.
“The U.S. has
2/
built logistics like we are short of people, and Russia has done it like manpower is free,” said Trent Telenko, who spent 33 years at the Pentagon’s Defense Contract Management Agency and has studied Russian military logistics.
3/
The article claims these banks have frozen accounts to prevent withdrawals:
Yuzhou Xinminsheng Village Bank (located in Xuchang City, Henan Province)
Zhecheng Huanghuai Bank (City of Shangqui, Henan Province)
Shangcai Huimin Rural Bank (Zhumadian City, Henan Province)
2/7
New Oriental Village Bank (City of Kaifeng, Henan Province)
Huaihe River Village Bank (Bengbu City, Anhui Province)
Yixian County Village Bank (Huangshan City, Anhui Province)
3/7
Tactical helicopter transportable armored vehicle firepower will make the USMC and US Army's 82nd Airborne & 101st air assault divisions very happy. 2/8
If you add Switchblade-600 and Coyote loitering munitions to such vehicles.
The power projection implications get...interesting.