I haven't talked truck logistics in a while. This thread 🧵will revisit truck logistics of the Russo-Ukrainian War.
1. What we thought we knew. 2. The logistical truth on the ground. 3. And how Ukraine's new HIMARS/GMLRS weapons are kicking over the logistical table.
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What we thought we knew came from the outstanding November 2021 piece by Alex Vershinn titled:
"FEEDING THE BEAR: A CLOSER LOOK AT RUSSIAN ARMY LOGISTICS AND THE FAIT ACCOMPLI"
The passage I've clipped here was the heart of the November 2021 advanced Western understanding of Russian logistics.
The problem with the passage below is everything Alex Vershinn stated as a 'beer math' model of Russian truck logistics is horribly wrong.
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Alex Vershinn, like every other Western logistician, was blindsided by the 80 year/four generation Western intelligence failure to notice the Russian Army doesn't use mechanized logistics 'enhancers' to move its ammo & supplies.
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The Russian Army has no pallets, no forklifts nor any ISO containers.
This is what Russian Army artillery ammunition supply points look like.👇
And this one is from March 27th 2022 discussing the logistical advantages of Western & Chinese pallet capable supply trucks versus the Russian's complete lack.
Alex Vershinn's assumption that six hours of work day will fill & empty three truckloads of supplies in a 24 hour work day needs to be divided by 3 or 4 due to the lack of pallets & all terrain forklifts
Moving ammo packaged thus by hand takes longer👇 8/
I've talked to Ukrainian soldiers in the @walter_report Twitter space & it is taking a whole day to do one round trip resupply run to a range of 90 km, not 90 miles.
While Alex Vershinn mentioned in passing that damage to infrastructure invalidated his 'beer math,' expanding
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...a bit on what 'infrastructure damage' means is required.
When people on Twitter think of destroying bridges in Ukraine, they think like this👇
This Maxar video of the infamous "64 km convoy" north of Kyiv in mud season shows lots of little places where creeks or water drainage culverts go under the roads.
Any one of those blown up, see photo, require longer truck by-pass logistical routes. 11/
According to the US Army Chief of Staff, the latest versions of US GMLRS that Ukrainian HIMARS fire reach out to at least 85 km to hit within the various OSINT circular error probabilities of 3-to-7 meters.
The first was the UK's Operation Outward. It was noticed after a windstorm during 1940's Battle of Britain that barrage balloons dragging severed cables under them caused shorts on power lines, damaging the power grid in occupied Europe.
This would be the 2nd reported downing of a Tu-22M by an S-200. The earlier Tu-22M being in December 2023.
It looks like these Tu-22M are still using Soviet era EW suites which were not geared against the S-200 C-Band, 100 KW, 5N62 Square Pair FMCW tracker/illuminator. 2/
Between ~1996 and 2005, most FMTV trucks accepted by DCMA for the US Army had my signature on the truck property forms along with my DSN phone number.
I got three or four calls in Sealy Texas from NCO's in Iraq trying to score ballistic composite glass armor because they stopped these EFP attacks⬇️
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DCMA Sealy was getting photos from contractor relatives of bombed FMTV's with sheet metal armor and receiving IED damaged trucks to get rebuilt.
You could tell the blast damage from how the windows were missing and the roofs were bowed at the top.
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When you pulled out the stowage boxes in the cabs there were usually spent 5.56mm or 7.62mm brass casings...
Or SAM hunters can use a weather balloons with a set of commercial off the shelf ELINT and thermal imaging sensors - connected via a smartphone - hanging underneath to listen for radars and look for SAM missile launches 24/7.
The world has changed.
(I wonder if the Houthi are doing this balloon surveillance trick to the Western merchantmen?🤔)