Italy is back in the news due to debates over the ECB and bond purchases. Unfortunately, there are again lots of distorted stories and statements around.
Here's a data-based summary thread that may help in debunking the claims about a "profligate, reform-lazy Italy". 🧵
"Italy has been living beyond its means; now Italians finally need to adjust!"
In fact, 🇮🇹 has exported more goods and services than it imported since 2012 - also during the Covid crisis. Italians consume less than they produce - living below their means.
"Italy is just a debt mess at the costs of others in Europe."
In fact, private sector debt is relatively low in Italy compared to other OECD countries, which typically goes unmentioned when people complain about Italy's debt problems.
"If the ECB buys Italian bonds, this will just be an incentive for more profligate government spending."
In fact,🇮🇹 ran large and consistent primary budget surpluses before Covid: revenue exceeded spending excl. interest payments. 🇮🇹 has done more fiscal consolidation than 🇩🇪.
Italy's public-debt-to-GDP ratio remains high, but this is due to the 1980s legacy (when borrowing costs skyrocketed) and the impact of the financial crisis, € crisis and Covid crisis. Italy did more fiscal consolidation than any other country, contributing to slower growth.
"🇮🇹 received much more or very much more money from the EU budget than it payed in [3 out of 4 Germans believe this] - living off others in Europe."
In fact, Italy was a net contributor to the EU budget for decades. And the simple payer-receiver logic falls short (spillovers!).
"Italy is an economic mess, helped out a bit by tourism."
Italy remains a major industrial player in the EU: even during the Covid-19 crisis, 🇮🇹 recorded the EU's second highest industrial production after Germany, and exported significantly more goods than it imported.
"Italy's industry faces severe competitiveness problems."
There are some structural problems, but there are also exaggerations and badmouthing. Industrial production in Italy has increased by 10.1% since January 2015, while Germany's industrial production has fallen by 5.6%.
"What's Italy without tourism?"
The EU's second-largest industrial location, where firms produce and export lots of high-tech goods. Italy plays an important role in European industry networks.
"The increase in 🇮🇹borrowing costs reflects weak fundamentals."
In fact, history shows that moves in interest rates on 🇮🇹government debt go beyond fundamentals and reflect self-fulfilling market sentiment against which only ECB action (a crisis backstop) is effective.
"🇮🇹 fails to do structural reforms to calm investors."
This ignores labour market flexibilisation since the early 1990s with contested macro effects. Furthermore, 🇮🇹has committed to "structural reforms" with Next Gen EU. Talk about 🇮🇹not doing its "homework" is divisive.
"Italy must finally liberalise its economy."
🇮🇹 has carried out many market-liberal reforms. Labour market flexibilisation brought a sharp increase in fixed-term contracts and a decline in real wages. However, this type of structural reforms has not boosted productivity growth.
"Italy's labour market is sclerotic."
Labour market liberalisation generated temporary jobs. However, cheap labour reduced real wages and diminished incentives for companies to make labour-saving investments – with negative productivity effects, the basis for long-term growth.
"🇮🇹 households are wealthier than their 🇩🇪 peers anyway."
No. The median Italian household holds more net wealth than the comparable German or Austrian household (more private-property ownership!). But the average household is clearly wealthier in Germany and Austria #CAIN
Let's stop these one-sided stories about a more or less completely run-down 🇮🇹, incapable of doing "homework", artificially kept alive by ECB and EU. Let's improve the intellectual quality of our debates on how to improve things in 🇮🇹 and Europe. Otherwise, we'll all be worse off
"🇮🇹 fails to do structural reforms to calm investors."
This ignores major rounds of labour market deregulation since early 1990s with contested macro effects. Furthermore, 🇮🇹 has committed to "structural reforms" with Next Gen EU. "Homework" language remains divisive. #CAIN 🧵
Italy has carried out many market-liberal reforms. Labour market flexibilisation brought a sharp increase in fixed-term contracts and a decline in real wages. However, these structural reforms have failed to boost Italy's productivity growth.
Labour market liberalisation generated temporary jobs. However, cheap labour reduced real wages and diminished incentives for companies to make labour-saving investments – with dampening effects on productivity, which is the basis for long-term growth.
7 reasons why the ECB should not hike interest rates by emulating the Fed. Hiking interest rates could turn out to be another strategic mistake after hiking rates into the global financial crisis and the €zone debt crisis. A thread based on my new @socialeurope article: 🧵 /1
1. The rise in inflation in the US has occurred on a broader front in goods and services. In the €zone, rising energy prices are driving inflation much more than in the US. /2
2. Increased energy prices are largely driven by the geopolitical and economic consequences of recent events in Ukraine. Raising the key interest rate is not an effective tool to counter higher energy prices. /3
7 Gründe, warum die EZB bei Zinserhöhungen nicht der Fed nacheifern sollte. Die wirtschaftliche Lage in der €zone ist fragiler als in den USA; Energiepreise treiben stärker die Inflation; Zinserhöhungen können negative Dominoeffekte haben. Mein "DiePresse"-Gastkommentar 🧵 /1
1. Der Anstieg der Inflation in den USA hat sich auf breiterer Front bei Waren und Dienstleistungen vollzogen. In der Eurozone treiben die steigenden Energiepreise die Inflation viel stärker an als in den USA. /2
2. Der Anstieg der Energiepreise ist weitgehend auf die geopolitischen und wirtschaftlichen Folgen der jüngsten Ereignisse in der Ukraine zurückzuführen. Die Anhebung des Leitzinses ist kein wirksames Instrument, um den höheren Energiepreisen entgegenzuwirken. /3
Reinhart/Rogoff (2010) had an impact on the policy debate; policy-makers used their results (threshold in public-debt-to-GDP of 90% beyond which growth slows) to argue for austerity. But what does the evidence allow us to infer about growth effects of higher public debt? /2
Several papers argue that there is indeed evidence for a negative causal effect of higher public-debt-to-GDP ratios on economic growth, and for a (close to) 90% threshold in the public-debt-to-GDP-ratio beyond which growth falls significantly. /3
Guess what? Claims that CORPORATE TAX CUTS BOOST GROWTH turn out to be greatly exaggerated. In our new paper, we find that we cannot reject a zero effect once we account for publication bias in favor of growth-enhancing effects. Joint work with @SGechert:
We analyse the existing corporate tax-economic growth literature. We collect 441 estimates from 42 primary studies. Reported results are ambiguous: Corporate tax cuts increase, reduce, or do not significantly affect growth. /2
According to the average of all estimates, a cut in the corporate tax rate by 10 percentage points would signicantly increase annual GDP growth rates by about 0.2 percentage points. This result, however, is driven by publication bias in favour of growth-enhancing effects. /3
What is structural about unemployment in OECD countries? My paper on this question is finally in print in the current issue of "Review of Social Economy". Thread /1
The proposition that increased unemployment is to be reduced by measures that aim at deregulating the labor market (e.g. by easing employment protection, decentralizing collective bargaining, cutting minimum wage) has greatly influenced policymaking./2
One strand of the empirical literature has emphasized that labor market rigidities caused by protective labor market institutions are to be considered the major factor behind increasing unemployment rates within OECD countries. /3