Thread by @MarkHertling

It is 11 July, the 138th day of Russia's illegal war in Ukraine.

My last 🧵on the war was 20 June (below), written when it appeared to me the tide was beginning to shift. Today it's time for an update, with some additional predictions for the next few weeks. 1/18

https://twitter.com/MarkHertling/status/1539043835719962628

As always, I'll provide two caveats:
-this assessment is based on open-source intel, some friends in the theater of war, experiences as a commander in combat & an understanding of the RU and UA way of war.
-I'll use other's maps & reporting in this assessment. 2/

There's also less "kinetic" activity on the battle lines in the last week...

RU claims:
-They're in their latest "operational pause" (by my count, this is their 4th).
-They're "consolidating" in newly "secured" territory (use of "s due to those claims being questionable). 3/

Also last week, Ukraine:
-is increasingly effective w/ newly acquired HIMARs
-have seen success in regaining territory (Snake Isl, resistance in Kherson & Zaporizhzhya Oblasts)
-have defended against RU small-scale attacks in Kharkiv/Donbas

Big picture from @TheStudyofWar 4/

What's significant is while both sides are certainly fatigued, RU personnel & equipment losses are staggering.

While it's hard to tell true losses, no matter the figures one believes - & they very from UKR MOD to independent analysts - it is difficult to comprehend losses! 5/

UKR reports 37,000 RU dead; 1000+ tanks, 4000 AFV, 1000+ artillery pieces, hundreds of aircraft (planes and helos) destroyed & 2500 ballistic missiles expended in 4 months. That's upper end.

@pavel_luzin paints a more conservative picture: ridl.io/one-way-ticket/ 6/

In 138 days - less than 5 months - saw major shifts in RU strategic & operational objectives & RU has gained little ground.

“The RU invasion of UKR has caused hard & brutal fighting...UKR is making RU pay for every foot of territory they are taking.”
defense.gov/News/News-Stor… 7/

While they've been engaged in very tough fights in Donbas, indications are the UA has maneuvered brilliantly...employing an active defense, moving out from RU arty barrages, not allowing themselves to be surrounded, trading space for time & always finding defendable ground. 8/

That, combined with RU not properly regenerating attrited forces into capable fighting units and their seeming inability to C2 and executing effective combined arms maneuver with tanks, infantry, arty and engineers has added to UA success.

But there's more...9/

The introduction of US HIMARS, NATO MLRS, & western technologically advanced arty (w/ better intel & Q36/Q37 radars) allows UA to identify, target, strike, disrupt the RU artillery supply chain.

See this by @IAPonomarenko kyivindependent.com/national/1234 10/

So, what may happen next?

Great armies & great generals win by adapting to changing conditions on the battlefield.

General Zaluzhnyi is a great general.

He knows there are 3 main fronts.

UA is actively defending in the N & E and has active resistance in the south.

11/

Russia, according to @defence_centre has the following "stance:"

In Kharkiv Oblast: 29 BTGs, estimated 22-29,000 troops

In Donbas: 44 BTGs, 25-40,000 trps

In Zaporizhzhya: 22 BTGs,15-20,000 trps

In Kherson:13 BTG, 8-11,000 trps

These are my ESTIMATES, may be wrong...12/

Yesterday, Defense Minister Reznikov & President Zelenskyy stated it was time for a renewed fight "in the south" to ensure future economic stability.

Cities in Zaporizhzhya, Kherson, Mykolayivsk'a and Odes'ka Oblasts are critical to UKR economy.
thetimes.co.uk/article/ukrain… 13/

Additionally, UKR received increasing partner support.

The G7 and NATO conferences in Germany & Madrid were critical, but little notice was paid to the Lugano Conference (Switzerland) on 4-5 July.

The effort was on restoring UKR post-war, with several countries signing up. 14/

The following countries committed to specific restoration in these areas:
Ireland-Rivne Region
Germany-Chernihiv
Canada-Sumy
USA & Turkey-Kharkiv
Czech R, Finland-Luhansk
Belgium-Mykolaiv
Swe & NE-Kherson
Switz-Odesa
Norway-Kirovohrad
Austria–Zaporizhzhia
Poland- Donetsk 15/

With all this, as a operational commander I would assess:

RU:
-Supplies negatively affected by UA strikes
-Little success in offensive ops
-Low morale of forces, decreasing manpower & equipment quality
-Increasing effects of economic sanctions
-Decreasing alliances 16/

UK:
-Increasing western arms & ammunition, increasingly able to counter RU artillery/maneuver
-UA forces fatigued, but morale remains high w/ability for further mobilization
-Potential for reinforcing resistance success on the 2d front in south
-Continued allied support 17/

Key to UKR success:
-Hold in E & N, increase resistance in S
-Continue attrition of RU logistics & forces, protection of same in UA
-Continue materiel & psychological support from allies
-Steady/increase sanctions on RU; no relief on Putin
-Regain exports/economy control 18/18