Two months ago I said that the fight for the Donbas would have little bearing on the outcome of the war
Now as that fight moves into its attritional phase, Putin's evolving strategy is becoming quite clear. He believes time is on his side. And he may be right 🧵
Having failed at his original (and wildly unrealistic) plan of replacing the Zelensky government in 3 days and not having the forces to go back for major new offensives, Putin's best bet for achieving strategic success is now at the negotiation table
But given that the Ukrainians have (quite understandably) little interest in compromising with Russia, Putin knows he needs to increase his leverage before restarting the talks
And his best option for that is to prolong the war at least until winter
Putin is betting that he can sustain some level of combat readiness of his forces through shadow mobilization: compelled contractor signups, outright forced recruitment of Chechens and LNR/DNR males of fighting age and other similar methods
The change in the Russian military's tactics—pummeling Ukrainian defensive positions with artillery and air strikes and not pressing forward quickly—is likely slowing/stabilizing their casualty rates and allowing them to extend the combat readiness of their forces
Why is winter likely the earliest time for ending the hostilities?
That's when the impact of the Black Sea blockade and the games that Putin is playing with Europe's gas supply will really start to have a major impact on the West (and everyone else)
The food crisis precipitated by Ukraine's inability to export grain due to the blockade is likely to cause famine in some regions, contribute to global geopolitical instability and further exacerbate already rising inflation
At the same time, due to Russian gas cutoffs (for refusal to pay in rubles or pipeline 'maintenance'), EU gas storage inventories are at 50% capacity and continuing to drop as EU taps into them
Prospect of rationing of gas this winter seems very likely
Meanwhile, worsening inflation in energy and food prices and rising interest rates will almost certainly drive US and EU economies into recession early next year, if not earlier
The Russians are betting that the West's willingness to spend tens of billions of dollars on aid to Ukraine will diminish as the economic situation worsens
And without Western financial and military support, Ukraine's position will become untenable
And while the Russian economy is also contracting, the Russian state itself is flush with cash due to high energy prices. If the sanctions aren't lifted, the economic prospects for Russia are bleak in the long term—but they can do ok for quite some time
So, Putin likely believes that if Russia can hold onto most of its land gains in Donbas, Kherzon and Zaporizhzhia, he will be in a good position in ~6 months time to extract significant concessions from Ukraine
Putin's absolute minimal ask for lifting the blockade will likely be the lifting of the most impactful sanctions (eg. bank sanctions and chips import ban) and a ceasefire that would establish his de facto control over captured territory. But it is likely he will ask for much more
While it is obviously not in Zelensky's direct power to lift the sanctions placed on Russia, the reality is that if he were to ask the US and EU to do so as part of a negotiated settlement with Russia, they would almost certainly acquiesce
It is impossible to know whether or not Putin will achieve these goals, and the outcome is contingent on how dire the global food and energy crisis becomes—as well as on the willingness of the US, UK, France and Germany to keep financing Ukraine's fight
The West's willingness to continue the supply of large quantities of military aid will also likely depend on the Ukrainian military's ability to demonstrate that it can use that aid to push back the Russia forces and retake back their territory
If Ukrainian counteroffensives against Russian entrenched positions do not succeed in the next 6 months, they may well find the critical supplies of ammunition and weapons systems drying up, leaving them little choice but to go into a negotiation with Russia with a weak hand
Putin's hope is that he can hold on to the territory he has taken thus far and perhaps make some more incremental gains in the Donbas in the next 6 months
Ukraine must not allow him to succeed—or else its situation will get progressively worse with time
END
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Interesting piece on how it wasn’t the NATO expansions of the 90s but US-led action against Iraq and in the Balkans that eventually drove US-Russia relationship off the cliff
Ultimately it wasn’t just the outrage of “not being consulted” that infuriated the Russians
It was - in their view - the US-driven rebalancing of the Cold War alliance system that they saw as an attempt to drive traditionally Soviet-affiliated or non-aligned states into the US sphere of influence (sometimes through regime change)
Let’s talk about the state of the war and one of the most underreported yet crucially important issues:
Russian blockade of Ukrainian ports and resulting strangulation of the country’s economy 🧵
First, the state of the war.
Ukraine has won the Battle of Kyiv and forced Russia to withdraw from the north
The Battle for Donbas is underway and even though Russia has somewhat improved its tactics there and has shorter logistics routes, Ukraine has a good chance to thwart major Russian territory gains due to massive heavy weapons aid arriving now from the West
No, Lavrov did not threaten nuclear war in today’s interview. Quite the opposite.
He said: “Nuclear war is unacceptable, this is Moscow's principled position” 🧵
Yes, Lavrov also said that “the risks of nuclear war are now very significant, and this danger cannot be underestimated”
HOWEVER, here is the full context to that statement:
Lavrov: “I would very much not like that now, when the risks [of nuclear war] are really very, very significant, I would very much not like these risks to be artificially inflated, and there are many who want them. The danger is serious, it is real, it cannot be underestimated”
A lot of misinterpretations of Deputy commander of Russian Central Military District Rustam Minnekaev’s statement this morning on this site. Here is what he actually said: 🧵interfax.ru/world/837353
“Since the beginning of the second phase of the special operation, it has already begun just two days ago, one of the tasks of the Russian army is to establish full control over the Donbas and southern Ukraine”
“This will provide a land corridor to Crimea, as well as ability to affect the vital objects of the Ukrainian economy”
Despite the angry rhetoric and today's provocative action from Moscow, the practical consequences for Russia of Finland and Sweden joining NATO are minor since both are already members of EU and thus have ‘mutual assistance and solidarity’ guarantees from other EU member states🧵
This obligation to provide military (and other) assistance does not currently extend to the US, of course, but it would be difficult to see us not get involved if other EU and NATO countries are engaged militarily in the defense of Finland or Sweden and request our help
So it's very likely that the Russian political and military leadership already assumes that any war they initiate with Finland and Sweden, even without NATO membership for those countries, would essentially mean a fight with the US and NATO