Russia’s now threatening Lithuania over decision to halt rail cargo between Belarus and #Kaliningrad. While reporting this dispatch from the 100 km corridor known as the Suwalki Gap separating Kaliningrad from Belarus, I was surprised to see no troops…. 🧵politico.eu/article/suwalk…
in the Suwalki Gap itself. Border patrols were also light. One border crossing with Belarus I visited wasn’t even manned. Aside from Lithuania’s small army, the only soldiers in the country are from a German-led battle group of about 1,000 and a small American contingent. 2
Locals are convinced Russia has its hands full with Ukraine and won’t move in because they’re in NATO.
They risk underestimating how important Kaliningrad is to Russia, which has a major naval base in the exclave, not to mention nuclear missiles pointed at European cities. 3
Another big question is this: How eager would Washington and NATO be to risk Armageddon over a stretch of largely unpopulated farmland few of their citizens even know exists? 4
The best way to avoid finding out would be to station more NATO troops there, which now seem inevitable at the upcoming #NATOSummit in Madrid. Deterrence works. 5/End.
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The latest uproar over German antisemitism (it's endemic, despite a surprisingly successful campaign to convince the world otherwise by banging bronze plaques with Holocaust victims' names into sidewalks) is one of the more grotesque chapters in recent German political life. 🧵
Over the past few days, Germany's political leadership has been feigning shock and horror over these antisemitic images, which are part of a huge mural featured at Documenta, the country's premier art festival, held every 5 years.
Listening to German minister of culture Claudia Roth express dismay over the incident, one is overcome by heavy Claude Raines Casablanca vibes ("I'm shocked, shocked to find that gambling is going on in here")
Berlin’s leitmotif for what it will do to support #Ukraine is best described by the German adage “too much to die, too little to live” (zum Sterben zu viel, zum Leben zu wenig). 1/8 🧵
There’s a lot of buzz now around the German decision to send a state-of-the-art air defense system to Ukraine.Sounds good, but a closer look shows it to be yet another German head fake.The Bundeswehr doesn’t own the systems so they have to be ordered.Deliver will take „months“ 2
Scholz, who still won’t visit Ukraine or even say he wants the country to “win“ the war, is using the air defense announcement to divert attention from his refusal to send tanks, which Ukraine urgently needs and could be sent immediately. 3
“We want to see a strategic defeat of Russia,” U.S. NATO Ambassador @Julie_C_Smith tells #Strategic_Ark in Warsaw. “We want to see Russia leave #Ukraine.”
On Indo-Pacific and Ukraine: “we can address both of these challenges and threats.”
Focus now is on Ukraine, but the US “can walk and chew gum at the same time.”
Expect news on NATO force posture for mid- long-term at Madrid summit. NATO-Russia founding act (which forbade permanent bases in new alliance member states) is not a factor in that discussion, Smith said.
“Russia’s actions have fundamentally upset the order.”
Given the fog of war surrounding what Olaf Scholz said when over the past few months re Ukraine, I thought a timeline of his statements might be useful. On the key questions of arms deliveries, sanctions and the terms for peace, he has been all over the map 🧵
Feb. 6 Before traveling to US for meeting with Biden, Scholz says that Germany “has for years pursued a clear policy of not delivering arms to crisis regions and that includes not sending lethal weapons to Ukraine..that was correct and it remains so.”
Feb. 15, 2022: At Kremlin press conference with Putin, Scholz refers to Nord Stream 2 as a “private commercial project” and pushes Ukraine to embrace Minsk and “Steinmeier formula”
Important sentiment, which underscores the degree to which the USA remains the linchpin of European security. Though no one in the region ever really trusted the French or Germans, their handling of Ukraine has erased any lingering doubt that they could be relied on. 1/3
The flipside of this is that the US will (and should) reconsider its own commitments to Europe. If Biden loses the next election that could happen sooner than people think. 2/3
Zeitenwende or not, nothing in below has really changed or is likely to if you listen closely to the domestic debate. 3/3
Observing Berlin’s debate from the outside, one could be forgiven for thinking the entire war is about Germany and its struggle to find its moral compass. 🧵
A current German obsession revolves around the question of whether it could be considered an active participant in the war under international law if it trains Ukrainian soldiers how to use the heavy weaponry it plans to provide.
In March, the research unit of the Bundestag (for many the gold standard of non-partisan analysis) opined that training Ukrainian would indeed be a bridge too far. Given Putin’s slavish adherence to international norms, this is clearly a key question.