✨After 8 months of hard work with @Dramelac_ , now's the time ⏰ Exegol, a community-driven and fully-featured hacking environment, updates to v4.0
An opportunity to show you why you should probably drop your current pentesting env and get started with Exegol (10min read)
Exegol uses Docker. There are Exegol images that can be used to deploy Exegol containers.
This first concept allows its users to easily deploy environments that are separated from the host, that could be dedicated for some engagements tools, etc.
While we, as pentesters, help companies secure their infrastructure, our community itself has a lot of room for improvement when it comes to our tools and our practices 🤔 Having a unique, solid, environment for each client/engagement is a starter. Exegol allows that.
[thread 🧵] lets all welcome the new kid in town 😈
✨ Kerberos sAMAccountName spoofing ✨ from regular user to domain admin, because Microsoft didn't care enough about it's $$$
** CVE-2021-42278 - Name impersonation
Before patch, there was no validation process to make sure computer accounts names end with an "$"
** CVE-2021-42287 - KDC bamboozling
Before patch, there was a weird behavior on the KDC. When requesting a service ticket, if the KDC wasn't able to find the user behind the TGT, it would make another lookup, but this time with an "$" at the end of the name
[thread 🧵] Kerberos delegations. This meta-thread gathers three sub-threads, one for each delegation type. I’ll talk about Unconstrained, Constrained, Resource-Based Constrained (RBCD), S4U2self, S4U2proxy and abuse scenarios.
Kerberos delegations is a set of features included in the Kerberos authentication protocol. It allows services to access other services on behalf of domain users.
3 types of delegations exist
- Unconstrained: service can access any other service on behalf of any user
- Constrained: service can access a set of services on bhalf of any user
- Resource-Based Constrained (RBCD): service grants that « impersonating access » to a set of services