Thread by @MassDara

I continue to look for signs of long-term stability or problems in Russian military personnel recruitment and retention for 2023+ as a result of their war on Ukraine. Some preliminary thoughts from about the Russian spring draft. Conscript intake numbers are low so far (/1).

The 2022 spring draft runs from April – 15 July; roughly 85% of the time has elapsed as of today. In the 8 Russian regions I found information on conscription intake, most are at 30% or less of their conscript quota as of mid-June (/2)

8 oblasts is only 17% of total in Russia, but all 8 are coming up short as of June. These regions are geographically diverse and diverse in population density. This suggests an overall trend of sluggish conscript intake. (/3)

How low are the numbers I’ve found in 8 regions? The best I found was 35% intake with 66% of time elapsed. Most were between 18-30%. Some as low as single digit % of quota, with 66% of draft period time elapsed. (/4)

I attempted to compare these regions to previous draft cycles to see if this lag is typical. For example is there a big surge at the end of the cycle? And there sometimes is. Lots of holes in the information but, (/5)

For the few data points I found, the spring 2022 draft intake numbers are lower at this point than the same point in previous cycles, suggesting this spring is different. With only a few data points available, this view should be caveated significantly and revised as needed (/6)

Earlier, I noted that the casualty rates, stonewalling from the military about conditions, and pressures on conscripts, families in Russia might return to the old ways of hiding their sons or paying bribes to keep them away from the draft (/7) foreignaffairs.com/articles/russi…

..or potential draftees delay arriving at the commissariat for as long as possible. Already bribes are happening, apparently the going rate is 14,000 rubles in Siberia for a fake exemption (fines if caught are much higher) /8

In some regions, parents want assurances from commissariats that their sons won’t be sent to Ukraine. I noted before that when MOD leaders make statements that conscripts won’t be sent to the front line, it’s usually a sign of their worry. 2022 edition: vesti.ru/article/2696722

The Duma is changing the law that conscripts can now convert directly to contract service immediately upon being drafted, instead of waiting 3-4 months to go through basic training (i.e., allowing conscripts be legally eligible to fight in Ukraine immediately). (/10)

This is being done to fill holes, along with Russia’s other sources of personnel. The pressure on conscripts walking through the door to convert to contract service will be intense: large sums of money, peer pressure, lack of knowledge on rights etc. /11
iz.ru/1355498/2022-0…

What are signposts that Russia is struggling to make conscription quotas? They will extend the draft period through the summer to reach the number. They may or may not announce the extension. (/12)

a more serious signpost would be a more muscular search for those who are trying to evade or delay their summons, to once again check documents on the street, knocking on doors, going to their job, school, etc, like it was in the 90s or early 2000s. (/13)

So far there is no indication of that. There could be a lag in intake and by end of July they will announce that quotas were met. (/14)

In sum, it’s too soon to tell if there are problems in conscription that can't be recovered by the end of this summer. Some early data points suggest problems; perhaps families are holding back their sons or making deferment arrangements. I’ll keep updating this thread. (END)