Dara Massicot Profile picture
Jun 29, 2022 15 tweets 3 min read Read on X
I continue to look for signs of long-term stability or problems in Russian military personnel recruitment and retention for 2023+ as a result of their war on Ukraine. Some preliminary thoughts from about the Russian spring draft. Conscript intake numbers are low so far (/1).
The 2022 spring draft runs from April – 15 July; roughly 85% of the time has elapsed as of today. In the 8 Russian regions I found information on conscription intake, most are at 30% or less of their conscript quota as of mid-June (/2)
8 oblasts is only 17% of total in Russia, but all 8 are coming up short as of June. These regions are geographically diverse and diverse in population density. This suggests an overall trend of sluggish conscript intake. (/3)
How low are the numbers I’ve found in 8 regions? The best I found was 35% intake with 66% of time elapsed. Most were between 18-30%. Some as low as single digit % of quota, with 66% of draft period time elapsed. (/4)
I attempted to compare these regions to previous draft cycles to see if this lag is typical. For example is there a big surge at the end of the cycle? And there sometimes is. Lots of holes in the information but, (/5)
For the few data points I found, the spring 2022 draft intake numbers are lower at this point than the same point in previous cycles, suggesting this spring is different. With only a few data points available, this view should be caveated significantly and revised as needed (/6)
Earlier, I noted that the casualty rates, stonewalling from the military about conditions, and pressures on conscripts, families in Russia might return to the old ways of hiding their sons or paying bribes to keep them away from the draft (/7) foreignaffairs.com/articles/russi…
..or potential draftees delay arriving at the commissariat for as long as possible. Already bribes are happening, apparently the going rate is 14,000 rubles in Siberia for a fake exemption (fines if caught are much higher) /8
In some regions, parents want assurances from commissariats that their sons won’t be sent to Ukraine. I noted before that when MOD leaders make statements that conscripts won’t be sent to the front line, it’s usually a sign of their worry. 2022 edition: vesti.ru/article/2696722
The Duma is changing the law that conscripts can now convert directly to contract service immediately upon being drafted, instead of waiting 3-4 months to go through basic training (i.e., allowing conscripts be legally eligible to fight in Ukraine immediately). (/10)
This is being done to fill holes, along with Russia’s other sources of personnel. The pressure on conscripts walking through the door to convert to contract service will be intense: large sums of money, peer pressure, lack of knowledge on rights etc. /11
iz.ru/1355498/2022-0…
What are signposts that Russia is struggling to make conscription quotas? They will extend the draft period through the summer to reach the number. They may or may not announce the extension. (/12)
a more serious signpost would be a more muscular search for those who are trying to evade or delay their summons, to once again check documents on the street, knocking on doors, going to their job, school, etc, like it was in the 90s or early 2000s. (/13)
So far there is no indication of that. There could be a lag in intake and by end of July they will announce that quotas were met. (/14)
In sum, it’s too soon to tell if there are problems in conscription that can't be recovered by the end of this summer. Some early data points suggest problems; perhaps families are holding back their sons or making deferment arrangements. I’ll keep updating this thread. (END)

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More from @MassDara

May 12
Shoigu is out as Defense Minister, moving into head of Security Council. Andrei Belousov , an economist, is taking over. My quick thoughts on what it means for MOD, and what to look about changes possible in the near term. /1 Image
First, Shoigu is moving into a respectable and powerful position because he is loyal, and he and Putin are friends. it’s a signal that Putin listens to chatter and understands that Shoigu needed to leave the MOD, where he was just tolerated by his ministry and other agencies. /2
Belousov has no military experience at all or background in the military. He’s an economist. This will raise questions within the military who will fear a repeat of serdyukov. So I anticipate some unformed officer favorites appointed to leadership positions to balance this. /3
Read 9 tweets
May 10
Ukrainian officials say attacks on border areas in Kharkiv Oblast have begun. Is this the beginnings of a new front, limited incursion ("sanitary zone"), or harassment? Where does this lead? Threat= capability x intent, so let's consider both below. 👇
Intent: Putin in March said he wanted a "sanitary zone" aka occupied buffer zone inside Kharkiv, in response to shelling or cross border raids from groups like RDK. /2 apnews.com/article/russia…
Intent: a few weeks ago, the MOD elevated the Russian group of forces from “Border Protection” to Operational Group North – making it equivalent to the other Operational Groups of Forces. /3 Image
Read 12 tweets
May 2
Ukraine recently hit a Russian training site with ATACMs. Russia says it destroyed HIMARs launchers that were moving into concealed positions. Russian recon-strike has been getting faster & more lethal in the last few months & will require TTP changes. I'll show you what I see./1
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Recently, Ukraine hit a training area in Luhansk w/ ATACMs. The article in the 1st tweet of this thread lays this out. If the goal was to neutralize a force grouping, the strike was successful. Only half of these missiles hit their marks; extra are used to ensure hits, but still.
Here's what I see: 1 ATACM failed (dud), 1 ATACM missed a fixed command post (jamming, or coordinates slightly off?), 2 ATACMs hit a force grouping and probably another vehicle or CP/bivouac in the trees. /3


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Read 9 tweets
Apr 29
The U.S. supplemental has passed and aid is on the way to Ukrainian frontlines. But months of delay for ammo and manpower have come at a cost. Problems cannot easily be undone, especially in Donetsk. A brief thread on what Russian decisions say about their summer plans. 🧵
First, Russia’s efforts suggest their priority remains advancing to the borders of Donetsk, where they add reserve units, the VKS operates intensely, and where improved recon-strike (40-100km behind Ukrainian lines + SS-26 SRBM) is hitting high value assets / 2
The situation is now critical in Chasiv Yar and this thread from @Tatarigami_UA is very useful to describe why: /3
Read 17 tweets
Mar 29
More strikes against Ukrainian critical infrastructure last night. Russian forces are trying to destroy power in cities like Kharkiv, Dnipro, and elsewhere. The goal is to create “secondary effects”— to make these cities unlivable and force residents to leave at a large scale./1
“Secondary effects” of critical infrastructure strikes have been discussed in Russian military science for many years. Their strike patterns in Ukraine are consistent in many ways and different in others (for example they are not prioritizing attacking leadership locations)/2
Some power plants are critically damaged. Ukrainian authorities are warning it could be a very long time until power is restored in Kharkiv. A threat to the Kharkiv region (and prospective steps Moscow will take) is starting to come into focus for me. /3 pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/…
Read 5 tweets
Mar 21
I want to add context to Russian announcements of new units. Shoigu has periodically announced these types of changes in peacetime and then not staffed them (like in 2016). This is wartime, so it’s different. Keep an eye on it, but don’t take it at face value. A few thoughts 1/
In 2016, Shoigu said 10 new divisions would be stood up, mostly IVO Ukraine. We tracked them. They were based on existing brigades, not new units. They didn’t add overall billets to the army (red flag). They were undermanned until fall 2021 when some received BARS personnel. /2
Shoigu said last year they would create a combined arms army for Ukraine, and they did that. But then they basically lost that unit’s equivalent equipment at Avdiivka over five months. /3
Read 7 tweets

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