Alright team, I owe you guys a thread on battle theory. Let's talk force employment and why no single weapon system is ever going to be a "game-changer" in modern war... at least between opponents who know what they're doing.
The key to understanding why is grasping the concept of the "empty battlefield," something which emerged in the late 19th century but which truly came into its own during the First World War.
Prior to WWI, armies stood out of the terrain. Soldiers wore bright uniforms, carried standards into battle, and little if any thought was paid to camouflage except by specialized units.
If there was a battle going on, it was usually pretty obvious.
This all changed because the technology of warfare developed to the point that it was possible to kill any enemy that could be seen - and quite quickly.
Armies had to start using cover and concealment to survive, and learn to operate under these new conditions.
This situation has continued - and developed further - into the modern day. Modern-day troops spend the vast majority of their time hiding. Even while attacking, soldiers and even armored vehicles will dash from cover to cover.
Command posts and logistical operations will be carefully camouflaged, and if possible dug in. They'll move frequently in case they're found anyways. Units will take care to minimize radio traffic to avoid being located by their electromagnetic signatures.
The end result of all of this is the modern "empty battlefield" - a situation where an entire army is folded into the nooks and crannies of the terrain, and the only things visible are the smallest movements, even when that army is on the attack.
What this means is that even with long-ranged, powerful and accurate weapons, most of a modern army cannot be attacked because it cannot be located precisely enough to strike.
And this is just basic, passive countermeasures. Modern armies also employ extensive active measures - jamming, counterbattery sensors, and air defenses, as well as survivability measures like armor and entrenchments.
As such even the highest-performance weapons struggle to find targets, their launchers can be located and destroyed, and the munitions themselves may be ineffective on impact - or even shot down en route!
So where does this notion of military "game-changers" come from? Well, one is wishful thinking by bad analysts. The other is from observing wars between incompetent armies.
(charge of the Light Brigade pictured so I don't offend anyone too badly)
If military forces can't implement the "modern system" of war competently - let's say they're rolling around with flags flying, leaving their vehicles in the open, not using adequate air defenses, or use unsecure communications - then they can be struck at will by modern weapons.
As such if you have two incompetent armies squaring off, the technical capabilities of weapon systems become very important because they're being used at proving-ground effectiveness. Thus some fancy new missile or cannon can actually be a game-changer.
But if everyone knows what they're doing, the technical capabilities of weapons actually become much less important. We've seen this in Ukraine, with the endless parade of Western hardware delivering little in the way of battlefield results. /end
Addendum: If you want to read this same theory at immensely greater length and detail, check out Military Power by Stephen Biddle.
Trump seems to have concluded a ceasefire with the Houthis, negotiated in Oman, that will see the Bab al-Mandeb reopened to American ships and leave Israel and Yemen to continue their long-range war.
If this was his intention all along, the bombing campaign suddenly makes sense.
Rather than waging an open-ended air campaign in effective support of Netanyahu's poorly-defined schemes in the region, Trump may have simply wanted to get the strait reopened to American traffic so business as usual could resume... or at least that was an acceptable step down.
Lest we forget, the Houthis had announced an intention to attack any American traffic passing through the straits some time ago.
I wonder if this whole thing was actually a head-fake with the Israel lobby. Negotiations seem to have been conducted very quietly, via Witkoff.
The latest talking point out of the Ukrainian side is that they don't really need NATO's support any more because they have tons of kill drones and they're so incredibly lethal that's enough to hold off the Russians indefinitely.
Let's examine this.⬇️
First of all, let's examine the kill drone as a weapon system. Generally known as FPV drones, or as I prefer to call them, antitank drones, these are small, simple quadcopter drones equipped with a camera, a radio or wire communications system, and an explosive warhead.
This makes for a new type of weapon system that, rather than being extremely powerful at face value, gains its effectiveness through a combination of smart guidance and ubiquity. They do three things that prewar "legacy" antitank systems do not:
1. They have extremely precise guidance and can be maneuvered to attack weak points on an armored target or pursue dismounted troops into cover;
2. They have onboard sensors and sustained flight capability, and are capable of not just attacking targets outside of the operator's line of sight but actively conducting reconnaissance; and
3. They are relatively light and cheap, with two or three kill drones fitting into the size and weight factor of a single old-style antitank missile, and thousands of drones stamped out in Chinese factories daily on no-questions-asked contracts to be jury-rigged to ubiquitous Soviet-era antitank warheads.
These weapons do, however, have drawbacks compared to conventional antitank systems.
1. Radio-controlled models are vulnerable to electronic countermeasures;
2. They have limited lift capability and as such their warheads are generally relatively weak, often simply repurposed single-stage RPG-7 shells or purpose-built charges that are little better;
3. They fly relatively slowly and can be, and frequently are, defeated successfully by defensive fire from determined dismounted troops; and
4. They "fire" extremely slowly, as each drone must be manually prepped, linked to a command system, checked out, flown out to a target that could be several kilometers away, and then carefully maneuvered into the target for maximum effect. The rate of fire for a single drone team is thus measured in minutes per round rather than rounds per minute. Engagements where you see multiple drones hit in quick succession are the result of multiple teams attacking a single target or group of targets.
The Russians and to a lesser extent the Ukrainians have implemented countermeasures to lessen their forces' vulnerability to these weapons, generally consisting of ECM systems, defensive fire (skeet shooting has become a matter of great tactical relevance lately), and elaborate "cope caging" that would have drawn extreme mockery a few years ago and which still does in the circles of people who aren't going to survive the first battle of the next war. As such, the probability of kill (PK) of a given antitank drone launch at the moment is, optimistically, about 10% against an appropriately prepared armored vehicle.
And now, my readers, we see the inherent weakness of a military doctrine centered around these weapons. Recall what I previously said about the slow rate of fire of drone teams and compare it to the low PK to be expected of any system which an adaptive enemy has had a chance to respond to. Assuming a PK of about 8% and a five-minute engagement cycle, any given Russian armored vehicle can expect to have about one "drone-hour" of combat lifetime under attack by these systems. Thus a single vehicle being engaged by six teams, for instance, can expect to last ten minutes before being knocked out.
This combat model is borne out by numerous engagements in which Russian units have pushed through drone attack with few to modest losses despite clearly being under attack by multiple teams for extended periods of time. The "drone wall" tactic does, however, create a sufficiently dense swarm of drones at the point of contact to render advances at the platoon level largely a matter of luck and deliberate company-scale attacks a bloody proposition for the chance of little ground gained.
What about larger-scale attacks, though?
Let's run a little wargame. In this scenario, a Ukrainian division (let's say one of their new "tactical corps" that's effectively a divisional unit) is defending against a Russian divisional attack. The Ukrainian unit has deployed into a formation designed to maximize the intensity of antitank drone fire to be directed against an attack at any point on the front - very similar to AFU deployments on the ground right now - with two defensive lines of dismounted infantry in closely-spaced strongpoints and a final "line" of mechanized reserves to bottle up any breakthroughs. A mechanized Russian division has been tasked to smash its way through.
The exact geometry is also noted on the graphic below, but I'll state it here for completeness' sake - the AFU division is occupying a 27km front with three brigades each occupying nine kilometers. The two infantry defensive lines are each composed of platoon strongpoints located one kilometer apart, with the second line positioned three kilometers to the rear of the first line and able to support it with drone fire under intense combat conditions.
A few notes on the rules here.
1. Every Ukrainian strongpoint is assumed to contain one drone team with an engagement range under "assault" conditions of five kilometers. Each team will fire once every five minutes. Firing strongpoints will be marked with a red box in the graphics.
2. As I pointed out above, Russian vehicles have a combat lifespan of one "drone-hour." As such it will take twelve "shots" from a single drone team to kill a vehicle, or one shot from twelve drone teams.
3. I am assuming that a Russian unit will take 30 minutes to move 3-5 kilometers tactically, accounting for en-route mine clearance, etc. Moving through cleared areas will of course be quite fast.
4. Ukrainian strongpoints attacked from the front must be deliberately assaulted, which will take 30 minutes at 3:1 odds. Strongpoints that have been flanked can be hastily assaulted in the same turn as movement.
5. Ukrainian strongpoints in close combat with superior Russian units are suppressed and cannot fly off drones. This will be marked with a black box in the graphics.
6. Ukrainian artillery has largely been silenced and the Russians have stiff fire superiority and their own drones searching the battlefield. Once a Ukrainian drone team opens fire it will be spotted and destroyed by Russian indirect fire within two hours. Strongpoints with dead drone teams will be crossed out and will not fire, but must still be assaulted and cleared of their infantry for the Russians to progress.
7. The Ukrainian reserves cannot simply blitz to the breakthrough sector - they must be alerted and then move out, under attack by Russian interdiction fires and clearing scatter-mine obstacles on the way. Thus they are going to move relatively slowly.
8. The Russians have achieved operational surprise and there is no large AFU reserve force waiting for the assault. This isn't particularly unusual, a similar situation occurred at the start of the Battle of Avdeevka and the Kharkov incursion last year. The Russians seem to be able to pretty reliably mass large forces for operations if need be, without Ukraine or NATO intelligence noticing.
Simple enough? Maybe I should put in an application at Milton-Bradley!
Let's begin - I'll now transition to thread format.⬇️
Here we see the initial battlefield set. Of note, I'm depicting the Russians tactically by company but will be keeping a more precise tally of assault vehicles destroyed. Russian company icons will be removed as appropriate.
The little ovals are Ukrainian battle positions.
Dust rises on the war-torn steppe as a huge assault force rolls into view - an entire Russian battalion coming on out of the Russian line some way to the south.
The five closest strongpoints launch drones as artillery begins hammering down across the defensive line.
The closest historical analogy to the Ukrainian War I can think of is the American Civil War - ironically a conflict that Europeans have always shied away from carefully studying.
A thread.⬇️
The underlying causes of the American Civil War festered for decades, finally erupting into open conflict after a series of political calculations and miscalculations brought down a national compromise that increasingly resembled a house of cards.
Ditto Ukraine. I've said elsewhere the number of political offramps available to Western leaders to avoid this war were so numerous that the fact war broke out can only be explained as the result of anti-Russian policy - clearly miscalculated policy given the results thus far.
Top 10 pro-Ukrainian talking points - and why they're nonsense.⬇️
10. Ukraine is a democracy!
False. The last free and fair election in Ukraine - not held under an ultranationalist jackboot after the 2014 coup - was in 2010.
All elections in Ukraine have been suspended since 2022, and Zelensky's five-year term from 2019 expired months ago.
9. Russia is an autocracy!
False. Vladimir Putin and United Russia enjoy approval ratings among the Russian public that are extremely high, even in polling conducted by Western-backed, anti-Putin organizations.
Putin is popular enough to win any election held in Russia handily.
How many plans has NATO gone through to try to beat Russia in Ukraine?
Let's count 'em!
Plan A: The FGM-148 Javelin
It seems absurd now, but in late 2021 NATO's leadership thought Javelin was a tank-deleting magic wand that would deter Putin from challenging Zelensky's scheme to conquer the LDPR.
Javelin failed in service and is a rare sight on the battlefield.
Plan B: The Kazakh Gambit
The West quite obviously fomented an uprising in Kazakhstan in January 2022 in hopes of distracting Russia from the then-boiling Ukrainian crisis.
Didn't work. CSTO troops arrived and helped the Kazakh government crush the would-be color revolution.
Late last week the Ukrainian command, seeing their offensive in Sudzha-Koronevo bog down, tried to expand the flanks of their salient into Russian territory in Kursk. Part of this was an attack on the Glushkovo district to the west.
The Glushkovo District is somewhat isolated from the Russian interior by the Seim River.
Having learned the wrong lessons from their 2022 counteroffensive in Kherson, the AFU command decided to try to induce a wholesale Russian withdrawal by attacking the bridges over the Seim.
The large road bridge at Glushkovo, the district center, would be their first target. As in Kherson two years ago, HIMARS fired on the bridge with GMLRS. As in Kherson two years ago, it was ineffective.
Unlike in Kherson two years ago, the Russians killed the HIMARS launcher.