Jussi Jalonen Profile picture
Jul 7 31 tweets 5 min read
All right, maybe it's time to make some comments regarding Ukraine again.

This time I'm going to say openly some things that people in important positions are unwilling to discuss in public. Well, someone has to do it, right?
First, let's admit the obvious: by now, the Western strategy of arming Ukraine while avoiding intervention is probably destined to fail.

The strategy may be enough to guarantee that Ukraine will not lose. But it cannot guarantee Ukrainian victory.
At this point, one should note that while Russia will never be able to subdue the entire Ukraine, as long as hostilities continue, Russia is, for all practical purposes, winning more than it's losing.
Russia will be able to keep most of Eastern Ukraine under occupation and inflict devastation on Ukraine; Russia will still, in spite of its maritime setbacks, be able to control most of the Black Sea; and lastly, the ongoing war effectively sustains Putin's regime.
I've said before that Putin has based the very existence of his entire regime on war. So far, victorious wars -- Chechnya, Georgia, Crimea, Syria. A decisive military defeat would shake the foundations of his regime. But right now it seems he will be able to avoid that.
As long as the "special operation" continues, there's more fuel for the Russian government propaganda. There's an ongoing justification for new extraordinary measures, such as the recent steps towards war economy. At some point, more reserves will be called up.
What passes as "opposition elements" in Russia cannot do much. Sporadic civil resistance is limited, and likely to remain limited.

Putin can work gradually, slowly. The war in Ukraine is shaping to become a war of attrition -- the kind of war where Russia has natural advantage.
Western analysts and pundits have relied on overcoming this fact by the supply of supposedly superior Western military equipment to Ukraine. This supply has, however, been limited, and at any rate, it wouldn't solve the fundamental issues. There are no miracle weapons at hand.
Simultaneously, Western commentators have increasingly started to talk about how the war is likely to continue "for years". It's always so easy to accept a prolonged war when it's not fought on your own domestic soil, no? No road to victory is ever mentioned in these talks.
Several Western leaders have repeatedly stated that any peace treaty should be signed on Ukraine's terms. This is a nice carte blanche, but in practice, if the war continues on its present course, Ukraine will have no realistic possibility of retaking its territories.
Russians are building up entrenched positions in the East. While these may not be unassailable, I must say I doubt if Ukraine could ever break them alone.

And even with depleted troops, Russians advance. Last week, Sievierodonetsk; next, Sloviansk; after that, maybe Kramatorsk.
Better equipment, more skillful military art, bravery -- those will not be enough to tilt the balance. Wars of attrition are fought on production lines, and with troops, with raw numbers.

Western powers can gear up the production. But Ukraine does not have the raw numbers.
So, the West would have to supply some of these numbers.

This brings us to the part which no one wants to talk about, not aloud: the potential necessity of Western military intervention against Russia to stop the war, and to guarantee Ukrainian victory.
Do note that I'm not making policy here. From my point of view, I'm simply stating the obvious. Assuming that the goal is to guarantee the territorial integrity of Ukraine and Ukrainian victory in the war, treating this as some kind of a proxy war won't work, not in the long run.
One cannot approach the present conflict with the same strategy which was used when Western powers supported Croatia against Serbia, or when the Kurds were propped up to deal with the Daesh. Resource-wise, Russia is four times larger than Ukraine.
So, sooner or later -- if the war _is_ supposed to be won -- the EU countries or the NATO will have to consider the possibility of intervening directly.

In my opinion, the sooner this is stated openly and admitted as a fact, the better.
Furthermore: the EU leaders have named this war as war for Europe, for European values. How moral it is, in the long run, to treat such a war simply as an undertaking where only one country is suffering the casualties and facing destruction?
Obviously, people in the EU countries have tremendous difficulties adjusting even to the possibility of wartime measures or war economy -- incidentally, Ukrainians will have to deal with much harsher conditions, on daily basis.
How will the EU citizens adjust to the possibility of having to intervene against Russia, having to actually fight... well, that's up for questions.

Of course, in that case, certain countries -- including the one that I live in -- would be at greater risk than some others.
Naturally people are also concerned of the possibility of nuclear weapons. There's a realistic fear that an intervention might create a situation where Russia would "escalate to de-escalate", and embark on a nuclear exchange.
I'm not overlooking these fears. However, I would note that as long as a nuclear arsenal offers the possibility of launching a war of aggression with impunity, the established international order rests on a very shaky ground indeed. This is an issue that should be dealt with.
I also believe that allowing this fear to dictate our decisions only means that it will come back to haunt us later on, again and again. We've moved to an era of nuclear blackmail by rogue states, with Russia as one such state. The question is how long do we allow this to last?
I'm not saying that these issues are not difficult. They are -- they are _fatal_ issues, for the entire World. And I completely realize that even talking about these may appear irresponsible. There's nothing casual about them.
But even still: Ukraine is experiencing mass destruction daily. Western fears are, so far, mainly academic, and Putin is relying on those fears. What's happening Ukraine is real, and taking place right now.
There are really very few ways out of the situation. European security has been shaken by a regime which wages a war of aggression, seeks to rebuild its lost empire, and uses hunger and nuclear weapons to blackmail the World.
By now, most European states have accepted that a deal with such a regime is unthinkable. But we live in a peculiar limbo -- we have not yet really accepted what should be done next.
In the long run, you can't commit yourself to other people's wars without actually shouldering the burden yourself. Americans discovered this in 1941, and that was a rude awakening.
We're barely even thinking about supplying the victim of aggression effectively. We're shunning the possibility that we might have to make any final sacrifices ourselves. But eventually, we may be faced with exactly that.
We're prolonging the hostilities in the hope of avoiding them. We could act decisively to end them -- at a great risk, but the refusal to take this risk out of fear may mean a recognition of a much worse international order.
And, again: these are not easy things to say. But these are the issues people should be thinking about.
And just to clarify: in this thread, I'm talking of the Western intervention taking place _within_ Ukraine, to restore Ukrainian territories. _Not_ against recognized Russian national territory. But given that the Kremlin considers Crimea as such, for them, there's no difference.

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Jussi Jalonen

Jussi Jalonen Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @jojalonen

Jun 25
Iltalehti soitti torstaina kaipaillen kommenttia presidentin "velkapuheisiin". En ollut lukenut lehtiä, en tiennyt mitä presidentti oli haastellut, ja olin lähdössä evakkoon, joten jätin väliin.

Juttuun päätyivät vanhat twiittini. Sanon nyt pari sanaa.
iltalehti.fi/politiikka/a/9…
Talouspolitiikka, saati sitten rahapolitiikka, eivät kuulu presidentille, mutta ex-valtiovarainministerinä hän totta kai lausuu niistä asioita mielellään. Lausahdus "ei se taloustiede muuttunutkaan, eikä velka ollutkaan vaaratonta" herättää silti kysymyksen, mitä hän tarkoittaa?
Mistä velanotosta ylipäätään on kyse? Antti Rinteen hallitus otti velkaa 250 miljoonaa euroa enemmän kuin Sipilän hallitus. Otaksun, että tämä lisäys vuoden 2020 budjettikehykseen ei taida olla se, mikä meidät syöksee perikatoon.
Read 14 tweets
Jun 24
On Juhannus ja nimipäiväni, joten koen juuri nyt aiheelliseksi tehdä raamatullisen ketjun etunimestäni, koska minut on tosiaan suoranaisesti nimetty Johannes Kastajan mukaan. Tästäpä lähtee siis!
Ensin oma nimihistoriani: isäukkoni toinen etunimi oli Johannes, ja äitini ehdotti minulle kolmantena lapsena tätä toista etunimeä, siis lyhentämättömänä. Isäni totesi tähän omaan henkevään tyyliinsä "Saatana tässä perheessä tarvita kun yks profeetta ja se oon mää".
Sain nimen diminutiivina, mutta profeetta Johannes Kastajalta se siis peräisin on. Kasteen suoritti Nokian kirkkoherra Matti Majamaa. Tätä nykyä olen huutavan ääni Twitterissä.

Mutta mitä Raamatun Johannekset kertovat meille miehisyydestä?
Read 17 tweets
Jun 12
"Washington Postin" mukaan venäläinen tykistö ampuu päivittäin Donbassissa viisikymmentätuhatta kranaattia ukrainalaisten asemiin. Ukrainalaiset pystyvät ampumaan keskimäärin viisituhatta.

Aika moni on jo sanonut, että tilanne on vakava, ja taidanpa nyt sanoa pari sanaa minäkin.
Otetaan nyt historiallisia vertailuja. Helmikuussa 1940 neuvostotykistö ampui Summassa keskimäärin seitsemänkymmentätuhatta kranaattia päivittäin suomalaisten asemiin. Sen nyt varmaan muistaa jokainen, miten tämä mittelö lopulta päättyi. Rintama murtui ja lähtö tuli.
Koreassa syksyn 1952 asemasotavaiheessa amerikkalainen tykistö ampui lokakuussa 80 000 kranaattia joka päivä 105- ja 155-millisillä haupitseilla.

Huhtikuussa '53 kommunistit vastasivat tuleen, ja päivittäinen kulutus ylitti ensimmäisen maailmansodan. Kuten nytkin Donbassissa.
Read 20 tweets
May 16
Let's do this in English for a change, regarding this recent hassle caused by Mr. Erdoğan and the Finnish NATO membership. I'll state here my opinion of the matter as a private citizen.
Within two days, the government-backed Turkish media has evidently been publishing more false information about Finland than their Russian counterparts. This, it seems, is one way to welcome a potential candidate to the Atlantic Alliance.
Individual Turkish public commentators and academics have accused Finland of implementing arms embargo during the so-called "Operation Olive Branch" -- the Afrin offensive of 2018, against Kurdish people's protection units. Erdoğan has demanded that the embargo should be revoked.
Read 16 tweets
May 6
Viime aikoina täällä eliitin sosiaalisessa mediassa on kaipailtu keskustelua siitä, miksei Suomi hakenut NATO-jäsenyyttä jo 1990-luvulla. HS Visio toivoi peräti "historia- ja kontekstikeskustelua".

No, jospa tutkijana yrittäisi. Aluksi haluan vangita huomionne lehtileikkeellä.
Lehtileike ei itse asiassa liity aiheeseen kuin välillisesti, koska kukapa Boris Jeltsinin uhoamisesta olisi noina aikoina piitannut. Palailen kyllä vielä siihen, miten siinä meni oma aikansa, että NATO alkoi hyväksyä uusia jäsenmaita. Mutta aloitetaanpa suomalaisista asenteista.
Ensinnäkin: muistelkaapa tuokio 1990-luvun kansalaiskeskustelua ja politiikkaa. Siinä meni jokunen tovi, että kansalaistemme enemmistö lämpeni edes EY/EU-jäsenyydelle. Kansalaiskeskustelu oli monin tavoin aivan yhtä laadukasta kuin nytkin.
Read 40 tweets
Apr 4
En ole Unkarin politiikan asiantuntija, mutta tunnen Puolan kuviot, ja Varsovan ja Budapestin erityissuhde on viime aikoina kärsinyt ja pahasti. Tuli mieleen, että voisi kai lausahtaa pari asiaa tästä aiheesta nyt kun Unkarin vaalituloksesta jutellaan.
En muista, onko suomalaisessa mediassa mainittu Orbánin toistaiseksi räikeintä lausuntoa, minkä hän antoi heti sodan ensi päivänä, hallinnon oman KESMA-säätiön julkaisemassa Mandiner-lehdessä. Orbán totesi ykskantaan, että Venäjän hyökkäys oli Puolan idänpolitiikan provosoima.
Varsovassa reaktio Unkarin pääministerin haastatteluun oli sodan ja pakolaisvyöryn oloissa raivonsekainen. "Rzeczpospolita"-sanomalehti kuvaili sitä suoraan "puukoniskuksi selkään".

rp.pl/opinie-polityc…
Read 15 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Don't want to be a Premium member but still want to support us?

Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Or Donate anonymously using crypto!

Ethereum

0xfe58350B80634f60Fa6Dc149a72b4DFbc17D341E copy

Bitcoin

3ATGMxNzCUFzxpMCHL5sWSt4DVtS8UqXpi copy

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us on Twitter!

:(