Trent Telenko Profile picture
Jul 6, 2022 21 tweets 8 min read Read on X
I haven't talked truck logistics in a while. This thread 🧵will revisit truck logistics of the Russo-Ukrainian War.

1. What we thought we knew.
2. The logistical truth on the ground.
3. And how Ukraine's new HIMARS/GMLRS weapons are kicking over the logistical table.

1/
What we thought we knew came from the outstanding November 2021 piece by Alex Vershinn titled:

"FEEDING THE BEAR: A CLOSER LOOK AT RUSSIAN ARMY LOGISTICS AND THE FAIT ACCOMPLI"

2/
warontherocks.com/2021/11/feedin…
The passage I've clipped here was the heart of the November 2021 advanced Western understanding of Russian logistics.

The problem with the passage below is everything Alex Vershinn stated as a 'beer math' model of Russian truck logistics is horribly wrong.

3/ Image
Alex Vershinn, like every other Western logistician, was blindsided by the 80 year/four generation Western intelligence failure to notice the Russian Army doesn't use mechanized logistics 'enhancers' to move its ammo & supplies.

4/ ImageImageImage
The Russian Army has no pallets, no forklifts nor any ISO containers.

This is what Russian Army artillery ammunition supply points look like.👇

5/
I've done several threads on this issue.

This thread is from 24 March 2022.

6/
And this one is from March 27th 2022 discussing the logistical advantages of Western & Chinese pallet capable supply trucks versus the Russian's complete lack.

7/
Alex Vershinn's assumption that six hours of work day will fill & empty three truckloads of supplies in a 24 hour work day needs to be divided by 3 or 4 due to the lack of pallets & all terrain forklifts

Moving ammo packaged thus by hand takes longer👇
8/
I've talked to Ukrainian soldiers in the @walter_report Twitter space & it is taking a whole day to do one round trip resupply run to a range of 90 km, not 90 miles.

While Alex Vershinn mentioned in passing that damage to infrastructure invalidated his 'beer math,' expanding
9/
...a bit on what 'infrastructure damage' means is required.

When people on Twitter think of destroying bridges in Ukraine, they think like this👇

10/
This Maxar video of the infamous "64 km convoy" north of Kyiv in mud season shows lots of little places where creeks or water drainage culverts go under the roads.

Any one of those blown up, see photo, require longer truck by-pass logistical routes.
11/
Image
Infrastructure destroyed by Russian artillery plus the utter lack of mechanized logistics yields much different truck logistics 'beer math.'

1. 90 km on Ukrainian artillery ravaged roads is minimally a 2 hour drive one way or 4 hours on the road round trip.

12/
2. Since Russian trucks need to be loaded by hand, you are looking at least 3 hours to load & a further 3 hours to unload.

3. Add in needed break times for the drivers, etc. & 1 Russian tactical truck can do 1 supply run a day to between 60% & 75% the radius of action

14/
3. con't ...that 'FEEDING THE BEAR' beer math laid out, call it 30% of Vershinn's logistic capability model.

This has huge implications given the Ukrainian artillery depot interdiction campaign.

See @TheBaseLeg Russian Artillery Depot Strike thread👇
15/
And see the @COUPSURE Russian Artillery Depot Strike thread here:👇

16/
According to the US Army Chief of Staff, the latest versions of US GMLRS that Ukrainian HIMARS fire reach out to at least 85 km to hit within the various OSINT circular error probabilities of 3-to-7 meters.


17/
Effectively, GMLRS will push Russian tactical trucks outside their sustained one-day, round trip, supply range.

This means Russia is going to have to rely far more on railways than it has to date.

And the Russians have been relying more and more on railways.
18/
The easiest way to get around reduced truck supply lift is to 'bomb up' your tanks, AFV's and artillery at railway siding.

See the T-72 getting resupplied next to a train

19/
Or simply base, resupply & fire your longest ranged & most logistically intensive rocket artillery from railway siding.

See👇

20/
Once Ukraine works through the most critical artillery depots on it's list (map).

It will use all its newly acquired deep strike assets to slam Russian ammo supply trains like in those retweets.

21/ Image
Russian ammo trains in range of GMLRS are a whole lot easier to find & strike than tactical trucks.

Plus, when detonated, extensive train clearance & EOD removal will have to happen before the rail lines line can be used again.

GMLRS means Russian logistics is hosed.
22/End Image

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More from @TrentTelenko

May 23
This is another reminder that Peer-to-Peer drone warfare is all about attrition loss curves.

Ukraine's drones has made the roads of occupied southern Ukraine into an "anti-access area denial" (A2AD) kill zones for Russian trucks.
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Ukraine has achieved "Drone air superiority" over those roads rivaling WW2's Summer 1944 Allied air superiority over German occupied Normandy.

As a result, the Russian truck fleet is taking unsustainable attrition, particularly of its fuel tanker fleet.
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This AFU fuel interdiction campaign is causing panic:

"Fuel shortages are beginning in Sevastopol. This is the beginning of the consequences of the enemy's systematic strikes on oil refineries and tanker trucks along the land corridor to Crimea."
3/
Read 5 tweets
May 22
If true, it looks like Russian truck fuel logistics has completely fallen part on the Rostov-Dzhankoy highway.

This has a lot of strategic geo-political implications.

A2AD & Truck Logistics 🧵

1/
Given few/no trains, these are the Russian truck logistical facts of life:

1. At ~300 miles/480 km, tactical truck's only payload is fuel for a return trip**

2/ Image
2. A 56 mile/90 km radius from a supply point allows three trips a day with refueling & mechanized logistics to load & unload a truck

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Read 19 tweets
May 21
Texas has seven unique advantages in terms of infrastructure, political culture, and resource geography that make it uniquely suited to be the next industrial heartland of the USA.

The seven industrial development advantages of Texas 🧵
1/
They are as follows:

1. About 94% of land in Texas is privately held. This vastly limits what the Federal, State and local governments can do to in terms of regulations and NIMBY games.

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2. Texas is mostly flat. Texas hill country is small beer compared to the Appalachian and Sierra Nevada mountain ranges. This compounds with #1 for industrial development.

3. Texas has a lot of water compared to the US west & sea access.

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Read 7 tweets
May 20
I am still trying to see the military relevance of the MV-75 Cheyenne II.

Especially when 3rd rate powers like Iran have Qaem-118” (Ghaem-118) / “Misagh-358” jet engine powered, loitering, surface to air munitions.

1/4
The MV-75 Cheyenne II can't outrun a jet powered munition.

These things. ⬇️

2/4

None of the standard US Suppression of Enemy air Defense (SEAD) radar sensor detection practices work on a “Misagh-358.”

3/4
Read 5 tweets
May 12
This is one of the most logistically incompetent hot takes by any German journalist in the Russo-Ukrainian War.

95% getting through is a 5% loss rate per trip
95%(x) for 10 to 20 kills means x = 200 to 400 trucks on this route
10 trips means 40% total fleet loss - 80 to 160 trucks
1/Image
You can follow the 5% loss curve in this 500 unit fleet at 10 exposures in the graphic below.

A 40% fleet loss in 10 days from a 5% drone loss rate is logistical collapse for the Russian Army in occupied Ukraine.

Only some trying to get AfD eyeballs would say different.

2/ Image
This leaves out the fact that the Russian Army doesn't use *ANY* mechanized logistical enabler like pallets, Truck D-rings, forklifts, or telehandlers.

Russian trucks are in the drone kill zones 3 times as long as a Western truck due to loading times.

Receipts:
3/3
x.com/i/grok/share/e…
Read 4 tweets
May 10
Regarding this:

"The DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile, with a range of approximately 4,000 to 5,000 kilometers, was specifically designed and publicly nicknamed by Chinese military analysts as the "Guam Killer.""

I disagree with those analysts.
1/
The Chinese PD-2900 drone (2,500 km range, 12-hour endurance, 250 km/h speed, stealthy Su-57-like design) is far more a "Guam Killer" than the DF-26.

It is a matter of numbers.

2/
As laid out by warquants -dot- com, China is buying one million OWA drones to destroy all US/Taiwan/Taiwan allied military logistics from Guam to the China coast.

A quantity of one million "Shaheed plus" class OWA drones has quality all its own.

3/
Read 7 tweets

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