In the coming days, Americans may here about Lithuania's blockade of the RU enclave of Kalinigrad.
Few Americans know about this Russian enclave WEST of several NATO nations. I introduced the importance of its strategic importance to @CNN in December.
K-grad (as it's called by @USArmyEURAF ) is a Baltic port sandwiched between Lithuania & Poland. It was once known as Königsberg.
Founded in 1255 by Teutonic Knights during the Crusades it was eventually named Königsberg for King Ottokar II of Bohemia. 2/
Königsberg was Polish, then Prussian, then the largest easternmost city of Germany throughout World War II.
The city was bombed by RU from 1944 through the Battle of Königsberg.
It was captured by the Soviet Union on 9 April 1945, right before war's end.
Look familiar? 3/
Later, as the Allies met at Potsdam & divided responsibility for Europe after the Nazi surrender, the city was occupied by the Soviets & renamed for Soviet revolutionary Mikhail Kalinin. It was made RU's westernmost Oblast.
The Soviets desperately wanted this Baltic port. 4/
During Soviet days, RU had a "land bridge" through an area called the Suwalki Gap.
And the RU Baltic Sea ports were open.
There was never a problem getting to K-Grad.
But when Poland, the 3 Baltic countries & others gained independence in the 90's, things changed. 5/
RU conducted focused covert & overt activities in the area starting in the early 2000's
Informational, cyber and electronic attacks by RU significantly increased.
The cyber attacks against Estonia in 2007 were particularly "robust." 6/
Many (me included) believed RU would eventually attempt a "land grab" of the Suwalki Gap, using the excuse of physically connecting their ally Belarus with K-grad.
That would require them invading Polish & Lithuanian sovereign territory.
Which brings us back to LI's blockade.8/
Saturday, RU called the blockade "unprecedented" & "unlawful."
LI's FM Landsbergis responded that LI was implementing approved EU sanctions & they were taken after “consultation w/ the EU Commission."
Thanks, Lithuania, for these actions! 9/
A final thought...
In Jan 1991 as an Army major fighting in Desert Storm I wasn't watching events in Europe.
But in traveling to Vilnius, Riga & Tallinn in 2006 & again in 2011-12, I met those who had fought for their freedom.
They get it. Watch. 10/10
*hear*
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I've been hesitant to write a 🧵on the current tactical situation & what might happen next. But @DAlperovitch's view of potential outcomes (RT below) cause me to weigh in.
His view is plausible, but I don't believe it accurately portrays the current situation. 1/
In both the Donbas & Kherson, it appears the RU are following their playbook.
1. Russian Massive Arty barrages 2. Russian Attempts Recon in Force (RIF) 3. Russian targets civilians 4. RU focus on logistics build/regeneration 5. RU lacks Combined Arms Operation action 2/
At the same time, UKR is required to slightly adapt their tactics & operational design
1. UA conducts close counterfire fight vs RU arty 2. UA thwarts RU RIF 3. UA incorporating arms & logistics from West 4. UA employs limited Combined Arms capability. 3/
During an interview, the terrific @MarquardtA asked me why the US wasn't delivering the weapons "some" in UKR said they had requested (1000 artillery, 500 tanks, etc).
I cited @SecDef press conference from Madrid yesterday, where Austin rebuked the same question. 1/9
The @SecDef noted he was specifically coordinating equipment transfer and weapons priorities with Ukraine's Defense Minister Reznikov.
Reznikov's top priorities are:
-Long Range fires
-Armor vehicles
-Mid-range ADA systems
-Howitzers
Then Austin provided some numbers...2/
-Reznikov asked for 10 battalions of artillery, the west has provided 12.
-R asked for 200 tanks, UKR has received 270
-Ukraine received 97,000 anti-tank missiles, more than they requested, which is also more than the number of tanks in the entire world. 3/
Due to the 1/6 report, 2A legislation & economic issues, details of Donbas battles & the illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine are not at the forefront.
UA isn't "losing" & the action isn't stalled. It remains a slugfest in the east.
Here's a new 🧵on equipping UA. 1/21
As I said in past threads, the "new phase" of the fight (which started in early April), brought change.
-RU focus is on massing artillery, attempts at breakthrough.
-UA focus is logistics, active defense & maintaining will.
I've used this slide to describe the major shifts. 2/
In the last few days, the @nytimes, @washingtonpost, @WSJ & others have reported Ukraine's demand for more combat equipment.
UA needs support, lots of it. It's important to understand the scope of their "asks," the art of the possible & the associated logistics requirements. 3/
Normally I have no problem sleeping. But after watching the first Congressional 1/6 report, I needed to write some things down.
So many disturbing things:
-Barr's comments
-Kushner's dismissal of WH counsel advice
-the witness testimony
-the extensive new video
A 🧵 1/9
Congresswomen's @RepLizCheney description of events was masterful & yet extremely upsetting. She described the state of our democracy being in grave danger.
But it was @BennieGThompson opening remarks, and his comments about our Constitutional oath, that has me wide-eyed 2/
As a soldier, and a few times as a government official, I've taken that oath. I've also given it every time I promoted someone or was promoted myself.
It's sacred.
I learned to recite it from memory after being chided by a 1SG for reading it from a card when I was a Captain. 3/
Travel & work have limited my ability to comment & provide updates on Russia's invasion of Ukraine from a "ground commander's" perspective.
But I've continued to watch actions -especially in the E & S- & several followers have asked for me to provide thoughts.
Here's a🧵 1/
First, a caveat.
It's easier providing thoughts on operational & strategic movements & actions than commenting on tactical battles.
Even w/ feeds from units or S2/J2 (intelligence) assessments, the "fog of war" skews the assessment of the up-close fight.
2/
At our Army's training centers, "observers/controllers" (the O/Cs or trainers) have receive a common operational picture (COP) of BOTH sides of the battle.
O/Cs see what friendly AND enemy forces are doing, hear communication from both sides, sense the state of troops. 3/