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Trent Telenko Profile picture
@TrentTelenko
Jul 6, 2022 • 21 tweets • 8 min read • Read on X
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I haven't talked truck logistics in a while. This thread 🧵will revisit truck logistics of the Russo-Ukrainian War.

1. What we thought we knew.
2. The logistical truth on the ground.
3. And how Ukraine's new HIMARS/GMLRS weapons are kicking over the logistical table.

1/
What we thought we knew came from the outstanding November 2021 piece by Alex Vershinn titled:

"FEEDING THE BEAR: A CLOSER LOOK AT RUSSIAN ARMY LOGISTICS AND THE FAIT ACCOMPLI"

2/
 warontherocks.com/2021/11/feedin…
The passage I've clipped here was the heart of the November 2021 advanced Western understanding of Russian logistics.

The problem with the passage below is everything Alex Vershinn stated as a 'beer math' model of Russian truck logistics is horribly wrong.

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Alex Vershinn, like every other Western logistician, was blindsided by the 80 year/four generation Western intelligence failure to notice the Russian Army doesn't use mechanized logistics 'enhancers' to move its ammo & supplies.

4/ ImageImageImage
The Russian Army has no pallets, no forklifts nor any ISO containers.

This is what Russian Army artillery ammunition supply points look like.👇

5/
I've done several threads on this issue.

This thread is from 24 March 2022.

6/
And this one is from March 27th 2022 discussing the logistical advantages of Western & Chinese pallet capable supply trucks versus the Russian's complete lack.

7/
Alex Vershinn's assumption that six hours of work day will fill & empty three truckloads of supplies in a 24 hour work day needs to be divided by 3 or 4 due to the lack of pallets & all terrain forklifts

Moving ammo packaged thus by hand takes longer👇
8/
I've talked to Ukrainian soldiers in the @walter_report Twitter space & it is taking a whole day to do one round trip resupply run to a range of 90 km, not 90 miles.

While Alex Vershinn mentioned in passing that damage to infrastructure invalidated his 'beer math,' expanding
9/
...a bit on what 'infrastructure damage' means is required.

When people on Twitter think of destroying bridges in Ukraine, they think like this👇

10/
This Maxar video of the infamous "64 km convoy" north of Kyiv in mud season shows lots of little places where creeks or water drainage culverts go under the roads.

Any one of those blown up, see photo, require longer truck by-pass logistical routes.
11/
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Infrastructure destroyed by Russian artillery plus the utter lack of mechanized logistics yields much different truck logistics 'beer math.'

1. 90 km on Ukrainian artillery ravaged roads is minimally a 2 hour drive one way or 4 hours on the road round trip.

12/
2. Since Russian trucks need to be loaded by hand, you are looking at least 3 hours to load & a further 3 hours to unload.

3. Add in needed break times for the drivers, etc. & 1 Russian tactical truck can do 1 supply run a day to between 60% & 75% the radius of action

14/
3. con't ...that 'FEEDING THE BEAR' beer math laid out, call it 30% of Vershinn's logistic capability model.

This has huge implications given the Ukrainian artillery depot interdiction campaign.

See @TheBaseLeg Russian Artillery Depot Strike thread👇
15/
And see the @COUPSURE Russian Artillery Depot Strike thread here:👇

16/
According to the US Army Chief of Staff, the latest versions of US GMLRS that Ukrainian HIMARS fire reach out to at least 85 km to hit within the various OSINT circular error probabilities of 3-to-7 meters.


17/
Effectively, GMLRS will push Russian tactical trucks outside their sustained one-day, round trip, supply range.

This means Russia is going to have to rely far more on railways than it has to date.

And the Russians have been relying more and more on railways.
18/
The easiest way to get around reduced truck supply lift is to 'bomb up' your tanks, AFV's and artillery at railway siding.

See the T-72 getting resupplied next to a train

19/
Or simply base, resupply & fire your longest ranged & most logistically intensive rocket artillery from railway siding.

See👇

20/
Once Ukraine works through the most critical artillery depots on it's list (map).

It will use all its newly acquired deep strike assets to slam Russian ammo supply trains like in those retweets.

21/ Image
Russian ammo trains in range of GMLRS are a whole lot easier to find & strike than tactical trucks.

Plus, when detonated, extensive train clearance & EOD removal will have to happen before the rail lines line can be used again.

GMLRS means Russian logistics is hosed.
22/End Image

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More from @TrentTelenko

Trent Telenko Profile picture
Jul 10
Given the massive Ukrainian victory in the "Battle of the Azov Sea."

We can say Ukraine has achieved “Usable Drone Air Superiority" over the Sea of Azov in exactly the way the Chinese would in the waters around, & air over, Taiwan when it invades.
🧵

1/
 united24media.com/war-in-ukraine…
The "Battle of the Azov Sea" shares a lot of historical elements of both the WW2 "Battle of the Bismarck Sea" and the slaughter of Allied oil tankers in 1942 during Operation Drumbeat (Paukenschlag) and Operation Neuland.

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The Battle of the Bismarck Sea was the slaughter of 12 ships of a 16 ship Imperial Japanese convoy of eight IJA freighters and eight IJN destroyers moving 6,900 IJA troops.

Tipped off by IJN seaplane deployments & radio intercepts, only 2,700 IJA troops arrived w/o weapons or ammo.
3/Image
Read 12 tweets
Trent Telenko Profile picture
Jul 2
Just...no. Russia HAS BEEN "Battle of the Cities" from the very beginning...targeting hospitals as a means of destroying ethnic minorities.

This has been Russian policy for DECADES.

Ukraine retaliating for atrocity is _RECIPROCITY_ per the Laws of War, not degeneracy.
1/2
I asked @grok to document this Russian policy of atrocity at the link, excerpt:

"February 24, 2022–present (Full-scale Russian invasion): The scale escalated dramatically. As of May 2026, the WHO had verified more than 3,000 attacks on healthcare via its Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care (SSA). A coalition of organizations (including PHR, eyeWitness, Truth Hounds, etc.) documented ~3,095 attacks, with 1,632 damaging or destroying hospitals and clinics"

x.com/i/grok?convers…
2/
I'm afraid @cdrsalamander has gotten the moral vectors in the Russo-Ukrainian war wrong.

What is degenerate here isn't RECIPROCITY.

Degeneracy here is defined as using Woke NGO Elite definitions of morality, AKA claiming AFU RECIPROCITY per the laws of war as a war crime.
3/3 Image
Read 4 tweets
Trent Telenko Profile picture
Jun 30
When I've talked about the legacy of Soviet industrial gigantism (one big factory) making Putin era Russia far more vulnerable to a drone strategic bombing campaign.

This is a very good example. ⬇️

Strategic Drone Airpower🧵
1/3
I've talked about this vulnerability in a couple of previous threads. Here is a shorter one:



Putin's decades long "Russian exceptionalism" propaganda campaign, that says WW2 was won on the Eastern Front, has made Russians incapable of seeing this.

2/3
If strategic airpower was irrelevant then. So is damage from it now. 🤦‍♂️

Here is the larger in-depth thread detailing the vulnerabilities of ex-Soviet "One-Big Factory" infrastructure (AKA gigantism) Ukraine is exploiting.

3/3
Read 4 tweets
Trent Telenko Profile picture
Jun 28
There is so much to object to here that I'm going to restate some basic design observations on the FP-5 to clarify how the Russian reflexive control data fed AI slop that is polluting public discussions of the FP-5.

FP-5 🧵
1/
1. The FP-5 Flamingo is about four times the launch weight of a BGM-109 Tomahawk (i.e. ~13,200 lb), and 2-3 times the range (i.e. ~1,620 nmi) while carrying twice the warhead mass (i.e. ~2,000 lb).

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2. The FP-5 design concept is modelled on the USAF MGM-13 Mace GLCM as Fire Point told Ukrainian military analysts - but designed with modern technology to be extremely cheap to make (claimed 1/6 the cost of a Tomahawk - likely not counting the engine cost).

3/ Image
Read 17 tweets
Trent Telenko Profile picture
Jun 23
It's time to revisit how 992 Ukrainian drones and 10 small cruise missiles were used to saturate Russia's Moscow air defenses.

There was a lot of technology, technique & tactics involved.

Drone War 🧵
1/
The first thing that needs to be pointed out is that in 2026 Ukraine has not only replicated, but likely exceeded, the 2018 capabilities of the USAF's Stand-off Munitions Activity Center (SMAC) at at Barksdale AFB.

I've mentioned this before ⬇️
2/
In 2018 a Dallas chapter of the Association of Old Crows gave an award to SMAC & we got an open source brief of what they did to earn the award.

These guys do the evasive routing for integrated cross-service standoff munition attack profiles.

3/
Read 14 tweets
Trent Telenko Profile picture
Jun 19
The BLUF of every missile based integrated air defense is the number of missiles and launcher reload times are known.

Winning a saturation attack against one is simple arithmetic, total all the defending missiles, then +10 more drones above that number.
1/2
Electronic warfare is always a "saving throw" with an expiration date for the defense.

Plus no one in the world, since 1989, has invested in enough mobile guns for robust AA-combined arms to screw up the simple arithmetic of a saturation drone/missile attacks.

2/
Russia burned out Ukraine's considerable stocks of 5V55 SAMs (~3,300 rounds), 9M83 SAMs (~1,000) and 9M38 SAMs (~800) by repeat saturation attacks.

Ukraine returns the favor. This is not that difficult to grasp.

Saturation attacks were central to legacy Soviet doctrine.
3/
Read 5 tweets

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