samczsun Profile picture
Jul 5, 2022 17 tweets 7 min read Read on X
1/ Today, someone tried to hack me with a crypto stealer, so I guess I've finally made it

Fortunately, they weren't successful, but all it would've taken was three clicks. Read on to learn about how the attack works, how to protect yourself, and some basic malware analysis🕵️
2/ The first step is to create an urgent and compelling hook. When placed under pressure, even trained security professionals might act instinctively instead of rationally. This DM does both.

If you clicked the link, then you're only two clicks away from being pwned
3/ Clicking the link automatically downloads this file to your computer. Once again, this is compelling - who is cryptogeng.eth, and what exactly does the statement claim?

If you open the download, then you're one click away from being pwned
4/ There are two files in the archive. If you have file extensions enabled, then you'll see the first as a URL. If you don't, then you'll see the second as a PDF. Both of these are malicious, and opening either of them would give the attacker full access to your tokens
5/ So how do you protect yourself? Well, the first step is to recognize when a message looks suspicious. In this case, the phrasing in the DM was very clunky, and it came from an untrusted source. However, you can't always rely on this, since it's trivial to hire a proofreader
6/ The next step is to take a moment to gather your thoughts if you're in an urgent situation. If you're communicating async, you have all the time in the world to respond. If you're on a phone call, ask them to wait. There's almost nothing so urgent that they can't wait 30s
7/ Don't let curiosity get the better of you. It might be tempting to snoop around, but threat actors know this and they'll exploit it. This is also why you should never plug in USBs that you find laying around, or open files named "2021-12-payroll.xlsx". Curiosity killed the cat
8/ Finally, if someone wants you to download and run a program, you should almost always double check if it's legitimate. Once you run a program, it has full access to your computer, so make sure you trust and verify who the program is coming from
9/ Now on to the basic malware analysis. How did I know that this is a crypto stealer without getting hacked? The first step was to pick a sandbox. I chose Docker because I figured some Windows malware probably wouldn't have a Linux container escape if I accidentally ran it
10/ It turns out the files are chonky
11/ I ran `strings` on the binary to see if anything interesting popped up and it crashed trying to render this seemingly infinite stream of Y
12/ At this point I figured that the binary itself was obfuscated and the Y garbage was embedded in the program, and I contemplated whether I actually cared enough to continue. However, @gf_256 suggested just checking if the files were right-padded
13/ So now I just had to trim off the trailing Y spam
14/ At this point, I had two binaries that I could've opened in IDA or Binary Ninja or any other reverse engineering tool. However, no point working harder if I could work smarter
15/ I dumped both files into @HybridAnalysis and let it run. Sure enough, both files came back malicious
16/ Specifically, both files try to:
a) steal your wallet data directly
b) steal your wallet data from browser extensions
c) steal your Discord session token
17/ So there you have it. All it takes is three clicks for a crypto stealer to get your wallets and session tokens, so make sure you watch for red flags in grammar, don't panic when facing an urgent situation, temper your curiosity, and never run software that you don't trust

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More from @samczsun

May 20, 2023
On 2023/05/20 at 07:25:11 UTC, Tornado Cash governance effectively ceased to exist. Through a malicious proposal, an attacker granted themselves 1,200,000 votes. As this is more than the ~700,000 legitimate votes, they now have full control.

openchain.xyz/trace/ethereum… Image
First, what does this mean for Tornado Cash?

Through governance control, the attacker can:
- withdraw all of the locked votes
- drain all of the tokens in the governance contract
- brick the router

However, the attacker still can't:
- drain individual pools
Next, how did this happen?

Well, when the attacker created their malicious proposal, they claimed to have used the same logic as an earlier proposal which had passed. However, that wasn't exactly the truth, because they added an extra function

etherscan.io/address/0xC503… ImageImage
Read 6 tweets
Apr 3, 2023
Block 16964664: A user managed to drain five MEV bots by exploiting a bug in mev-boost-relay.

Here's the block: etherscan.io/block/16964664
Here's the user: etherscan.io/address/0x3c98…
Here's the patch: github.com/flashbots/mev-…
Here's the longer explanation:
One of the core ideas behind Proposer-Builder Separation is that proposers cannot be allowed to see the contents of the block they're signing until they've signed the block. Proposers must trust mev-boost to return the most profitable header to them.
Theoretically, this makes it extremely hard for a malicious proposer to deconstruct bundles, as they would have to
1) double sign for a single slot, which is slashable
2) win the race against the relay to submit the block to the network, which is highly unlikely
Read 12 tweets
Dec 2, 2022
uh oh
ummm
hmmm
Read 4 tweets
Oct 6, 2022
Five hours ago, an attacker stole 2 million BNB (~$566M USD) from the Binance Bridge. During that time, I've been working closely with multiple parties to triage and resolve this issue. Here's how it all went down.
It all started when @zachxbt sent me the attacker's address out of the blue. When I clicked into it, I saw an account worth hundreds of millions of dollars. Either someone had pulled off a huge rug, or there was a massive hack underway
@zachxbt At first, I thought that @VenusProtocol had been hacked yet again. However, it only took a couple seconds to determine that the attacker *really did* deposit over $200M USD into Venus

Instead, I needed to figure out where those funds came from
Read 21 tweets
Aug 1, 2022
1/ Nomad just got drained for over $150M in one of the most chaotic hacks that Web3 has ever seen. How exactly did this happen, and what was the root cause? Allow me to take you behind the scenes 👇 Image
2/ It all started when @officer_cia shared @spreekaway's tweet in the ETHSecurity Telegram channel. Although I had no idea what was going on at the time, just the sheer volume of assets leaving the bridge was clearly a bad sign Image
3/ My first thought was that there was some misconfiguration for the token's decimals. After all, it seemed as though the bridge was running a "send 0.01 WBTC, get 100 WBTC back" promotion Image
Read 12 tweets
Mar 24, 2022
I need to make a correction! Thanks to @madergaser and @siintemal for pointing out that I completely missed the other half of the exploit.

So as I mentioned earlier, the two token accounts must hold the same token. The attacker forged accounts to bypass the validation on common.crate_collateral_tokens, but what about depositor_source?

Well, the depositor_source has to use the same token as common.collateral. Image
Read 7 tweets

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